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Daily Report
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FBIS-EEU-96-122 *24 June 1996*

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EU: EU Document on Former Yugoslavia Adopted

LD2206150296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1405 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, June 22 (TANJUG)—The European Union (E.U.) gives full support to the strengthening of the peace process and holding of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina on Sept. 14, said a declaration on former Yugoslavia which was adopted by E.U. heads of state or government on Saturday.

Backing the conclusions of the ministerial conference held in Florence recently on the holding of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Council of Europe asks all sides to secure the necessary conditions for the holding of elections.

The council gives freedom of movement and access to public media, including independent tv stations, as some of these conditions which should guarantee that elections will be free and correct.

The Council of Europe said (Bosnian Serb Republic) Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzic should leave the political stage and pointed out that the Dayton Accords ruled out the possibility of persons indicted for war crimes taking part in the elections.

The declaration asks all sides to cooperate with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, underscoring that the Council of Europe joins the international community in urging strict control in this area.

The European leaders welcomed the signing of the agreement on subregional arms control in Florence on June 14 and called on all sides which signed that agreement to take the necessary steps to facilitate the signing of an agreement on regional arms control.

The declaration underscores that the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina presents a key element for reconciliation and normal life in Bosnia-Herzegovina and sets out that none of the sides would be discriminated against if they fully respected the articles of the Dayton peace accords.

EU: Polish Prime Minister Speaks to Journalists on EU Summit

LD2206192896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said in Florence that Poland wanted to join the EU, but it wanted to do it in a wise fashion. The prime minister delivered a speech at the EU summit there. Government leaders of the 12 countries that are seeking EU membership are taking part in the summit. [passage omitted]

At a meeting with journalists, Cimoszewicz said firmly that Poland's will to join the Union was not weakening. However, the date for full membership—any other formula is out of the question—is a matter of secondary importance. It is more important to do it in a wise manner.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] If all of a sudden a miracle happened and we were offered membership in the Union next year, it might turn out that we would not be prepared for it with regard to institutions, the legal system, and our economy. Both sides must be very well prepared to avoid undesirable negative effects.

I myself think it is more important to conduct the negotiations in a very wise way and to protect effectively the interests of our country, rather than bring membership forward by a few months. If we are not prepared well for the negotiations and if we make mistakes, we will suffer the effects of them for many years. [end recording]

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"The 45-day long election campaign and the election day of May 26 went on regularly and without incidents until 1800 pm [1600 GMT] time when the Socialist Party [PS] secretary general, former interior minister of the communist regime, ordered all members of election commission to withdraw from the polling stations and said: 'We are at a deep loss.'"

Despite the call of the left wing opposition for a boycott of elections, the electorate turn out reached 89 per cent. More that two-thirds of the electoral commissions stood at their posts and half of them belonged to the opposition. Nevertheless, not excluding the possibility of irreconcilable compromises in special constituencies, I asked the Central Electoral Commission [KQZ] to put all election documentation in disposal of everyone who had complaints.

But the parties that boycotted the elections did not address any complaint or request to the Central Electoral Commission since May 27 until now. They have decided to completely boycott not only the elections but also institutions of the rule of law in general.

The KQZ during verification of election documentation, on the basis of over 100 complaints from electoral subjects, identified serious irregularities in one constituency and not quite confirmed irregularities in another, therefore it decided an immediate annulment of elections in those two constituencies. In order to create space for the opposition, I asked the KQZ to apply the principle "in dubio pro reo" during examination of the complaints and requests from electoral subjects. According to this principle, the KQZ had to count as valid for the socialist candidate all the invalid ballot papers in which all the candidates were marked by lines but the line on the Socialist candidate's name changed in the slightest in form, thickness and colour as compared with the lines on other candidates.

A distinguished international expert whom the KQZ asked to assist in the handling of the election documentation declared that "according to all international standards these ballots are invalid, but you may consider valid for the sake of a political compromise."

Based on this principle, the KQZ identified 15 constituencies with irregularities for which I decreed a rerun of elections inviting the opposition to take part in them. Just like in the first and second rounds, the opposition also boycotted the rerun of polling in these constituencies.

From June 11 to 14, chiefs of missions in Tirana, the current EU chairman, Italy, and of the U.S.A., as well as representatives of some other friendly country, had intensive talks with left wing opposition representatives. These representatives said to the Albanian Government on June 15 that the two left wing parties were ready to take part in elections and declared their decision to ask the Constitutional Court to adjourn the election date in order to have ample time to make preparations and for the international monitoring of the elections.

The government assessed this request and the Democratic Party declared it would welcome a decision by the Constitutional Court to adjourn the day of elections, which would make possible the participation of the opposition in the polling. But on June 14 in the evening, quite contrary to what the Albanian Government was told by the representatives of the friendly countries, leaders of the left opposition not only declared their non participation in the elections but with their request to the Constitutional Court they had asked that Court to qualify as illegal the decision of the Central Electoral Commission for the rerun of elections in 17 constituencies and reconfirmed their approach insisting that they considered the May 26 vote illegal. On June 15 the Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the KQZ for the rerun of elections in 17 constituencies and turned down the opposition request.

I want once more to stress the stand of the Albanian Government. It made great efforts to have an electoral campaign and elections day within acceptable election standards. After the election boycott, it recognised the limited irregularities and was resolutely committed to correct them. It has not accepted and will not accept that individuals, groups or set circles in or out of Albania to use the communist boycott to pawn the Albanian democracy, to inflict the stability and sovereignty of Albania. It is open to dialogue with all the political forces. It has manifested and will always manifest this will.

The government has also appreciated the valuable assistance by friendly countries, the contribution of international institutions to Albania and the cooperation it has established with them. It denounced the incorrect stands of a group of observers in ODIHR [Office of Democratic Institution for Human Rights] mission, their double status as observers, the close and old relations of some of them with the Hoxha regime, in order to help the ODIHR institution for which it has a great respect. The government also stresses that it has nothing to do with the ideological convictions and the past of those observers, but with the fact these observers have not respected the ethic and professional rules of the institution they represent.

A proof of our open stand is the invitation of the Central Electoral Commission to Ambassador Glover, ODIHR chairwoman, to visit Tirana and the decision of the KQZ

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to consider to remarks and to realise some of the ODIHR recommendations through which, we are convinced and resolute the electoral process will improve.

The situation in Albania is calm. Albanians have not and do not back at all the policy of total boycotting the red front did to the electoral process and the total Stalinist nihilism of institutions and government. Another challenge to this policy was their participation at 70 per cent in June 16 elections.

At the end Berisha said "I want to assure you as the chairman of the OSCE rotating presidency and representative of a friendly country that Albania, being a sovereign and independent country, will not accept anyone whoever he may be that directly or indirectly make use of the boycotting policy and total nihilism of the former communist leaders to realise his aims or atavist interests towards Albania or Albanians."

Cotti on his part expressed his estimate on Albania's achievements during the past four years of democracy and the level of cooperation between Switzerland and Albania. He appreciated the invitation of the Central Electoral Commission to Ambassador Glover and said he considered very important the dialogue among the political parties in Albania.

Albania: PD Leader on European Parliament Resolution

AU2206144496 Tirana ATA in English 1710 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 21 (ATA)—The Democratic Party leader Tritan Shehu today told the daily ALBANIA that "Two resolutions, one of the left and the other of the right wing, were presented to the European Parliament."

This followed the adoption of a resolution on the elections in Albania by the European Parliament.

"The resolution of the left wing group was aggressive and criticized severely the process of elections in Albania and in one way or another it asked for new elections in Albania."

"While the right wing resolution of Christian Democratic parties and democratic parties of Major, Kohl, Chirac, Mock, Aznar, and many others expressed their support for the democratic developments in Albania. It also considered the elections results as fair and asked for a dialogue among political forces in the present stage of political developments in Albania.

"So we have to do," Shehu said, "with a normal and fair resolution which responds to the Albanian reality."

Yesterday's meeting was attended by 175 of 624 members of the European Parliament who approved the left wing resolution by a majority of votes.

"We should not forget that the European Parliament is dominated by left wing forces, but with its offices it has only consulting and not decision making duties."

Every day many such resolutions are approved and they are not binding for the European Community, for EC leaders or other European countries.

"I want to say," Shehu added that "at present the Italian Government in an open debate in the parliament focused on its relations with Albania and it is not for new elections in Albania."

"Everything is going on normally despite some possible attacks. Such a great victory, the destruction of communism in Albania could not but have some transitory troubles," Shehu said.

"Italian deputies themselves have severely criticized the mass media for speculations about the elections in Albania," Shehu said.

This statement of the Italian Government is also very positive for the fact that Italy is currently holding the rotating presidency of the European Union.

"We consider seriously the observations made and always try mend our mistakes at work, Shehu stressed. We do not think that everything is perfect in Albania."

"With the help of the European Union we shall put right the weak points and the shortcomings noted. This will also be confirmed by the new government to be approved by new parliament, which will convene after a few days. This will also be proved by the democratic developments, the privatization, the market economy, the consolidation of the democratic institutions and the extension of the democratic legislation in Albania," said Shehu.

"Albania is heading to the right direction, to a right development. Now we must take over and fulfill the obligations the Albanian electorate imposed us with their vote on May 26."

Albania: Socialist Party Refuses To Recognize Parliament

AU2106202996 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 21 Jun 96 p 1

[Statement by the Socialist Party Presidium issued in Tirana on 20 June: "The Socialist Party Does Not

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Recognize an Illegitimate Parliament Based on the Theft of the People's Votes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the midst of the political chaos that has enveloped him since 26 May, the Albanian head of state has announced that the parliament will convene on 1 July. This is a fundamentalist and arbitrary act, unheard of in any country that is a member of the European democratic family. The presidential decree confirms that the Democratic Party's [PD] political staff is determined to play out to the end the scenario of police violence, which has involved the plunder of the free ballot and everything else that belongs to the sovereign people, massive manipulation before and after the elections, and political stubbornness that has relied solely on violence and the truncheons of the secret and not-so-secret police in place of dialogue with the opposition. Such behavior does not look much like democracy. The Socialist Party [PS] and the other opposition parties have publicly raised their objections at all stages of the electoral process. They made political decisions that rescued the country from an irreversible course of events. The PS understood and very properly appreciated the recommendations of the U.S. State Department and the EU for dialogue and a monitoring of the process by international organizations. Throughout this period of tension and violence, when human rights and freedoms are being most brutally endangered, an attempt is being made to establish an authoritarian regime in Albania, Albania's integration in Europe is being put in question, and the country is at risk of being swept up in political chaos and instability, the PS has continually sought to build bridges of dialogue to solve the political crisis by fully respecting the principle of free and fair elections. However, all the opportunities for dialogue offered by individual parties or groups of parties in the opposition have been cast aside by the head of state and the organizations dependent on him. With their overtly Enverist mentality, they have opposed not only the proposals of the opposition, but the recommendations and reports of international organizations who observed the elections and are watching with interest the postelectoral period. The U.S. State Department and the EU have suggested that foreign monitors should examine the irregularities, but the head of state and the Central Electoral Commission have made their own announcements and have covered up the truth. The opposition asked for the voting in the 17 constituencies to be postponed, in order to respect the law. The Constitutional Court acted on the orders of the head of state. The Council of Europe asks for dialogue among the main political forces in Albania, while the head of sate announces that parliament will convene, even though the Central Electoral Commission has still not issued its final communique, elections have still not been held in he constituencies rejected by the PS, and the results of the proportional voting are still not known. Moreover, the PS will accept no seat from the proportional lists, because it legally deregistered all its candidates on 26 May. Meanwhile, politicians and the official PD media have pounced on the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers, the International Helsinki Federation, and the Association for Democratic Culture, because the truths that they have revealed are bitter pills for the PD. Whatever meets on 1 July will not be the parliament of the Albanians. The people did not vote for it. Fraudsters voted for it in order to hoodwink Albania and the world. It was voted in by police violence and by ruffians in order to turn the state into an institution of violence and crime. It was voted in by stealers of votes, in order that they might plunder the Albanians' property. It was voted in by those who are against the law, in order to bring down the rule of law. This parliament might be anything but it will never be the parliament of democracy. The PS Presidium reemphasizes one more time that it refuses to recognize this illegitimate parliament built on violence and the manipulation and theft of the people's free votes. The real representatives of the people can receive mandates only from the people's free ballot.

Albania: Proportional Lists Complete Parliament Composition

AU2206203096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 22 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Rezear Xhaxhiu: "Proportional Representation: Godo and Melo in Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The 140 seats in the Albanian parliament have been filled. The Central Electoral Commission computers yesterday produced the additional 25 candidates who will join from the proportional lists, with 17 mandates for the Democratic Party, five for the Socialist Party, and one each for the Republican Party, the National Front, and the Human Rights Union. These are the trophies secured by the parties at the end of an electoral battle that witnessed both victors and casualties. The Democratic Alliance, the Social-Democratic Party, the Christian-Democrat Party, the Social-Democratic Union, and the Legality Movement won no prizes. Godo, Melo, and Ermenji are catapulted into parliament, but Durollari of the Legality Movement, Laco of the Social-Democratic Union, Bushati of the Christian-Democratic Party, and Kola of the Association of Former Victims of Political Persecution remain outside its doors. Thus ends the history of the formation of the new Albanian parliament, which will start the new legislative session on 1 July. The marathon toward the temple of legislation

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began at the end of April. More than 1,000 candidates from 28 political parties lined up at the great starting line to go through the campaign, the elections, the boycott, the second round, and the repeat elections. A total of 140 candidates from five political parties remained on the track to enter parliament. There are 10 Socialist deputies who will not take their seats on 1 July. The Socialist Party has held fast to its political stand of boycotting the elections and not sending its representatives to the parliament. Eight representatives of right-wing parties will sit down opposite 122 blue PD deputies. Godo of the Republicans and Melo of the Human Rights Union secured parliamentary mandates to become "generals" of parliamentary groups consisting of three deputies. "Parliament is a battlefield, and we will struggle worthily within it," Godo said a few moments after being informed of the results from the proportional lists. According to him, a Republican parliamentary group means one more form of opposition within the parliament. Melo of the Human Rights Union took the same view. He called his presence within the parliament something positive for the party he leads. It is still not known whether Ermenji or Selfo will lead the National Front duo. "The professor [Abas Ermenji] will decide himself whether he will be a deputy or not," said National Front Deputy Chairman Hysen Selfo, adding "it is up to the party leader to decide." The National Front won one seat in the first-past-the-post elections, and has still not decided on its second candidate. "The professor has not said," Selfo announced, leaving "the Ermenji riddle" still unsolved. Though pleased at having won seats, the leaders of the small parties do not conceal their reservations at the injustices they have suffered on the road to the parliament. Expressing skepticism over the Central Electoral Commission's results, Godo said he should have had more. According to him, his party took more than 6 percent of the vote. Melo expressed the same reservations. "We deserved more seats," the Human Rights Union leaders said, blaming the bitter aftertaste of 26 May. If three small Albanian political parties will sit down alongside each other in the People's Assembly, Bushati, Laco, and Durollari will strive outside parliament to regroup their forces for the next parliament. Ceka and Gjinushi, who did not gain anything from the proportional lists, will join them. Only nine days are left until 1 July, when the 140 deputies will climb the marble steps of the parliament building. The first rearrangements in the parliament building began yesterday. The 140 names have been inscribed on the monitoring screen, and entrance permits and mandates are being prepared for those who will take their seats in the chamber. The final tests of the computer and sound systems will be the finishing touches of the parliament's staff, who will greet new faces after four years of Arbnori's legislature.

Albania: Press Views Prospects for Political Compromise

AU2306141296 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 22 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: "In Search of a Political Solution—A Compromise for the Sake of the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since 26 May, the most frequent signal coming from abroad has been for the need to find a compromise among the political forces in Albania in order to return everything to its normal course and to preserve the stability of the country and perhaps the region. This may strike many people as normal, but, if one considers it a little more deeply, it is nothing of the sort. First, even if one concedes that a compromise would be fair and indeed a necessity, why do our political parties wait for it to be served up for us by others, who do not know our woes and problems better than we do ourselves? Nobody can know better than the master of the house where the roof leaks. Thus, if there is a need to insist on finding a formula for compromise, this must be a domestic initiative. Indeed, there has been no lack of such initiatives. The Republican Party [PR] was among the political forces which, as soon as the postelectoral crisis began, put on the table the idea of a compromise and a formula for a solution. Unfortunately, we still tend to think along the lines of, "That is a good idea, but I will not agree with it because it was not mine." Therefore, neither the Democratic Party [PD] nor the Socialist Party took the effort to budge from their positions or to show even minimal interest in any proposal for a compromise such as that offered by the PR. It required criticism from abroad suggesting a compromise through dialogue for this term to subsequently find a place in the parties' political vocabulary. Above all, no compromise would even have been necessary, in spite of everything that has happened since 26 May, if the law had really been held sacred, but there can be no question of this in a country that still has no constitution and in which the laws are defined according to the appetite of one side or another, and especially the desires of the political force that holds power in its hands, and often abuses it. Remembering this, even if a compromise is achieved this time, this does not mean that everything will be conclusively solved unless this particular bull is grasped by the horns. This means that any compromise must first of all be for the sake of the future. This is no doubt the wish of Europe and the United States, which do not want to have to hack through totalitarian undergrowth

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in any country. The first aim of any compromise must therefore be to find the best possible way to provide the country with an up-to-date constitution that will be a firm obstacle to any reversion to the past. Second, after this is done, a good proportion of the laws that still carry a whiff of communism and totalitarianism must be reexamined. Of course, the Electoral Law passed by the PD-ite majority in the last parliament is one of these laws, and must be replaced by one that will not penalize any of the political forces and above all will not favor the party in power. Only after these things have been done will one really be able to talk about the genuinely democratic settlement according to international standards that Europe is seeking from us, and is now making a condition for further cooperation.

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Bulgaria: Gechev Leaves for Trade Talks in Croatia

AU2406110396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0600 GMT 24 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning a Bulgarian delegation led by Rumen Gechev, deputy prime minister and minister of economic development, left for Croatia. The delegation, which is to take part in the first session of the Bulgarian-Croatian mixed commission on economic, industrial, trade, and technical cooperation, includes senior ministry officials, chiefs of associations and trade organizations, and a large group of businessmen.

At Sofia Airport, Rumen Gechev told the listeners of the Khorizont Program about his expectations:

[Begin Gechev recording] What we plan to do is sign an agreement with Croatia on mutual protection of investments, which is very important, an agreement on joint development of tourism, and an agreement on plant protection. These three intergovernmental agreements that will be signed in Croatia tomorrow or the day after will undoubtedly stimulate the development of economic relations between the two countries. Our impression is that the trade turnover is far below the possibilities of our economies—it stands at only $19 million. As a result of these additional agreements, we intend to create the necessary prerequisites for a considerable rise in trade turnover, a substantial increase in investments by Croatian business in Bulgaria, and an expansion of Bulgarian business in Croatia. These meetings, which will be at the level of the Croatian ministers of economy, tourism, and agriculture, will be working ones, and today it will become known whether meetings can be held tomorrow at the highest level in Croatia. In any event, meetings at such a high level will contribute to developing our economic contacts. The very fact that the delegation on the plane to Zagreb includes a large number of Bulgarian businessmen from private and state companies shows we will try to utilize the cooperation at the political level in the proper way to ensure good economic conditions for business. [end recording]

Bulgaria: Nuclear Fuel for Kozloduy Delivered by Air

AU2106155396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy has announced that in the period from 18 to 20 June fresh nuclear fuel was delivered to Bulgaria by air for refueling the WWER-440 reactors at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. This is the first time that nuclear fuel has been delivered to Bulgaria by this means, but the fact that the operation has been completed successfully shows that this possible method of delivery is a good one.

After checking the necessary documents and coordinating them with the competent departments, the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy issued a permit for the delivery.

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Czech Republic: Havel on NATO, Russian Elections, Parties

LD2306181896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 23 Jun 96

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Eva Hulkova at Lany presidential residence; date not given: "Conversations at Lany"—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hulkova] [Passage omitted] A certain reluctance on NATO's part and inscrutability as regards the issue of its enlargement is not very attractive. Speaking at the NATO conference in Warsaw, you asked specific questions—when, who, and how?—and described their reaction as positive. So, who is to be blamed for the fact that nothing is happening?

[Havel] Things are happening, but everything is happening rather slowly, while we need steps and decisions that are more courageous and broad-minded. This situation has many explanations. Politicians are after all restricted by numerous interests that they have to take into account, particular party and national interests, and this is why they are more reserved. On the other hand, unlike politicians, soldiers are not restricted by these things and can assess the situation from a security and strategic point of view probably better. Saying this, I would not like to imply that politicians are incapable of doing so—but they are to a certain extent restricted by various other interests and linkages.

[Hulkova] You also mentioned the Russian phenomenon. Speaking about the Commonwealth of Independent States and about its relation to NATO, you said that it was necessary not to have the borders between these two entities blurred and let the territories in question decide by themselves where they want to be. These are rather courageous words, and you should expect the Russian side to react to them as they often do after your speeches.

[Havel] I do not think so, I do not. On the contrary, I am trying to explain that Russia and the entire surrounding space gravitating toward Russia are an enormous entity, an enormous Euro-Asian power that is influential and will always be influential, and its identity should be honored and respected.

I do not like people saying that Russia should not be forced out of Europe and that it should be integrated into all Euro-Atlantic structures in order not to push it aside. [passage omitted]

This reflects that traditional European attitude of good Samaritans. This is not what the world at present is like. The world now consists of various regions that are all equal despite their different nature. [passage omitted] I think that an intelligent Russian not only understands this but is also pleased by it.

[Hulkova] Could you now briefly comment on developments in Russia, or do you want to wait until after the second round of the presidential elections? [passage omitted]

[Havel] I think that so far we can be relatively satisfied with developments in Russia. The fact that this immense empire, without much experience of democracy, held truly free elections without any incidents, the democratic elections of the head of the state is, of course, good in itself.

It seems that Russian President Boris Yeltsin has been strengthening his position. Of the existing choice of candidates, Yeltsin seems to provide the most probable guarantee of reforms and democratic developments. I see his postelection steps as clever; he got rid of some very unpopular personalities representing those forces that will perhaps tend to use force in this situation. This has created an option of cooperating with democrats such as Grigoriy Yavlinskiy.

I think that so far we can be, let us say, conditionally satisfied.

[Hulkova] How satisfied, relatively or absolutely, are you with the situation in our country?

[Havel] You might be surprised, but unlike many people I am not panicking. I do not feel the earth shaking. I do not think we have entered a stage of instability or even crisis.

It is entirely normal, given the election result in our country, that we have to go through a stage of long and uneasy talks that might in the end bring some results. I am convinced that this will be the case in our country, that these talks will bring good results, and that the coalition will in the end find a consensus, finding a way to communicate with the Social Democrats, leading to the parliament passing a vote of confidence in a new government.

I dislike the views that perhaps our constitutional system or our election system should be changed. It is absurd if somebody does not like the election result and immediately wants to change the rules. It is the same as if you are playing chess and once you are losing you say let us play draughts instead of chess.

[Hulkova] How important do you think the main issue of the last few days—that is, majority versus parity—has been?

[Havel] There are rumors that I am backing those who want strict parity. This is naturally nonsense. I do not

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know who is spreading this rumor. On this issue I am truly neutral. I restrict myself to appealing to all those involved in the talks to seek consensus. Personally, as I have already said several times, I really think that it is less important whether a given party has one minister more or less than whether the government consists of truly capable people, with their own views, who know what they want to achieve and are good in their field.

[Hulkova] Do you think our politicians share your view on this?

[Havel] No, they do not.

[Hulkova] Speaking about parity, there is the question to what extent the demands of the two smaller coalition parties are legitimate because these parties did not win too many votes in the elections. Is this a mechanical calculation, or does this reflect other aspects?

[Havel] I can understand both sides. I fully understand that the Civic Democratic Party, which has twice as many seats in the parliament than the other two parties combined, wants to have more members in the government to reflect this. I do understand this.

On the other hand, considering the coalition principle itself, I do understand the small coalition parties. A coalition is always a very rough reflection of the distribution of power and cannot copy the distribution of seats. The coalition principle is a consensus. [passage omitted] As there is a proportional election system in our country, with the assumption that we are always governed by a coalition, then a coalition has to emerge from coalition talks and in a way has to respect the will of smaller coalition partners regardless of the fact that they might only represent a few seats in parliament. Such seats are important to secure the majority needed by the government.

In other words, I do respect both views, but I repeat that I am totally neutral in this dispute and do not intervene in it. This matter is exclusively for the sides at the talks. I can only repeatedly call on them to seek consensus and a solution to move us successfully forward. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Daily on Price Yeltsin Is Paying for Reelection

AU2106145396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Lubos Palata: "Yeltsin Is Paying the Highest Price for His Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin won the first round of the presidential elections, but General Aleksandr Lebed was the factual winner. He now comes into the Kremlin at Yeltsin's invitation, which was necessitated by the situation, and assumes greater power than anyone, apart from the president himself, has had at his disposal in Russia in recent years. This is only too reminiscent of the situation after the putsch in 1991, when Gorbachev returned to his seat as the first man of the Soviet Union, but Boris Yeltsin turned out to be the real ruler.

The uncertain situation after the first round has forced the Russian president to make the biggest concessions altogether possible to Lebed. The authority that the general has assumed with his appointment as head of the Security Council and national security adviser to the president has even been reinforced by special powers. Lebed thus has all of the key ministries in Russia under his control—defense, interior, and, moreover, management of counterintelligence.

These are such decisive functions in the Kremlin that, if Lebed were to hold on to them for a longer period, he would be the real lord of Russia, and Yeltsin, despite his massive authority, would in fact be his hostage. So the price Yeltsin paid for his reelection may be virtually as great as the value of the office of president.

Lebed, on the other hand, has also taken a considerable risk. Yeltsin is definitely not the Gorbachev of 1991, although he too faces extremely fundamental problems with the continuation of his government. The Russian president, however, has one basic advantage: He can learn from Gorbachev's mistakes and, looking back on his own very tough and indiscriminate course of action, gauge Lebed's future conduct and, if the need arises, elegantly get rid of him.

Another advantage is the fact that he has something to offer the general for his loyalty. This is the prospect of the presidential seat, albeit a still distant prospect following another four years of Yeltsin's reign.

Lebed does not, however, have to hang on for so long, and it does not have to be a military coup that presents itself for the assumption of power. A far more viable and likely solution is Yeltsin's retirement on health grounds, which would be an option acceptable to both the West and Russia.

In any case, Lebed now has hold of all of the basic instruments for creating for himself the position as Yeltsin's successor, whether Boris Nikolayevich agrees with this or not.

Until then, however, he has to find sufficiently strong allies both on the Russian domestic political scene and within the Army. The initial blunder concerning the alleged military coup that the general committed at virtually the same time he took office suggests that this

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will not be completely problem-free. To be successful, either in a duel with Yeltsin or alongside him, he has to find an equally strong range of followers and offer the kind of clear and attractive prospect that Yeltsin offered the Russian citizens five years ago with his vision of independence.

Despite the fact that Yeltsin will probably win the second round, the era of his factual absolutist rule has, for the time being, come to an end. The question, which will be answered in the very near future, is whether this will be just a short break or a definitive situation that sooner or later culminates in Yeltsin's departure and Lebed's succession to the presidential throne. The chances of the two currently most powerful men in Russia are, for the very near future, virtually even.

Czech Republic: Farm Policy Seen as Block to EU Entry

96CH0098F Prague PRAGUE POST in English 1-16 Apr 96 p 11

[Article by Johann Tasker: "EU Agricultural Policy a Road Block to Czech EU Accession"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] If country folk detest one thing more than any other, it's the idea that somebody else knows what's best for the countryside. Rural life may not be the fastest in the Czech Republic, but at least the air is fresh and relatively pollution-free. As the far-off metropolis hurtles noisily toward the 21st century, life in the country does have its advantages. And the people there know it.

So when, as now in Turin, the future of Europe is debated by those who have never seen a Czech farm, it rankles. On the long and winding road of Czech accession to the EU, agricultural policy is not so much a chicane as a French tractor blockade strewn defiantly across the highway. And many Euro-politicians would rather take a detour.

Since the first wave of state farms went on sale in the early 1990s, Czech farmers have been more successful than their EU counterparts. They have coped with far fewer subsidies, attracted large-scale overseas investment and turned a previous command economy into a low-cost agricultural production line of vast potential—all without the agricultural policy that currently costs the EU around $46 billion every year.

Central European agriculture has been so successful that the Visegrad Group — the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia — will be net exporters of grain by the year 2000. The Czech Republic is already attempting to export surpluses to the EU. But that, as Czech Agriculture Minister Josef Lux acknowledges, is only where the problem begins.

Accords reached at the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) restrict the quantity of subsidized grain that the EU can sell on the world market. Allowing cheaper imports into the EU from Central Europe would create an even larger grain surplus and is a concession that Brussels in unwilling to make, even to EU applicants.

The Czech Republic will only gain full access to the European market when accession to the EU is complete. But somebody is going to have to pick up the tab. Think of a number between 6 and 40, multiply it by one billion and, depending on who you believe, you have the approximate cost in U.S. dollars of integrating Central Europe into the EU's complicated Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Current CAP subsidies are so high that, if extended to Central Europe, they would increase financial returns from Czech grain production by more than 60 percent, according to a recent internal European Commission report. The experts agree on nothing if not the unaffordable expense of accession.

Though German, French and British farmers have all done well under present CAP rules, the EU is unable to extend present subsidy levels to Central European countries. There will be no "golden hello" for farmers in the Czech Republic. And paying large subsidies to already-rich Western European farmers but not to their poorer European cousins is an argument that the EU agriculture commissioner, Frans Fischler, has been unwilling to sustain—which means the CAP must change before Central European accession is possible.

An old joke echoing along the corridors of power in Brussels suggests only six people fully understand the CAP in the whole of the European Union. Now that is changing. Even stringent supporters of the most protective agricultural policy in the world are slowly realizing that while all good things might now have to come to an end, they must at least move with the times. The bureaucrats in Brussels are slowly being forced into action.

Czech agriculture would benefit from a totally free market throughout the whole of Europe. Czech food products priced lower than those of the competition would guarantee sales, at least in the short term. But the EU persists in its refusal to stop subsidizing farmers in existing member states.

Current EU subsidies are linked to production. The more food farmers produce, the more subsidies they can claim, so it is in their interest to produce as much food as

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possible. When the CAP was first conceived following World War II, similar subsidies guaranteed a food supply to a whole region fresh from the battlefields of Europe. Now such thinking is outdated; were the present system to be adopted in Central Europe, it would be prohibitively expensive. The only effective alternative is to decouple financial support from production levels.

While decoupling would be an unpopular move with the farming community, such a move would have untold benefits for the whole of Europe. CAP reform would pave the way for the rapid accession of Central Europe, vital if EU Single Market law is to remain consistent. Capital released could then be redirected to those farms in real need of financial assistance, rather than being distributed across the board regardless of want.

There is great pressure for reform of an agricultural policy that currently costs each EU citizen more than $100 every year. While the Intergovernmental Conference is expected to last for up to 18 months, it is unfortunate that it will take much longer for politicians to agree on reform of the CAP. It is unfortunate too that, until reform is forthcoming, the Czech Republic will not become a full member of the European Union.

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The writer, a freelance journalist living in Prague, has contributed to various government-commissioned agricultural studies in the United Kingdom.

Czech Republic: Klaus's Early Views on Change Revealed

96CH0098B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 10-16 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ross Larsen; translation and assistance by Ulli Stadler: "Economist Warned of Revolution's Dangers"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Just five days before student demonstrations precipitated the collapse of Czechoslovak communism, economist Vaclav Klaus appeared on Austrian television opposing the revolutions that were then sweeping the East bloc and warning against the dangers of rapid free-market changes.

"I think that the restructuring in Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union brings with it more difficulties and problems than solutions," he told the panel of Central European experts on the program East Studio Nov. 12, 1989.

Klaus was introduced by the show's host, author and commentator Paul Lendvai, as the head of the Macroeconomics department of Prague's Prognostic Institute. The other guests were Yugoslav human rights activist Katja Boh, international politics professor Hans Peter Neuhold, Peter Bender, who published several books on the East bloc and Hungarian Free Democrats' spokesman Ferenc Koszeg.

In this setting, Klaus steered a careful line: acknowledging as an economist that evolutionary changes must take place in the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republic, but at the same time frowning on the chaos of revolution. He refused to predict whether Czechoslovakia would experience a revolution, but he conceded that the advocates of slow reforms had "lost their arguments."

"In my opinion, the whole of perestroika (restructuring) in Czechoslovakia is much more complicated than the naive reforms in the Eastern bloc.

"We have reforms from the bottom up and evolution," he said, rejecting the charge that Czechoslovakia was clinging to the old communist ways. "We don't live in a textbook of planned economy."

Sharply dressed and speaking confidently in fluent Germany, Klaus conceded that the current system had to change, but he insisted that the change must happen from the bottom up, perhaps by the year 2000.

"The crippled and invisible hand of the market can bring great problems," today's free-market champion said.

"The idea of decentralization is not a solution, it cannot improve the efficiency of the economy."

When he was asked what the alternatives were to completely changing the old system he said. "There is no alternative, but you cannot do it overnight. We have to create a real market economy, but we cannot do it over night."

Lendvai asked him whether economic change could happen without political change. Klaus said it could not, but he added that political plurality was already developing in Czechoslovakia. As an example, he said that the commentaries in newspapers of various political parties were different from each other.

Klaus also took the opportunity to criticize the policies set in motion by then-Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, whose reforms precipitated the collapse of the East Bloc.

"We are certainly not as enchanted with him as others," he said. "I don't mean politicians. I mean normal Czechs."

Fourteen days after the program, Vaclav Havel introduced Klaus (incorrectly as Mr. Volf) to Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec at the beginning of negotiations that

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would eventually topple the communist monopoly on power.

Czech Republic: Some Progress in Czech-German Negotiations

96CH0098C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 10-16 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Siegfried Mortkowitz: "Progress, but No Breakthrough in Czech-German Negotiations"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Reports claiming that there has been a major breakthrough on a joint Czech-German declaration are exaggerated, according to Czech government sources.

However, the sources did confirm that both sides have agreed that the document is to contain a Czech apology relating to the expulsion of 2.5 million ethnic Germans from Czech territory.

The declaration is meant to resolve bilateral problems resulting from the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia during World War II and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and expropriation of their property after the war.

Czech Ambassador to Germany Jiri Grusa said on German radio that he was more optimistic about the negotiations than ever before, the Guido Westerwelle, chairman of Germany's Free Democratic Party, told the Czech daily *Pravo* that a breakthrough was imminent. But Rudolf Jindrak, director of the Czech Foreign Ministry's department responsible for German affairs, said that no final statement had yet been drafted. "Some progress has been made," Jindrak said, "but no political decisions have yet been reached on either side."

According to Jindrak, the present draft of the declaration contains a Czech apology for the excesses committed during the "wild" expulsions of Sudeten Germans that took place from May to August 1945, before the legal "transfers" that were carried out with the approval of the 1945 Potsdam Conference.

The German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported earlier that the German government will officially continue to support Sudeten claims for confiscated property, but the text of the Czech-German declaration will be formulated to protect Bonn from having to pursue or cover Sudeten claims. According to Jindrak, it will affirm past judgments of the German Constitutional Court that have declared that the German government is not liable for Sudeten legal claims.

According to another Foreign Ministry source, the Germans apparently have dropped demands that the Czechs condemn or abolish the Benes decrees that legalized the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the confiscation of their property, a significant concession from Bonn.

Despite compromises on both sides, however, Jindrak said, "I cannot imagine that we will have a signed declaration before the (May-June) Czech elections," he said.

Czech Republic: Cabinet Rejects Another Report From Holan

AU2106165296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "(nak, gag,)": "The Cabinet Has Returned a Third Document on the Country's Defense to Holan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Defense Minister Vilem Holan failed in the government yesterday with a report on the activity of military intelligence last year. His cabinet colleagues returned it to him for finalization because, in their opinion, it does not provide enough information. This is the third time that Holan has taken away rejected material; the Cabinet twice previously returned his concept for the Army's transformation.

"We discussed the report, but we decided to continue the discussion next time because the Defense Ministry's views, which generally concern the state's defense capability, are of interest to us," said Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda. Therefore, according to him, the Cabinet set Minister Holan the task of dividing the report into two parts. "The findings of the defense department on the state's defense capability engrossed the government so much that it is asking for this chapter to be drafted separately and submitted to it as an independent document," said Kalvoda.

The ministers were not completely satisfied even with the second part of Holan's report, which contains a summary of the activity of military intelligence. "It is, in essence, an enumeration of activities, orientation, and quantification. The government, however, wants to know not only the summary, but also the results," added Kalvoda.

Kalvoda refused to give more detailed information because this is a classified document.

The Cabinet returned the concept for the Army's transformation to Holan earlier and advised him that, instead of the expected analysis of the situation in the Army, he should just outline its current problems.

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Czech Republic: Fund To Help 'Persecuted' Slovak Citizens

AU2406111196 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 Jun 96 p 2

[CTK report: "A Slovak Fund"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The charitable fund "Alone" [A sam] has been registered at the District Office in Prague 1 to support Slovak citizens persecuted for their political stances and views. Fedor Gal, Daniel Kroupa, deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the director, Vlastimil Venclik, have accepted membership in the fund's board. According to Gal, it is necessary to help the several thousand ordinary citizens who are persecuted by means of the criminal, civil, and labor laws for promoting human and civil rights and for criticizing the Slovak political situation.

Czech Republic: Coalition Agrees on 3 New Cabinet Members

AU2106165596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Jiri Kubik and Sabina Slonkova: "There Will Be Only Three New Ministers in the Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—There will be only three new faces—former Deputy Culture Minister Michal Prokop (Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]), current Deputy Justice Minister Cyril Svoboda, and Deputy Miloslav Vyborny (both Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party)—in the next cabinet, whose composition was discussed by the coalition troika yesterday. Prokop will assume the post of culture minister, Svoboda will be in charge of the Army, and Vyborny will be social affairs minister.

People's Party Chairman Josef Lux and ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda arrived with these names at the sixth round of talks on the government and its program. "All three are acceptable to the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]," declared a senior representative of the strongest party.

Even though Klaus, Lux, and Kalvoda also agreed at yesterday's meeting on the old-new names of the ministers who will be in the next government, it is still not clear if there will be 16 or 17 seats in the Cabinet. That is, the coalition troika was again unable to resolve the prolonged dispute over whether the ODS will have a majority in this cabinet. If Klaus were to secure a majority in defiance of his smaller coalition partners, the ODS would have nine ministers, and the People's Party and the Alliance would have four each.

Klaus, Lux, and Kalvoda began the coalition talks with a friendly debate on the progress of our soccer team in the European championships; despite this, they could not relax because of the majority issue.

"The situation in the discussions on a majority is still the same. Klaus again demanded a governing majority; we again refused to back down. The atmosphere of the entire five-hour meeting corresponded to this. This time, Klaus did not propose the right of veto but attempted to appease us by saying that he, as prime minister, should not have the right to vote in the Cabinet. Admittedly, we would not have to worry that the ODS could outvote us, but this method is senseless. The prime minister must be able to make his view clear," declared one of the participants in the meeting. After the meeting, the representatives of Klaus's party repeated their point of view that they insist on a majority. On the other hand, following the recent meetings of the coalition troika, the People's Party and ODA think that Klaus will back down in the end. "He is going to Florence on the weekend for the meeting of European Union officials, and he would be in a very poor position if we were not to reach an agreement before then," thinks another of the governing politicians.

Klaus also made it clear yesterday that the coalition agreement will be concluded definitively before the first session of the new parliament—that is, before Tuesday [25 June].

The leaders of the coalition parties will discuss the majority issue again today. "We are creeping forward bit by bit," said Klaus in commenting on the talks.

Because Klaus, Lux, and Kalvoda, even in their sixth round of talks, did not come to an agreement on the ratio of forces in the government, President Vaclav Havel canceled yesterday's scheduled meeting with the ODS leader. Klaus, as opposed to Lux and Kalvoda, has not yet had a meeting with the president this week.

The chairmen of the coalition parties yesterday kept the details of the talks on a majority to themselves. They only announced publicly that they had not reached an agreement.

On the other hand, the coalition troika approved, without fundamental changes, the policy part of the coalition agreement that had been drafted on Tuesday [18 June] by the ODS from the results of the previous two rounds of talks. "We agreed absolutely on the whole text," said Kalvoda.

People's Party Chairman Josef Lux confirmed that the five-page document that MLADA FRONTA DNES published on Thursday corresponds to the one on which they agreed.

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Klaus added that they had merely discussed words. "Our debate was about words, whether the 'amalgamation of sickness benefit and health insurance' should be written in the coalition agreement or whether the 'preparation for the amalgamation' should be there. This is one of dozens of cases," said Klaus.

The politicians also dealt with the final contentious issue—taxes. They agreed that the program will not say by how much taxes will be lowered but will merely contain the statement that taxes will continue to be lowered. ODA had demanded a far more dynamic reduction of taxes than its coalition partners.

Czech Republic: Economic-Crime Police Reorganized

96CH0101B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 17-23 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "Graft in Fraud Squad Leads to Demotions"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Interior Ministry is moving to reorganize Prague's economic-crimes police in response to two recent corruption cases within its ranks.

Jan Subert, spokesman for the Interior Ministry, said the changes will involve transferring 30 of the department's 93 members to lower jobs in Prague's districts, overhauling the current leadership and setting up an independent supervisory commission with access to all case files.

Subert added that the ministry will also expand the responsibility of the new leadership to include ensuring smooth operation of the entire unit.

"It's quite a serious problem. We found out that the people weren't sufficiently controlled and that a lot of case files were in a mess," Subert said. "At the same time, I can't say chaos reigned in the department. It's just that we need to tighten the control mechanisms."

Subert said April 11 that changes will start taking place immediately.

The first corruption case involved two detectives accused of seeking bribes in return for their investigative "efforts."

Ivar Fiser, a former head of the defunct Ceska banka, who implicated the two men in late January, alleged he had paid them 350,000 Kc ($12,960) in 1994 after they threatened to drop a case against one of the bank's worst debtors.

Subert said the two detectives' work was symptomatic of their department, with low efficiency and "little effort to gather evidence."

"For example, one case involving 13 separate offenses was filed as 13 individual cases," he said.

Police arrested two other detectives in the same department March 27 on racketeering charges. Interior Inspection bureau officials declined to specify the amount of money they had sought, except to say that it was substantial.

Czech Republic: Conference on Business, Social Awareness

96CH0101H Prague PRAGUE POST in English 17-23 Apr 96 p 7

[Article by Kit Kimberly: "Views Differ on Whether Free Trade and the EU Can Promote Social Awareness"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will never be allowed into the European Union, says Colin Hines, a participant in the Social Venture Network Europe (SVNE) conference on socially responsible business.

Hines, who is the former coordinator of Greenpeace International's economic unit and author of *The New Protectionism: Protecting Our Future Against Free Trade*, even questions whether the countries of Central Europe would want to be part of the EU.

"Forward-thinking people in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have to begin to see trade among themselves as their future, and not expect trade with Western Europe to be the inevitable way forward," Hines said in an interview at the conference.

"Imagining that the doors to the EU will open to countries that will cost the EU staggering amounts of money—well, it's just not going to happen."

The SVNE conference, entitled "Integrating Corporate Responsibility and Successful Business for a Humane and Sustainable Society," brought together socially and environmentally concerned business leaders from all over the world to discuss ethical business practices and business possibilities in Central Europe. Economic protectionism, said Hines, is essential to creating a climate where socially responsible business can thrive.

Hines defended his Euro-skepticism and self-admittedly "heretical statements" by describing three trends: increased automation, free movement of capital, and job insecurity in Western Europe. All of these trends, promoted in the name of free trade and international competition, are damaging, rather than beneficial, to individual countries' infrastructures, he said.

The movement toward increased automation—not only in industry, but in the service sector as well—and

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relocation of industry to Asia and now Central and Eastern Europe, where labor and materials are cheaper than in the West, contribute to the increased levels of unemployment that some Western countries now face. This job insecurity, in turn, will lead to lower consumer demand, lower production and an eventual recognition of the need for protectionism rather than free trade.

"The depth of the economic problems within the European Union does not seem to be grasped (here) at all," Hines said. "So to imagine that countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary could be absorbed into Europe during a time of economic stress is beyond belief."

Marcello Palazzi, a co-founder of SVNE and a participant in the conference, disagrees:

"Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland are not big economies by the standards of Western Europe, so I don't think this is a realistic argument. The (former) Soviet Union is very different: It has a big economy, and that could create a great imbalance in the economic position of Western Europe.".

Hines cited the prohibitive cost to the current EU member states of absorbing the Central European agricultural sector via a common agriculture policy. But much more fundamental, he said, is the growing Western European desire to protect jobs.

"The idea that countries with wage levels of about one-tenth that of some of the Western European countries will be allowed in is pushing the charitable largesse of Western European workers," he said.

"You go to (corporate) shareholders who might be doing OK with their pension schemes, but they find their children are being put out of work by the very process that, in theory, is better for business."

Free-trade agreements have not helped unemployment, because they enable capital to move to where the cheaper labor is.

"Being internationally competitive is bad," said Hines. "Economists say: 'Reducing barriers to trade is good. Countries should do what they do best, and then prices will be lower.' But every country in the world is reducing its social infrastructure in order to compete with every other country in the world. It's a no-win situation, a race to the bottom."

At the SVNE conference, Hines participated in the session on "social and environmental effects of globalization" on April 13. The new protectionism Hines promotes is not a result of socially responsible business practices, but rather an element necessary for those practices to develop.

"Now there is enormous potential for businesses to act ethically, but if they're in competition with other businesses that don't act ethically, chances are they'll lose their business," Hines said.

The new protectionism is necessary, he said, to have a future that protects the environment and helps communities. He urges the Czech Republic and other Central European countries to reject the move toward free trade and international competition and to concentrate on their own national and regional markets.

Palazzi, however, pointed out that while focusing on the local economy is important, it must be balanced with an eye to the world.

"We must be much more concerned with the local dimension of business and with the local community, but we are living in an international world," Palazzi said. "There's nothing we can do about stopping global competition, and we must be playing in the global competition, too. There are far too many countries out there that want to develop their economies internationally, and they're going to develop the markets, and we're going to lose out."

Hines argument fails, said Palazzi, because he doesn't take the needs of other nations into account. Unemployment problems and movement of capital are "not going to be successfully resolved by companies acting only locally. Economically speaking, it would be much better for the countries in Europe to focus on higher technology and to subcontract manual work to other countries that also need the revenue from manual labor.

"It is good if other nations get these jobs—why not? They need jobs too. This kind of protectionism is going to reduce the benefits that we give to the rest of the world."

Czech Republic: Uranium Smuggling Incident Detailed

96CH0098E Prague PRAGUE POST in English 10-16 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Maggie Ledford and Jan Stojaspal: "Bribes, Threats 'Tested' Nuclear Theft Detectives"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Not long after he started his probe, an investigator in a Prague Uranium-smuggling case received a letter offering him enough U.S. dollars to set him up for life. All he had to do was release the Russian being held in the case.

The anonymous writer went on to say the investigator and his family would be killed if he didn't comply.

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When that letter failed to get results, the author sent a second missive, threatening to detonate a nuclear device at a Prague hotel if the Russian was not released.

"The writer promised a small Chernobyl," said a Czech police investigator who is familiar with the case.

The threats, which occurred in early 1995, were made public March 22 by a U.S. Senate subcommittee on investigations at a hearing on global proliferation of terrorist weapons.

The Senate investigator's report provided a number of new details on the Prague uranium-smuggling case, which has drawn worldwide attention because it involves the largest cache—about 3 kilograms (6.6 pounds)—of bomb-grade uranium ever seized. The Russian, identified in the report as Alexandr Scerbinin, Czech nuclear scientist Jaroslav Vagner and Valera Kunicky of Belarus have been in jail since their Dec. 14, 1994, arrest on a street in Prague 7. Police found the uranium in the backseat of the car in which the men were riding.

Jan Rathausky, an investigator in the case, said police took the threats seriously. Both letters were written in pencil, in the same hand, and postmarked in Prague, he said. The style and substance suggested that they were "not from a manual laborer," he said. The first letter included details about how the promised money would be delivered, he added.

Rathausky said that the name Scerbinin was not correct, but he refused to identify the man himself.

"We think we were being tested to see whether we would cave in," said Rathausky.

The Senate investigators placed Jaroslav Vagner at the center of a group of smugglers who were attempting to profit from the uranium business. The Prague case and one in Landshut, Germany, involving four Slovaks, a Czech and a German, were linked, said the investigators. A sample of bomb-grade material was found in the Landshut case, and one Slovak man received a two-year prison sentence.

"The uranium came from one cache that had been broken up into smaller parts to facilitate the search for buyers," according to the American investigative team, which included representatives from the U.S. departments of State, Defense and Customs, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

According to the subcommittee report, the uranium came from Obninsk, a city about 120 kilometers (75 miles) southwest of Moscow, the Senate investigators concluded. The city has a number of research and military facilities that deal with radioactive material.

The material was brought from Russia to Prague by train, by way of Belarus and Poland. A sleeping-car conductor at one point stored the material in a car reserved for train employees, the investigators said.

Once the radioactive material arrived in Prague, the gang of smugglers sought a buyer.

The Senate investigators said law enforcement authorities told them that middlemen tried unsuccessfully to negotiate sales with North Koreans, Spaniards and Nigerians. They then found a German buyer willing to meet their asking price of $1,600-$1,800 (43,200 Kc-48,600 Kc) per gram.

"This buyer wanted to be supplied with 5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium per month," said the Senate report. The Russian suppliers promised to deliver 40 kilograms of the uranium "within a short time frame," said the report.

Milos Beran, the scientist at the Czech Nuclear Research Institute who analyzed the uranium seized in Prague 7, said 40 kilograms of the radioactive material could pose a real threat to the public.

"If the guy were a specialist and had the right facility, he could produce a bomb, but he couldn't make it in the kitchen," he said.

Czech investigator Rathausky took issue with some of the Senate subcommittee's findings, particularly the attempt to portray Vagner as the ringleader in the smuggling group. "He was involved, but he wasn't the key person," he said.

He confirmed the account of the uranium's being transported to Prague by train, with the help of a conductor.

Rathausky said Czech investigators now know "exactly who transported the material, and how." He would not elaborate.

He confirmed that a buyer was found in Bavaria. "We know his identity," he said. "He's an individual, just another part of the chain."

The Czech investigator said he has no evidence to suggest that a German undercover agent posed as a buyer in a police sting, as was alleged, but never firmly proven, in the Landshut case. He said he continues to believe that the uranium was to be delivered to an unnamed country in Africa.

The Czech investigation is expected to wind up "soon," said Rathausky.

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Slovakia: Meciar Seen To Cause Government 'Crisis'

AU2106173196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Ondrej Dostal: "Coalition Government Versus Government Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's events give reason to dust off the once oft-used term "Slovak specific features," which has more recently been pushed out by another fashionable formulation—"in Slovakia it just is that way." After yesterday's meeting of parliamentary political parties, Slovakia can take pride in another rarity—it has a functional coalition government and, at the same time, a nonfunctional government coalition. This is at least what the prime minister of the coalition government, once regarded also as the leader of the government coalition, claims. To supporters of Vladimir Meciar, this must seem like a case of deja vu: "History" is repeating itself. If it had happened in March [when Meciar's second government was dismissed] it would have been more spectacular, but if necessary one can have "March" in June. When Vladimir Meciar's third government took up office it was generally assumed that, even that time, he would not hold out as prime minister to the end of his term. But the months passed by and nothing happened. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] parliamentary club was not deserted by a single deputy, the smaller coalition partners seemed to be relatively content, and even the electoral preferences remained at a stable and high level. At a time when the public was gradually starting to get used to the idea of the government lasting through its entire term of office, suddenly everything was back "into the old rut." According to the prime minister, the coalition partners had ceased fulfilling the coalition agreement. To quote his authentic statement, their "national pride and workers' honor ended in Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company]." The prime minister's witticism is well formulated, but its content is not in the least original. It only restates what has been said by many before him. In normal countries disputes within government coalitions tend to be triggered by different political ideas, and in Slovakia by conflicting privatization aspirations.

The HZDS and the progovernment media have already started a campaign aimed at convincing citizens that Vladimir Meciar has once again fallen victim to the treason of evil allies and their privatization greed. The problem is that his coalition partners have been the way they are from the beginning, and he knew it from the beginning. Just as in the past, even now it is first and foremost Vladimir Meciar himself who is responsible for his problems. The impression that he is being pressured by his coalition partners into a government crisis is false, because he is the one who is consciously pressuring the government coalition into the crisis by his intransigence. It is irrelevant whether he has carefully thought out his course of action in advance or whether he is improvising. It is possible, however, that the steamroller from Zlata Idka [venue of an in-camera meeting of HZDS functionaries in October 1993 where Meciar announced his plan to "steamroller" the opposition] will end at exactly the same place as national pride and workers' honor. Even in Slovakia, the distance from the government coalition to the coalition government is not as long as it may seem.

[The coalition crisis is also the subject of a 500-word commentary by Juraj Hrabko, entitled "Standard Situation, Standard Solution," published on the same page. The commentary stresses that the present situation, the loss of parliamentary support, is not new for the prime minister, and that his solution to it is also "a standard one: The attempt, by means of blackmail or buyout, to break up the renegades' parliamentary clubs and secure temporary allies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, accompanied by the brainwashing of citizens until the time comes for them to cast their votes into the ballot box."]

Slovakia: Meciar's Plan To Change Constitution Assessed

96CH0094C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3-9 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Emma McClune: "Meciar Aims for Total Power by Rewriting the Constitution"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In what has been described as a naked bid for power, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has announced plans to change the constitution and concentrate more authority in the hands of a single person.

Speaking March 24 at the close of the sixth national conference of his party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Meciar said that certain recent political episodes point to a disfunctional system. In order to stabilize Slovak politics, a total overhaul of the constitution is necessary, he said.

But opponents and political analysts say that Meciar's not-so-hidden motive is a desire to dislodge his arch enemy, President Michal Kovac, and consolidate power in his own hands.

Under the current "mixed" system, executive power is shared between Meciar and Kovac. At present, Kovac must ratify all of Parliament's bills to give them

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force of law. But if the constitution were changed to a parliamentary, presidential or chancellery system, one executive would hold that power. Meciar could launch himself into a No. 1 position of chancellor, like German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, or president, like U.S. President Bill Clinton. He could do away with a president altogether and concentrate power in the role of prime minister.

For a man with such "extraordinary ambition" as Meciar, the current setup is simply too cumbersome, said Stephen Heintz, executive vice president of the Institute for East West Studies in Prague.

"It's very much a personal thing," he said. Meciar wants to remove barriers to his political stranglehold on the nation at any cost, and Kovac is in the way, Heintz said.

"First he tried the political approach. That failed. So now he's trying the constitutional (approach)," he said. Theoretically, if Meciar uses democratic means to achieve this end, he could succeed, Heintz said. But at a cost.

"The constitution is the touchstone of democracy; any attempt to tamper with it is a high-risk strategy," and a dangerous precedent, he warned.

Opposition leaders, however, are steeling themselves for the worst. According to Jozef Moravcik, former prime minister and opposition politician, Meciar will probably favor the position of president.

"At the moment, there is a very real danger of a conversion to totalitarianism, and this conversion would be easier under a presidential system," Moravcik said.

However, in order to change the constitution, Meciar will need a constitutional majority of 90 of the 150 votes in Parliament, said Ernest Valko, first and last chairman in 1992 of the Federal Czechoslovak Constitutional Court. Valko added that the prospect of Meciar as president is "a horror."

At present, Meciar's HZDS and its coalition partners control 83 votes in Parliament, which means that if Meciar is serious about constitutional change, he must now pull at least seven votes from the opposition.

Meciar may strengthen his hand in Parliament if he succeeds in pushing through changes to the election law. At the same party conference, he announced plans to revamp the present proportional-representation electoral system to a "winner-take-all" system or a mix of the two. Meciar said he seeks the change because the present system does not allow for the emergence of a second large opposition party. Critics, however, say that Meciar will change the electoral system to ensure total supremacy of his own power.

"He's very nervous about competition of any kind," emphasized Valko. "In my opinion, power is his only goal—and removing his enemies."

At the party conference, Meciar spoke of his concerns about the "instability" of the Slovak political atmosphere. Drawing an example, Meciar said that the electoral system must be changed to "prevent a repeat case of the Democratic Union (DU)."

Last year, a number of HZDS rebels broke away to form the DU. Consequently, Meciar lost his majority and was forced out of office—for the second time—in April, only to regain his position six months later in the fall elections.

At the conference, Meciar said that finishing touches were being put to an analysis of his April 1994 downfall, but he already had the answers to the questions "who, to whom and how much."

Slovakia: Addendum to Hungarian Treaty Discussed

96CH0094D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3-9 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Emma McClune: "Slovak 'Interpretation' Clouds Hungarian Pact"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Following months of delays and discussions, the Slovak Parliament has finally ratified the Slovak-Hungarian treaty—along with an added "interpretation" of its own.

According to this addendum, Slovakia will not accept any interpretation of the treaty that provides the ethnic Hungarian minority with collective rights.

The treaty, signed a year ago by the two countries' prime ministers, was designed to be a statement of neighborly concord that would aid both countries' entry into the European Union (EU). In return for recognition of the inviolability of Slovak borders, Slovakia agreed to respect the rights of its 560,000-strong Hungarian community. The Hungarian Parliament ratified the treaty last year. As passed March 26, however, with the added "interpretation," the treaty will be enforced differently in each country.

The Slovak ratification comes after a year of aggressive campaigns against minority culture and language, and represents a final blow for those who hoped to turn the tide against assimilation, Hungarian minority leaders say.

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Pal Csaky, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), one of the ethnic-Hungarian parties in Slovakia, said the refusal to honor the treaty's insistence on minority rights is typical of the state's hard-line stance toward Slovak Hungarians, a group that represents 11 percent of the population. All 15 MKDH representatives voted against the treaty as presented with the added "interpretation," he said.

If the treaty had passed in its original form, Hungarians could have used it as a springboard for filing a collective suit against such government legislation as the controversial language law, which forbids the use of minority languages in official contexts, according to Sharon Fisher of the Open Media Research Institute.

"But the government was never going to give them collective rights," Fisher said. "Every party in the ruling coalition was against it."

For the time being, Slovak Hungarians have no recourse. International lawyer Brenka Gabriel said that the "interpretative" addition to the treaty is a legally binding statement. Furthermore, international law does not regulate the ratification processes of international agreements, he said. The Slovak constitution allows for addenda of this kind.

Gabriel also pointed out, however, that even though both sides had signed the treaty, there is nothing to stop the Hungarians from now adopting their own "interpretation."

Across the border, Hungarian leaders shrugged at the news of the Slovak appendage to the hard-earned treaty.

Speaking in a televised debate, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn said that any appendage or additional clause added to the treaty was of "minor importance." Even if Slovakia chose to attach a recipe for *strapacky* (potato dumplings with sheep cheese) or a weather report to the treaty, at least they had ratified it, he said. Appendages of this nature are not usual in international agreements of this kind, he added.

In the afterglow of Parliament's decision, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk said the "successful" Slovak ratification of the treaty is symbolic of Slovakia's willingness to increase stability in the region.

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Hungary: Kovacs Comments on EU Reform, Admitting New Members

LD2206113996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A Hungarian delegation led by Prime Minister Gyula Horn is attending the EU summit in Florence. Prior to departure, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said that only after a fundamental transformation can the EU admit new countries smoothly. Miklos Berenyi interviewed the foreign minister.

[Begin recordi g] [Berenyi] [Passage omitted] Laszlo Kovacs is not afraid that affairs such as the beef crisis will slow down European integration.

[Kovacs] It is frightening to assess the possible consequences of Britain's no cooperation policy, but the way this crisis was resolved also indicates the EU's ability to resolve crises.

[Berenyi] The foreign minister believes that the Eastern European country's future accession will not trigger a EU protest, similar to the British boycott. However, he admits that only a fully transformed EU will be able to receive the applicants. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] We will not be attending this conference with excitement or anxiety, because we are not expecting a big change or big decisions. We will be attending with interest, because we will see how far the intergovernmental conference has progressed, and we will also be given the opportunity to report on our preparation. [end recording]

Hungary: Defense Minister Outlines Army Reform Plan

LD2306214796 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The new commander in chief of the Hungarian Army [Lieutenant General Ferenc Vegh] introduced himself to the public this week. In his official note addressed to soldiers and civil servants in the army, the lieutenant general outlined the way he saw the army's situation. His assessment is rather devastating and his conclusions dismiss a lot of illusions, mainly the hope that the entire Hungarian Army could easily become suitable for NATO accession. Therefore, the new commander in chief considers his most important task to have the reform plans on the creation of a smaller, efficient and non-political army passed by parliament. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] You completed military studies both in the Soviet Union and the United States. Have you seen any difference between the two military training institutions?

[Vegh] Yes. There is a fundamental difference. The attention is focused on special professional [Hungarian: szakmai] training and combat leadership in Russia. By doing this—and based on battle experiences gained during World War II—they have trained very good battle commanders. Training is more comprehensive in the United States. Thinking leads from the general to the particular and training is embedded in a security policy environment.

[Correspondent] Which do you find to be closer to you, or rather which is more in line with Hungary's efforts?

[Vegh] A mixture of both is the best. There is a need for professional training, because it is necessary for certain positions, but management training is also indispensable. The higher level we achieve, the more advantageous I find the Western, Anglo-Saxon training. For it is very important to train leaders and not experts.

[Correspondent] Hungary is preparing for its NATO membership. In your view, will NATO membership imply an easier situation or more burdens for the Hungarian Army?

[Vegh] Both of them. First it will bring more burdens, then it will lead to an easier situation. For common defense will certainly have to lead to an easier situation, but before we become a NATO member we have to do a lot in order to restructure our army. We have to assume more financial burdens, we have to change the structure of the army and establish a new thinking. Our NATO membership will be the result of a very hard work planned step by step.

[Correspondent] What do you think the Hungarian army will be like in future? Will it be a professional army, or can you imagine a solution which also includes elements of the present [conscript] system?

[Vegh] I consider a transitionary phase expedient in this case, too. It is no use for me to say that I consider a professional army expedient, when it costs much more than the present one, cannot be financed and will not be possible to finance in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the combination of the two could meet our needs.

We have to assess the inevitable forces and means of a crisis management—both on international and domestic level—to decide with which troops we are planning to join and participate in NATO and we have to build on this. We have to build up our army based on the snowball effect [Hungarian: hogolyo effektus]. This small snowball now has to be in line with our budget and following this, in my view, the army's budget will have to be increased and then this snowball might be enlarged to a normal size.

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This, in my view, means that two armed services—the land and air forces—have to be maintained in this country. Within this it is important to have reactive forces: immediate, rapid reaction forces and main defense forces. The bulk of the main defense forces should consist of reservist forces, that is to say, they could only be filled up as a result of a mobilization. They also have to be trained at training bases. Furthermore, we also have to prepare an entire new system of territorial defense [Hungarian: teruletvedelem], which will also have to be synchronized with our NATO accession. [end recording]

Hungary: Secret Service Minister Views Recent Cases

AU2106190496 Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian 20 Jun 96 p 11, 67

[Interview with Istvan Nikolits, minister in charge of the secret services, by Gyorgy Acs, Pal Eotvos, Peter N. Nagy, Gabor Toth, and Peter Nemeth, from the Forum program broadcast on Nap-Nyugta-A3 television on 13 June: "Responsibility Cannot Be Determined...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Istvan Nikolits, minister in charge of the secret services, was today's guest of the chief editors' forum. The questions were asked by Gyorgy Acs (MAGYAR HIRLAP), Pal Eotvos (NEPSZABADSAG), Peter N. Nagy (MAGYARORSZAG), Gabor Toth (MAGYAR NEMZET), and Peter Nemeth (program presenter).

[Acs] My question might be a bit unscientific, but surveillance has not been necessary against the internal opposition since 1990, and I can imagine that the imperialist spies have somewhat withdrawn since then, and the international situation has also changed. Could it not be that we are trying to find the jacket to fit the button when we hear that the secret services participate in the fight against the black economy and they take over many seemingly police jobs like [action against] human smuggling?

[Nikolits] I do not think that we are trying to find the jacket to fit the button. Fortunately, and in fact, political surveillance no longer exists, but this was not the only type of surveillance before 1990. Intelligence and counterintelligence, and military and technical service also existed then; these have started to have separate lives since 1990 and they have their own budgets. Although the range of tasks have been rearranged, just because various facts are not publicly known, we should not think that Hungary does not need counterespionage or counterterrorism. We need not believe, either, that certain arms, nuclear material, and human smuggling does not affect our country, or that all countries watch all our actions sympathetically, without trying to influence our decisions. These are certainly not police tasks.

[Nemeth] When did you last manage to achieve results, for example, by counteracting terrorism, in the area of defending the Constitution, or in counterespionage?

[Nikolits] For example, we do not expose terrorist not because the services do not handle this issue with proper care, but because at the moment, fortunately, Hungary is not a target country of major terrorist organizations. This does not mean that these organizations have nothing to do with Hungary.

[Nemeth] Do they come here to rest?

[Nikolits] Well, if you are thinking of certain analogies, I am not talking about this kind of rest. I feel that in this issue, namely spying and other issues, Hungary is still in a lucky position but this does not mean that such cases do not exist or that we could name these cases and reveal them to the public.

[Eotvos] Are you or the police dealing with the explosions in Szeged, in the Mathias church, and at the Parliament?

[Nikolits] Both. The technical aspects of these cases belong to us but, unfortunately, I have to say that, apart from the known facts, we have not managed to make any progress precisely in these cases.

[Nagy] The secret services have terrible traditions in this region. Recently, we have had two cases which justify the question of "jacket to fit the button." One is the issue of the observation of national minorities in which it remained incomprehensible, even after the acceptance of the parliamentary committee, why the observation of the German minority was justified by the south Slav war. The other case is the surveillance affecting 797 opposition politicians and others, which turned out to have been irregular. What are the guarantees that in the new situation we will not need to ask questions motivated by such anxieties?

[Nikolits] These are two completely different cases. In the minority issue, my stance from the beginning was that I would not make a statement until the documents of the case were carefully examined. When I finally explained everything at a two-hour, detailed news conference, many people pretended not to have understood anything. It was very difficult to accept that, in the way those present imagined it, there was no "issue." Even amidst the defective legal regulations, defensive intelligence work was a clear task of the National Security Office in 1992. This work was started in defense of the minorities, and we said that there

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had been no surveillance. No secret service methods, whether requiring authorization or not, were used. No report on the surroundings or observations were carried out. Open information materials were collected and compared to information coming in through other channels. After the decision of the committee, I have to say that, as a matter of fact, even the 797 surveillances were in order. After 1990, the office had a section which dealt with security controls. In this period, the law regulated the use of secret service methods in a temporary way. The council of ministers regulation relevant to this area talks about security defense rather than control. Reports on the surroundings are not open acquisition of information, because it means that whatever can be collected in the work, living, and free-time environment, will be collected. These pieces of information are processed in a report on surroundings. This section performed this type of work in 797 cases. This means the minor or greater procedures which clashed even with the defective regulations. In the majority of cases, the fault was that those in truly important positions or people expecting to be appointed to them had not been informed about this procedure. According to the data protection officer, other mistakes were also made in some cases. I turned to Parliament in connection with the investigation, which was then carried out by the National Security Council, and at the voting it decided five votes against four that no violation of the rules had been committed because no personal responsibility could be determined.

The consequence of the decision is that the result of these observations became justified data with me. The committee also said that after the national security law is passed, these pieces of information are to be used in accordance with the new data handling regulations. Once we had a data protection officer, Ferenc Koszegi turned to him with this issue as a first case and, after examining the case, the data protection officer decided that the affected people had to be informed. The National Security Committee, in the presence of the data protection officer and the ministers involved, decided that the affected people would have to be informed by the person who ordered the surveillance about the section of the files which can be seen as security control, if the person ordering the surveillance can be identified. For the section of the files for which the person ordering the surveillance cannot be identified or it contains other than security surveillance, it has to be assessed from a national security point of view whether its contents carry risks for other areas, and if they do, then the relevant area has to decide on informing the affected person. Where the identity of the person who ordered the investigation cannot at all be ascertained, a member of the cabinet has to perform this task.

[Toth] Who were the initiators? A state administration organization, perhaps a ministry?

[Nikolits] Precisely. However, in a not too large but existing number of cases the initiator of the procedure cannot be found. Even a piece of paper cannot be found which would prove that X. requested it and the service launched it.

[Eotvos] This is where one starts to get frightened. And this actually gets through a filter first. Obviously, when a person is to be appointed to a confidential position, the first thing to do is to talk to him and inform him that his affairs would be assessed. I find the story hair-raising and would very much like to find out what those present, namely Bela Katona, Peter Boross, and Mr. Galszecsy, said about it.

[Nikolits] And Tibor Fuzessy [officials in the former government]. Naturally, I am not able to reveal what they said because it was a closed session. Apart from being able to settle this issue, I do not actually have anything to do with it.

[Eotvos] Apart from informing a person that his private life had been observed, will there be any compensation?

[Nikolits] Let me ask you, what do you think could be done?

[Eotvos] Mr. Boross is a deputy sitting in Parliament, and so are Mr. Katona and Mr. Fuzessy. These gentlemen are involved in public life with which this is irreconcilable.

[Toth] I imagine they will apologize....

[Nikolits] If they have to apologize then, I believe, they will obviously do so.

[Eotvos] I am sorry but what use is it.

[Toth] They cannot give out compensation notes instead.

[Eotvos] They could at least disappear from Parliament....

[Nikolits] I can only say that there is a right to self-determination regarding information, on the basis of which everyone has the right to decide over his own data, therefore, all those who will learn about these will be able to request the data to be erased.

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B-H: Muratovic Receives OSCE's Cotti in Sarajevo

LD2306164496 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1451 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jun (BH PRESS)—Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic received Flavio Cotti, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] chairman, in Sarajevo today. Also present at the meeting was OSCE Ambassador Robert Frowick. Preparations for the forthcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina were discussed.

After the talks, Muratovic said: We shall do everything to meet the conditions for holding the elections in the Federation; we will also demand that the conditions are fulfilled in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic; Cotti will determine whether conditions for holding the elections exist or not; and we trust the members of the EC and if they say that the set standards are acceptable, then they are acceptable.

Asked whether this meant that Radovan Karadzic can stand at the elections, Muratovic replied that the electoral rules were very clear and that Karadzic could not stand in the elections.

I do not believe he will appear on the list but he will do everything for the elections not to be held. The Serb side is attempting to maintain the status quo because it is the only way these people can remain in power. It is the only way to to prevent anyone arresting war criminals and the only way the refugees can be stopped from returning to their homes. They are saying they want the elections to be held as soon as possible but, in fact, they will do everything not to hold the elections, Muratovic said.

Flavio Cotti said that this visit to Sarajevo represented a further step in preparation for the elections, adding that he would inform the OSCE meeting in Vienna next Thursday [27 June] about the data he has gathered in talks with different parties. It is then that the decision as to whether or not the conditions for elections exist will be taken.

Asked whether the United States was exerting any pressure in respect of the elections, Cotti replied that until now no country had exerted any pressure in this respect.

B-H: FM Prlic Rejects Vice President Ganic's Accusations

AU2106160896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the speech by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the last session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, during which he announced the launch of a procedure to dismiss Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the office of the foreign minister has issued a communique, which states among other things the following:

In addition to citing the nonexistent gentleman's agreement and [words indistinct] accusation at the expense of the Croat side, Ganic also criticizes Prlic, as foreign minister, for not promptly informing the governments of the Contact Group member countries and other international organizations about the content of the (?press) reports on the reshuffling of the Government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

There is no established practice that the official organs, governments, or Ministry of Foreign Affairs of any country inform other governments on their (?conflict) internal relations through diplomatic (?sources).

In the last five months, since Prlic has been performing the duties of foreign minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Minister Prlic's office have never received any such reports. However, this does not mean that foreign diplomats do not have a special interest in what is happening in a particular country, that is, that they are not receiving information about events from relevant places.

In the past few days, Minister Prlic has had several meetings with foreign diplomats, including the ambassadors and special envoys of the U.S. Administration, Great Britain, Germany, members of the Organization of Islamic Countries, and some other countries. In these contacts, all the more important aspects of the current events in the country have been discussed.

[Word indistinct] selective approach by the vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation to the events that are burdening the implementation of the Dayton agreement and the document on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a noticeable tendency of accusing only the Croat side and its representatives in the joint government, has misled some deputies in the Constituent Assembly and some political party representatives to express views, even to support the unknown practice in diplomacy of widening differences between the partners and (?misinterpreting) the functions performed by some state organs.

This was stated among other things in a communique issued by the office of Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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B-H: Prlic Accuses Ganic of Anti-Croat Bias

LD2106175296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The office of Jadranko Prlic, the foreign minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina [as heard], issued a statement today in response to a statement made by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's vice president, Ejup Ganic, at the 14th session of the constituent assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Jasna Primorac filed a report from Sarajevo:

[Primorac] In response to the statement by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, at the latest session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's constituent assembly, when he announced that he would launch proceedings to relieve Jadranko Prlic, the foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of his duties, the office of the foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has issued the following statement:

Despite the fact that, by citing a nonexistent gentleman's agreement, Ganic imputed an unfounded accusation against the Croat side, he in the same context holds it against Prlic that the foreign minister did not inform the governments of the member countries of the Contact Group and other international players in writing about the content of a newspaper report on the government reshuffle of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

The practice of official bodies of any country's government or Foreign Ministry informing other governments in diplomatic correspondence about their own internal problems is unknown. It is obvious that some constituent assembly deputies and party representatives were led astray by a biased attitude on the part of the vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation towards events that put a heavy burden on the implementation of the Dayton agreement and documents referring to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and his clear tendency to accuse only the Croat side and its representatives in shared bodies of authorities. Under that influence, they declared themselves in favor and even supported the practice—unknown in diplomacy—of using protocol to gossip about circumstances in one's country. This attitude can only contribute to deepening the differences between the partners and misunderstanding of the functions of state bodies. This is said in the statement issued by Mr. Prlic's office.

B-H: 'Instigators' of Bihac, Cazin SBiH Rallies To Be Tried

AU2106130096 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 96 p 9

[Article by Senad Mesetovic: "Maximum Sentence 60 Days in Prison"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The trial of Firzet Prosic, whom an indictment charges with being one of the instigators of the incident at a promotional rally by the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [SBiH], is expected to open in Bihac today.

As we have learned from Edhem Veladzic, interior minister of Una-Sana Canton, the results of the investigation confirm that at the SBiH rally in Bihac [not further specified] at about 1230, while Dr. Silajdzic was speaking, Firzet (son of Husein) Prosic, born 11 June 1961 in Bihac and residing at 84 Razo Omanovic Street, a citizen of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was standing by the entry door, violated the public law and order by loudly shouting abuse against President Izetbegovic and the Islamic faith.

Although those present warned him not to curse, Prosic retorted that his brother died for Alija, Islam, and somebody's seat in the authorities. [passage omitted]

After the questioning, the judge released Prosic from jail, calling a new session for 0900 today. During the investigation, Firzet Prosic admitted to everything he was charged with in the indictment. He could, thus, receive a maximum sentence of 60 days in prison for his insolent behavior and the defamation of the citizens' national and religious feelings.

As for the events in Cazin, the investigation has hitherto identified a total of 14 persons who particularly excelled in the violation of the public law and order prior to the holding of the SBiH promotional rally in Cazin. [passage omitted]

"Charges were pressed against all 14 persons for insolent behavior and the violation of the public law and order. A commission consisting of the people from the Interior Ministry of Una-Sana Canton, assisted by Asim Fazlic, assistant minister of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and a crime inspector from Sarajevo, are still working on the case. The international police are also helping, and we expect to wrap up the investigation in the next few days and identify those responsible for the events in Cazin," Edhem Veladzic said.

Minister Veladzic claims that the SBiH members do not wish to take part in the investigation and that they were instructed not to make any statements to the police,

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which is greatly hindering efforts to establish the truth. [passage omitted]

In light of the publicity that the events in Cazin have generated, DNEVNI AVAZ has learned that the trial of the 14 accused Cazin residents will take place very swiftly and is expected to be completed by the end of this week. For the actions cited in the indictment, the persons in question can receive a maximum sentence of 60 days in prison.

B-H: Silajdic's Party Dissatisfied With Prosic Trial

LD2106174196 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding yesterday's information about the beginning of the trial of Fikret Prosic in Bihac for arrogant behavior and giving offense to national and religious feelings of other citizens, and about the fact that 14 persons who disturbed the public peace have been identified, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [whose chairman is Haris Silajdzic] says in its public statement:

From the political and legal point of view, it is entirely unacceptable that someone is being put on trial for verbal offense, while at the same time the instigators and perpetrators of the attempted murder of Dr. Haris Silajdzic remain unpunished.

B-H: Cazin Police Arrest Silajdzic's Attacker

AU2106195296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The events concerning the promotion of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Cazin are about to get their epilogue. Members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Una-Sana Canton this morning arrested Mujo Ismet Beganovic, a locksmith from Cazin, on the founded suspicion that he had physically attacked and seriously injured Haris Silajdzic, president of the party. During his arrest, the suspect, Beganovic, admitted to the investigating officers that he had hit Silajdzic with a (?wooden flagpole) during the incident in Cazin. [passage omitted]

B-H: Croat Official Reaffirms Commitment to Federation

LD2206174796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic, Vladimir Soljic, the defense minister of the Muslim-Croat Federation, and Bozo Rajic, the chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will hold a news conference tomorrow to respond to the latest reactions by Bosniak Muslim officials and foreign diplomats to the decision to reshuffle the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. Ivan Bender, The acting president of Herzeg-Bosnia's Presidential Council, issued a statement on the same topic. Antun Mrkonjic has a report.

[Mrkonjic] It is said that the statement issued from the Presidential Council session, at which the decision to reshuffle and scale down the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was reached, did not represent correctly the essence of that decision that in fact implements the HDZ decision to gradually transfer civilian authority to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's bodies. This is a step that strengthens the federation, which can be seen from the reduced number of ministries whose competencies have been curtailed and transferred to the federation's bodies, which is in the spirit of the Washington and Dayton agreements.

The statement issued by President Bender's office goes on to say that urgent measures will be taken to continue transferring all functions of civilian authorities that the governments of the federation and counties [cantons] can take over. In order to ensure normal conditions of life and work for the people in areas where the federation's authorities have not started functioning, adequate coordinated forms of carrying out these functions will be organized. Immediate measures to establish the bodies of authority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation will also be taken, especially at the level of counties across the federation, to which political and other officials representing the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina will make a full contribution.

In conclusion, the statement confirms the indisputable commitment of Croat political representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the consistent implementation of the Washington and Dayton agreements until the federation is completely set up and the final goal of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is achieved in a comprehensive process of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Croat Leaders Say Muslims Plotting To Dismiss Zubak

LD2306152496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to reshuffle and scale down the government was reached in the interest of implementing the Dayton agreement and as a step forward in the process of transferring power to relevant ministries in the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Jadranko Prlic,

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Vladimir Soljic, and Bozo Rajic told journalists this today. Antun Mrkonjic has a report from Mostar:

[Mrkonjic] The decision by the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to scale down Herzeg-Bosnia's government brought about a cut in the number of ministries from 14 to six and a reduction of the competences of the bodies of authority in the area controlled by the Croatian Defense Council. Jadranko Prlic, the foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said this when he opened the news conference. He added that the vital functions had to be preserved [under Herzeg-Bosnia's control] until the federation took hold fully, in order to protect the population.

Prlic stressed that the Republic of Croatia recently came under the strongest pressure from the international community in months. A good, but wrongly interpreted, decision was understood as an attempt to undermine the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the United States, in particular, considers to be very important, Prlic said.

Bozo Rajic, the chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressed that Herzeg-Bosnia had never made a decision with better intentions. Honestly speaking, we presented a good decision in a wrong way and were hit by it as a boomerang, Rajic stressed. All this gave ammunition to our critics, especially in the ranks of our federal partner [Muslims], to attack us in the media and denounce us for allegedly trying to obstruct the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, Rajic said. Commenting on the Muslim side's demands to dismiss the leading people in the federation, [President Kresimir] Zubak and [Vice President Ejup] Ganic, Rajic stressed that this demand was a smoke screen to disguise the Muslim leadership's true intentions to dismiss Zubak and thus—with the alleged sacrifice of Ganic—accuse the Croat side of obstructing the Dayton agreement.

Our federal partner is using all means to move from the political defensive to the offensive, Vladimir Soljic, the defense minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation said. He added that the law on defense had not been approved because there were attempts to turn it into a republican law.

Speaking about changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina's Foreign Ministry, Minister Prlic said that he personally had proposed five Croat ambassadors and recalled 10 existing ambassadors. Although I was given support for this by the government, the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency, which is in charge of this, had made no decision on the issue, Prlic said.

As the conference wound up, Rajic, the chairman of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, pointed to the importance of the elections in Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croat side has urged the population to vote and it will submit its electoral lists to the temporary electoral commission in due time. Conditions for holding elections are not ideal, Rajic said, but we will carry out the international community's will. Rajic expressed the hope that the elections in Mostar would be held in a democratic and tolerant atmosphere.

B-H: Croats Deny Seeking To Preserve 'Separate Statelet'

AU2206172996 Paris AFP in English 1711 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 22 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat leaders denied Saturday seeking to preserve their separate statelet in Bosnia and blamed a press release they issued last week for creating a false impression of their intentions in Bosnia.

Bosnian Croat leaders announced in a statement issued last Saturday that they had agreed to reshuffle their self-declared "government" in the self-styled Herzeg-Bosnia statelet in the southwest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On Saturday however, in a further statement carried by the Bosnian Croat HABENA news agency, the separatist Croat leadership said the previous release had created a false impression of their plans.

The reshuffle was "an act of strengthening the federation," the statement said.

"It abolished most of the ministries of Herzeg-Bosnia and transferred their competencies to the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation," it added, according to an English-language version sent to AFP in Zagreb.

Under the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia, Bosnian Croat institutions are supposed to dissolve into the umbrella Moslem-Croat federation, set up in Washington in February 1994 as a buttress against the Bosnian Serbs.

The Croats have on occasion resisted international pressure to fall in with the shaky federation, but Saturday's statement sought to reassure international officials implementing the peace accords that they were committed to the Moslem-Croat entity.

"The political body of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina has concluded to undertake immediate and concrete measures for further speedy transfer of all functions of civilian authorities that the federation and cantonal governments are able to take over," it added.

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The Croat leaders said they wanted to "reaffirm their commitment to ... implementing the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation as the final goal of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Three leading Croats—Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prilic, Defence Minister Vladimir Soljic, and Bozo Rajic, chairman of the Bosnian Croatian Democratic Union—would hold a press conference in the southern town of Mostar at 12:30 p.m. (1030 GMT) Sunday to "clear up every misunderstanding caused by the said decision," the Croat leaders said.

B-H: SDA Denounces Government of Herzeg-Bosnia

AU2206151596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by A. Alickovic: "Moral Attack on SDA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The SDA [Party of Democratic Action] has expected more from the last federal parliament session devoted to the work of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was stated at the party's regular news conference on Thursday [20 June].

According to SDA Secretary General Mirsad Ceman, the session adopted very general conclusions. He said that his party did not agree with the explanation given by the Croat deputy caucus as to why the government of the so-called HR HB [Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia] had been set up.

"We do not accept the existence of the 'HR HB' government and will demand the sponsors of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina settle this issue as soon as possible. The government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that of the HB parastate cannot exist at the same time," Ceman stressed, adding that the assembly had limited success because it did not condemn directly the restoration of the government of the so-called HB.

Speaking about the incident in Cazin, in which Haris Silajdzic was injured, SDA spokesman Ismet Grbo said that the incident had started a horrific campaign against the SDA, which does not benefit anyone. He said that the opposition parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the media, international players, and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] did not report on this incident correctly, but simply attacked the SDA which, as he said, was among the first to condemn the attack on Silajdzic.

"The events that had caused a spontaneous reaction represent, in a way, a moral attack on the fundamental values of our people. In our political experience, at least as far as we know, the practice of condemning political parties because of what some individuals had done has never existed," Grbo said.

B-H: Soljic Blames Bosniaks for Obstructing Defense Law

AU2106145196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 96 pp 4-5

[Unattributed report on the speech by Bosnian Federation Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic at the 14th Session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 19 June: "The Problem of Command"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic has attributed the existence of the government of the "Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" to the difficult economic situation and the ineffectiveness of the Federation Government. In his words, it was reduced at the last session and exists only because of the fear of social disorder, as the Federation has still not begun to function properly.

"I have several functions, but only one salary, although the opposite would be better," said Soljic. "The defense law is on the agenda today because the Bosniak side does not accept it as agreed in Washington. They have also launched a media campaign against Croatian officials so as to draw attention away from other more important issues. I assumed the position of defense minister after the Federation was formed and there has not been single casualty or major incident since."

Explaining why the Defense Ministry was not functioning, Soljic said that it could not be expected to function when the defense law had still not been passed. He said that it had been agreed in Petersburg to form a joint ministry, which to this day had not happened.

"If I am the one who is stopping the defense law from being passed, then the problem is easy to solve," said Soljic. "This house can relieve me of my duties and appoint someone who will do a better job, and I do believe that there are such people. But until the top officials of the Croatian and Bosniak people, and we are talking about two to four individuals here, solve the problem of the civilian command, it is difficult to expect a definite bill. According to the Bosniak proposals, the Federation president and vice president would be excluded from the civilian command. We cannot go on for ever with these problems, recklessly toying with inconsequential issues, while the real problems are still waiting to be solved," Soljic said.

According to him, a new defense law proposal arrived from the United States two days ago, "but the Americans

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are not insisting on imposing solutions but rather endeavoring to have us produce them."

B-H: Zubak, Ganic Meet Government Ministers, Heads of Cantons

AU2106192296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, president and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, have been holding an initial briefing with the Federation Government and the governors of the Federation's 10 cantons in Fojnica today. They discussed the main problems that are preventing and obstructing the development of the Federation on the ground.

Zubak and Ganic stressed once again that there is no alternative to the Federation and that only concrete work in the municipalities and cantons can lead to the rise of the Federation. The ministers and the governors presented a number of problems, as well as proposals as to how these should be overcome. These include, among other things, the proposal that pupils returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina from abroad and that pupils who are coming from any entity will enjoy the same rights when enrolling in primary and secondary schools. Their certificates will be accepted regardless of where they are enrolling.

Also, the customs authorities are working in such a way that of the 228 million German marks [DM] planned for the whole year, DM63 million has been collected and deposited in the Federation's treasury so far this year.

Unlike the Assembly sessions, in view of the speeches and figures, this meeting has given the impression that the Federation is achieving significantly more success on the ground than the average citizen of the Federation realizes.

Meetings like this one instill optimism and as they are specific and are held in a constructive atmosphere characterized by tolerance.

B-H: Opposition Coalition To Run in Mostar, General Elections

AU2106192396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Five opposition parties—the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD], the Republican Party, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, and the Croatian Peasants' Party—which signed a coalition agreement on 10 June, today registered their coalition with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] to take part in the upcoming elections.

According to UBSD deputy leader Sejfudin Tokic, the coalition for Bosnia-Herzegovina will take part in the elections for all levels of authority with a joint list in both the Federation and the Serb entity.

We will put forward candidates for the post of a member of the Presidency from the ranks of the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb peoples. The coalition has decided on the party structure and the top candidates for the parliament of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These will be presented to the public at one of the future news conferences, Tokic said.

He said that all shortcomings have finally been removed, and the city election commission in Mostar has finally accepted the joint list of five opposition parties for the elections in that town.

B-H: EU Says Anti-Serb Pamphlets Appearing in Mostar

AU2106174896 Paris AFP in English 1742 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 21 (AFP)—Pamphlets calling for Bosnian Serbs to leave the Croat part of the southern Bosnian town of Mostar are being distributed, an official of the European Union said Friday [21 June].

The pamphlets call on three named Serb women in particular to "get out of our flats, get out of our town, and get the hell back to Serbia," but said the full list of Serbs who would have to leave Mostar would be completed later.

The document was not signed but bore the language used by the Croat far right extremist movement "God and the Croats, Ready to Defend the Country."

According to the EU's administration of Mostar, just 3,000 remain out of 23,000 Serbs who lived in Mostar before fighting broke out there between Moslems and Croats in 1993.

B-H: Buses With Voters in Mostar Under EU Police Escort

LD2206122196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1207 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 22 (TANJUG)—Voters in Mostar will be taken to and from polling stations on June 30 from the Croat into the Muslim parts of this Bosnian city by buses which will escorted by European police, Croatian Radio said on Saturday.

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Martin Garrot, a deputy of the E.U. administrator for Mostar advized voters not to cross the separation lines on foot at the time of the elections.

E.U. Administrator for Mostar Ricardo Peres Casado told a press conference that 77 polling stations would be opened in this divided city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The polling stations will be secured by European police in cooperation with local policemen, and strong IFOR [Implementation Force] forces will supervize and control all developments.

The Croatian Radio correspondent from Mostar said it was not known yet how many buses with voters would arrive from abroad.

Mostar was one of the heaviest battlefields in the one-year conflicts betwen Muslims and Croats. Before this fighting, the two nations had expelled more than 40,000 Serbs from the wider area of the city.

After the Muslim-Croat conflicts, Mostar was divided into Croat and Muslim Mostar and placed under a two-year administration of the European Union.

B-H: OSCE Official Says Markovic Has No Voting Rights

AU2206192996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1518 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Jun (BETA)—Kasim Begic, member of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] interim election commission, has stated that former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic "has neither active nor passive voting right, and cannot vote or stand as a candidate at the forthcoming elections."

"At the last census in 1991, Markovic was not a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that he was born in Konjic does not mean that has the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizenship," ONASA reports citing Begic's statement in today's issue of DNEVNI AVAZ.

Begic said that "Markovic can obtain citizenship, but to take part in the elections, he must wait at least two years, until the next elections."

B-H: Serb Prime Minister Sees No Need To Postpone Elections

LD2306151196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1420 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 23 Jun (TANJUG)—There are no reasons for the postponement of elections, as the postponement could jeopardize the implementation of the Dayton agreement, Gojko Klickovic, the prime minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic, told Radio Kragujevac today.

"We are completely ready. We have secured a democratic atmosphere throughout the territory of the Serb Republic. We have enabled all the registered parties access to the media under equal conditions. We will enable the foreign media to cover the elections. We want observers to come and to see on the ground how the elections are organized and to see that nothing will be done far from the eyes of the public," Klickovic said.

"We ask that the Muslim-Croat federation does not put forward any additional conditions, but to go to the polls as it is the only way to show that it wants to cooperate in the implementation of the Dayton agreement."

Assessing the importance of the elections for the Serb Republic, Klickovic said that they will be a litmus test whether the Pale policy is the correct one. For Bosnia-Herzegovina the elections are important because joint institutions will be formed after the elections "so that some things that are left could be jointly solved."

According to him, this is at present being done mainly through commissions and they are "quite inefficient."

"It is important to hold the elections so that we could start establishing joint institutions—the parliament, the presidency, the Constitutional Court and all that is envisaged in the Dayton agreement," Klickovic said.

B-H: PM Klickovic Opposed to Reunification of Bosnia

AU2306162396 Paris AFP in English 1610 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 23 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic Sunday reiterated his opposition to the reunification of Bosnia and claimed the division of Bosnia was written into the Dayton peace treaty.

"People are trying to promote ideas that are not included in the Dayton peace treaty, like reunification," he told a Serbian radio, cited by the BETA news agency.

Klickovic, a hardline Serb nationalist appointed by Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in May, said he opposed the use of the Dayton peace treaty's stipulation of freedom of movement to promote the "mixing (of people of different ethnic groups) and the return of refugees in order to reintegrate Bosnia."

The Serb leader said the Serb entity in Bosnia, which runs roughly half the country, was "ready" for upcoming elections and said the Moslem-Croat federation should not seek to impose conditions for polls to go ahead.

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Leaders of the federation have called for the arrest of Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both indicted war criminals, before elections go ahead, fearing elections under current conditions would simply confirm the position of extreme hardliners in the Serb entity.

B-H: SDS Puts Karadzic Forward as Presidential Candidate

LD2006154996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1444 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Jun (SRNA)—At today's session of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS; Bosnian Serb ruling party] municipal committee in Pale, the proposal was unanimously adopted that Radovan Karadzic stand again as a candidate for the president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

Srdjan Knezevic was appointed chairman of the committee; he is expected to appoint between three and five deputy chairmen.

A list of 50 deputies for the Pale municipal assembly was also put forward and verified at today's session. Srdjan Knezevic heads the list. The personnel committee will decide on the order of the deputies on the list.

The SDS Pale municipal committee extended the mandate to Nenad Veselinovic, a deputy in the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic.

Different commissions of the municipal committee were also appointed: for economics; social activities; housing, social, humanitarian issues, and issues related to former soldiers; for refugees and displaced persons; development of the countryside; work with the young; and personnel issues.

Some young members were admitted to the SDS at today's session. In addition to their membership card, they were given a collection of poems by Jovan Ducic.

B-H: Pale's Klickovic Warns of 'War' If Karadzic Arrested

AU2106141696 Paris AFP in English 1350 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, June 21 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic has warned an arrest of Serb leader Radovan Karadzic could start a "new war" in Bosnia, a Belgrade fortnightly magazine said Friday.

Any arrest of the Serb leader could "start a new war in the Balkans," Klickovic, a hardliner named as prime minister in May, told the magazine DUGA, in an interview published Friday.

"Anyone who was to attempt to do something (to arrest Karadzic) would have to ask how he would be able to leave the Republika Srpska afterwards," the Serb premier warned.

"We will not sacrifice Karadzic...we have already sacrificed him to a certain extent accepting that he pulls back into the shadows.... That is sacrifice enough," he added.

On Thursday Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party voted to name Karadzic as candidate for the presidency of the Serb entity in Bosnia in upcoming elections. The announcement drew fire from the international community. [passage omitted]

B-H: Pale Serbs Stand by Karadzic Candidacy

LD2106195996 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Serbs continue to insist that they step into the future with war criminals. Namely, the Serbs from Pale have put forward Radovan Karadzic as their candidate.

[Reporter Zeljko Valcic] The latest move of the Bosnian Serbs, or rather the Pale Serb Democratic Party [SDS], has considerably upset the majority of the international politicians involved in the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government in Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Bosnian Prime Minister Muratovic in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The only way for the elections to be held and the situation to be changed is to get rid of Karadzic. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Reporter Valcic] There are rumors that if the international community fails to prevent Karadzic from standing in the elections, the government in Sarajevo might announce a boycott of the elections. It is also warning that this move by the Bosnian Serbs is directed toward obstructing the elections. Muratovic has said that the obstruction was expected, only the manner in which it was to be carried out was unknown.

In addition to another slap in the face of the peace process, the Bosnian Serbs, however, justify the decision and offer lectures on democracy.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified official] If Western Europe respects democracy, if it keeps emphasizing the principles of democracy, then it has to respect the will of the people. This is the people's will, the most powerful expression of democratic power.

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[Unidentified interviewee in Pale] Serbs as Serbs, they always behave as they should and they will not surrender their president.

[Second unidentified Pale interviewee] Karadzic and Mladic, and there is no one else. [end recording] [passage omitted: speculation on the degree to which Karadzic will influence elections]

B-H: Bildt Says Karadzic Cannot Stand in Elections

LD2206120196 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1030 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Carl Bildt, The EU peace mediator in Bosnia, spoke at the EU summit in Florence today. Bildt says that it is certain that Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan Karadzic will not be allowed to stand in the Bosnian elections in the fall.

[Begin Bildt recording from very poor reception] No, (?he) will not be able to stand as a candidate because we are supervising the elections. [end recording]

Neither of the Bosnian Serb leaders, Karadzic and Mladic, will have their names on the voting papers at the elections in Bosnia, Carl Bildt says. Among other things, he is responsible for the printing of the voting papers. The next 7-10 days will be decisive in the development of Bosnia, he says, especially concerning the position of Karadzic and Mladic.

[Begin Bildt recording] We have made certain things clear; [?returning to the issue of] Karadzic and the [words indistinct] elections. If they do as we have told them, then the sun will shine over our existence, to the degree that it is (?possible) with [words indistinct] in this part of the world. If they do not do this, then there will be rain—whatever this rain means. This will happen in the space of the next 7-10 days. [end recording]

Bildt says that he does not exclude sanctions if the position of Karadzic and Mladic does not change, but he would rather avoid this. Every measure creates a countermeasure and this affects the peace process in a negative way, he says. When I asked whether the information was correct to the effect that there are preparations to arrest Karadzic, he only said that all roads lead to the war crimes tribunal, nothing more.

It is half-way time in Bosnia now: peace was signed six months ago and in six months' time there will be elections. There have been many international meetings recently and many people are now expecting results, Bildt says. He also says that problems have appeared with the election campaign. It is important that everyone who votes in the elections receives free and independent information, but the Bosnian Government has now started to cause problems. All this means that the next 7-10 days could be decisive for the development of Bosnia, Carl Bildt says.

B-H: EU Warns Karadzic Over Election Candidacy

AU2206140096 Paris AFP in English 1102 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Florence, Italy, June 22 (AFP)—European Union leaders warned Saturday that the international community will do everything it can to stop Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic standing in forthcoming ballots.

The senior civilian peace official in Bosnia-Herzegovina Carl Bildt said pressure would be increased in the next week or so to ensure that Karadzic, an indicted war criminal, cannot run for public office in the elections in the Republika Srpska in September.

"In terms of standing for public office and holding public office we are extremely firm on that," he told reporters at the two-day EU summit in Florence.

"He is not going to be allowed. A decision on that will be taken in the next few days. That is not go to be tolerated. But that is not enough—he must step down from public office, not 20 percent, 60 but 100 percent."

And he warned: "If we see reason to take action in the next week 10 days then we will have a graduated response."

Karadzic was named by his Serb Democratic Party (SDS) on Thursday as a candidate for the post of president of the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in post-war Bosnia.

Under the Dayton peace accords, he is barred from standing in elections or from holding public office as he has been charged with war crimes. A hearing on the charges will take place in The Hague next week.

Other EU leaders gathered for the Florence summit also insisted there was no chance of Karadzic standing for office. British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind said simply: "It will not be possible for Karadzic to stand for elections.

"The Dayton accord made it quite clear that any indicted war criminals is forbidden from being candidate or being being involve on the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that will be insisted upon."

Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen concluded: "It is absolutely unacceptable that Karadzic continues to exert his influence on the spot. He is a real threat to the peace process and to stability.

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"I think the prime goal should be that he should step down. .. I don't think one should be ambiguous about it."

Bildt was less firm about the prospect of Karadzic being arrested in the near future.

"The responsibility is with the parties. All of them are in non-compliance," he said, referring to the former warring parties refusal to hand over a number of indicted war criminals.

"I'm not going to deliver him to (the UN war crimes tribunal in) the Hague," he said. "I haven't got any handcuffs."

B-H: Serb Interior Ministry Officials Support Karadzic, Mladic

LD2206195096 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The collegiate of the Serb Republic's Interior Ministry, meeting in an extended session in Bijeljina, today expressed loyalty to, and full support for, the president of the Serb Republic president, Radovan Karadzic, and the commander of the Serb army's main Headquarters, Colonel General Ratko Mladic, in their struggle for their people's rights and personal dignity.

B-H: SDS Urges People To Support Karadzic's Candidacy

LD2206192296 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Banja Luka Municipal Committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] today sent a public appeal to the Serb Republic citizens, in which it stresses that the international community—which fears our referendums and refuses to recognize their results—has now offered us an opportunity to tell them what we think, and especially what we think about the Hague tribunal. In connection with that, the SDS Banja Luka Municipal Committee urges citizens to sign in local communities the proposal for Radovan Karadzic's candidacy for president of the Serb Republic. To sign in support of his candidacy is much more than politics; it is our sign to the world that we respect our own dignity and the dignity of our people. This is said in a public appeal to the Serb Republic citizens issued today by the SDS Municipal Committee.

B-H: Daily Sees Karadzic Candidacy as Danger for Dayton

AU2306162996 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Sejad Luckin: "Elections and Karadzic"] txt)[FBIS Translated Text] If Radovan Karadzic does appear as a candidate at the September elections, then one can already say that the elections will not take place. If that happens, the peace agreement signed in Dayton would also completely collapse.

Such a denouement would completely obliterate the few jobs that the international community has accomplished in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past six months. But this would also be proof of the clumsy policy of Carl Bildt and his deputy Michael Steiner, and would finish off the already eroded authority of IFOR [Implementation Force].

They (Bildt, Steiner, Frowick, IFOR) and their ineffectiveness have in fact enabled Karadzic's supporters to start contemplating presenting their leader as the top SDS [Serb Democratic Party] candidate three months before the elections. They have in no way let the Serbs know that, according to the Dayton agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina is an integral country and will remain so after the end of their mission. In other words, they have not let the Serbs know that Pale's intention of separating the territory under their control from Bosnia-Herzegovina will not work. Moreover, they did not even try to arrest Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. And yet, these two moves by the international community represent the precondition for everything else that should be done according to the Dayton agreement. However, the international community's emissaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina tackle political issues in the same way they have been doing in the past four years of war. They travel to Pale, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Rome, Washington, Florence, Paris...and again discuss what had already been agreed. Every new session amounts to nothing but a gradual redrafting of the Dayton agreement, and this means of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For instance, the state leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina was promised in Dayton that the war criminals would be arrested and tried in The Hague. A half year later, the international community is satisfied with the removal of Karadzic from the political scene and has allowed Mladic to ridicule IFOR soldiers who got lost on the way to his base near Han Pijesak. So, what else can the poet from Mt. Durmitor [Karadzic] then conclude, but that he is allowed to run as a candidate at the elections and to finish off the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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He can carry on doing that as long as the OSCE officials think their task is to remove the consequences and not the causes of the military attack on and the destruction of this country. In doing so, they are careful to lash all three sides, thus making their responsibility for the war the same. It would therefore be illusory to expect Bildt to renew economic sanctions on Serbia because of Karadzic's impudent behavior. But, if the authorities in Sarajevo decide to boycott the elections, they will be accused of hindering the peace process, which would in fact correspond to the wrong order of moves that the international community has been making in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Sarajevo Radio Reports Karadzic's Alleged Resignation

LD2306145396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The war criminal Radovan Karadzic will offer his resignation in the next few days from the post of president of the Serb entity [Bosnian Serb Republic], but he will remain in power as the leader of the hard-line Serb Democratic Party [SDS—Bosnian Serb ruling party] which controls the government, Bosnian Serb sources said today.

The sources, which wanted to remain anonymous, said that the terrorist SDS would announce next week that Karadzic was to be replaced by [Foreign Minister Aleksa] Buha. Karadzic will step down from power but he will lead the SDS, an official said.

The anonymous sources said that the SDS leadership [words indistinct] under great pressure from the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, who has been threatened by renewal of sanctions should Karadzic remain in power.

Western diplomats in Sarajevo have said quote: Buha is a very good choice. He is completely loyal to Karadzic and he has never overstepped the program of his party.

B-H: 'Sources' Deny REUTER Report on Karadzic's Resignation

AU2306144696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1246 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 23 Jun (BETA)—The report carried by the British news agency REUTER that Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic (RS), will soon resign and that he will be replaced by Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha was categorically denied today by sources close to the RS state leadership in a statement for BETA.

There is still no official reaction in Pale to this report, which the RS state media did not carry.

In contrast to the reports on Karadzic's resignation, a campaign is currently underway in Pale for Radovan Karadzic to appear on the election list of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) at the forthcoming election in the RS, despite the rules of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], which forbid him from appearing on the list of candidates because of war crimes accusations.

After this proposal, which was made by the municipal committee of the SDS in Pale a few days ago, the initiative was joined by the SDS municipal committee in Banja Luka and the Association of War Veterans in Brcko, which numbers more than 15,000 members.

BETA has learned that this initiative will be supported in the next few days by other branches of the ruling party in the RS. The final decision on whether his name will appear on the SDS election list will be made on Friday [28 June], at the party's so-called St. Vitus assembly, which will be attended by the delegates from all over the RS.

Those familiar with the situation in the RS claim, however, that, although he will not resign, Karadzic will not appear on the SDS election list considering that this could jeopardize the party's election victory.

B-H: Buha Denies REUTER Claim of Karadzic's Resignation

LD2306170896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1643 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Jun (SRNA)—Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, today denied the news carried by REUTER about the alleged resignation of Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic.

Denying this report in a statement for BK [Brothers' Karic] television [independent TV station in Belgrade], Buha also rejected as completely unfounded REUTER's claim that he should replace Karadzic in his position as the Serb Republic president.

"These are journalistic speculations," the Serb Republic foreign minister said.

Buha announced that at a convention of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] on 27 and 28 June, it would be decided who will be the party's candidate at the forthcoming elections, who will head election lists, and other details.

REUTER, quoting unnamed sources in the Serb Republic leadership, reported today that President Karadzic

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would soon resign and that Minister Buha would replace him.

The agency also carried the claim that Karadzic would stay at the head of the SDS and that a statement on all this would be issued next week.

B-H: Karadzic on Election Candidacy, Hague Tribunal

BR2406104896 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 24 Jun 96 p 8

[Interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by Gordana Cirjanic in Pale; date not given: "Only My People Can Judge Me"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Cirjanic] Mr. Karadzic, will you be contesting the next election?

[Karadzic] The final decision lies with the next party congress, which will be held here in Pale before the end of June. I will do whatever is best for the Serbian people. Our people have the sovereignty to decide who will represent them.

[Cirjanic] Not only are you wanted by the tribunal in The Hague, but according to the Dayton accords you must also abstain from all political activity. Here in Pale, however, my impression is that all this is of little concern.

[Karadzic] This point in the Dayton accords is unacceptable inasmuch as it lacks a legal basis. Western justice should be based on the presumption of innocence: Everyone is presumed innocent until the opposite has been proven. During the five years of crisis and the four years of war, we lived under constant pressure from the international community and the West. Fortunately we never made any decisions under pressure. By this, I mean that, before being brought to bear, pressures are carefully examined with a view to influencing the decisions and behavior of those against whom they are directed. The best way to deal with pressures is to ignore them, to pretend that they do not exist. The international community is playing cat and mouse with us. It wants to resolve its problems at our expense. Here we see the intersection of the interests of a united Europe or of a Europe that is trying to unite and those of the United States, which wants to undermine it. In Bosnia we see the intersection of the interests of Iran and Sudan. Our Muslims, whose origins are Serbian, share with Iran and Sudan only their religion, and nothing else. Not even their language. Since we are the victims of the clash between various different powers and factors, we must act exclusively on the basis of our own interests. And our interests at the moment are to hold out, to survive, and to avert the enslavement and domination of Islam. This is why we must defend our state, which is the only guarantee of our survival.

[Cirjanic] What does it mean to you to be wanted by justice, to be regarded as a criminal by the international community?

[Karadzic] I prefer to think about those who fought for the Serbian people's ideals and who lost their lives. Many of our families' only children fell, and they had faith in me. I am concerned with these values. The rest does not interest me.

[Cirjanic] It is said that even Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic wants to get rid of you.

[Karadzic] I do not think that he will hand any of us Bosnian Serbs over to the Europeans. The Serbian Constitution prevents him from doing so. I also believe that he would not do anything of this kind for political reasons, too. For Serbian domestic political reasons. Such an action would be a very negative move for any statesman in the world. Personally, I think that Milosevic will have sufficient courage, when the moment of truth comes, to say "no" once and for all to that powerful machine, the international community. To everything that is acceptable we must say "yes," in absolute good faith and with the best intentions, but what is unacceptable from the viewpoint of our national interests must be rejected vigorously and with every available means. The international community must decide to accept our existence. An existence worthy of free men. We will never accept an existence without dignity.

[Cirjanic] Unless I am mistaken, you reject the charges brought by the tribunal in The Hague and consider yourself innocent.

[Karadzic] Only in dictatorial regimes does the suspect have to prove his innocence. In democracies it is the judge that must prove whether someone is guilty. I have always acted out in the open. What I have done, I have done within the context of the state institutions—legally and legitimately elected institutions. All my decisions have been backed by parliament and the people through the referendums. These are sufficient reasons for me not to consider myself guilty. I regard the opinions of the tribunal in The Hague as very arbitrary. The international community acts on the basis of its own interests, and not those of the Serbian people. We simply do not accept that tribunal and a dictated democracy. Either democracy exists, or it does not.

[Cirjanic] Do you believe that the war is really over?

[Karadzic] The war is over. Let me point out to you that we could have averted the war—I mean not we Serbs alone, but together with the international community.

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Nobody remembers that before the war a conference was held in Lisbon at which we submitted the proposal to transform Bosnia-Herzegovina into a confederation of national and ethnic states. The Republika Srpska was the outcome of that conference. Indeed, to be accurate, we were established with the support of the European Community, which sponsored that conference. On that occasion, after some three weeks, the Muslims rejected the agreement that they had previously accepted. We were therefore forced to fight for about three and a half years a war that could have been averted. Dayton saw the approval of something very similar to the proposal that the Serbs submitted in Lisbon. Had it not been for the Muslims' stubbornness, we could have averted the war, the deaths, and the destruction.

[Cirjanic] Could the war resume?

[Karadzic] If the Muslims change their minds and reject the Dayton accords, as they did the Lisbon accords, the war could even resume. We do not want it; we do not want any more war. The real problem now is the federation between Muslims and Croats. For us Serbs, it is most important that they resolve their disputes. Their federation is indispensable to restoring peace and stability to the region.

B-H: SDP Condemns Serb Stand on Brcko's Status

AU2106201096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The threats that have recently been issued by the members of the assembly and the prime minister of the Serb entity, Gojko Klickovic, that they will defend Brcko with arms if the arbitration commission makes an unfavorable decision for the Serb side, and that they will settle Serb refugees in all the areas around Brcko, represent that most brutal violation of the Dayton agreement, an open threat to peace, and the continuity in the criminal policy of genocide and ethnic cleansing by the supporters and [word indistinct] of Radovan Karadzic. This was stated in a statement issued by the Social Democratic Party [SDP]

The statement also adds: The Presidium of the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Brcko SDP Municipal Committee demand a resolute reaction by the relevant state organs, the (?leadership) of the Brcko municipality, the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and President Alija Izetbegovic.

We appeal to all political parties and patriotic forces to raise their voice against the continuation of the policy of ethnic cleansing, plunder, and extortion of other people's property, which the Karadzic regime obviously wants to carry out in Brcko.

B-H: Serbs Moving Into Muslim Homes in Brcko

AU2206141396 Paris AFP in English 1208 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 22 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb authorities are moving Serb families from all over Bosnia into former Moslem homes in the zone of separation round northern Bosnian town of Brcko, the Bosnian daily OSLOBODJENJE said Saturday.

Serb authorities in Brcko, north of Tuzla, are repairing Moslem homes in the officially designated "neutral" area around the town and moving in families from Serb areas elsewhere in the country, the town's Moslem mayor-in-exile, Munib Jusufovic, told the paper.

Brcko, on the banks of the river Sava, was mainly Moslem and Croat before war broke out in Bosnia. An arbitration process should decide by the end of the year who will control the town but the Serb authorities are moving people in in advance of the arbitration in order to try to sway the decision, Bosnian authorities said.

Jusufovic told Oslobodjenje: "We cannot allow people to move into our houses, especially not those who are not from Brcko. In agreement with (the NATO-led peace force) IFOR [Implementation Force] and the Serbs we have already done a lot of work on our houses."

"Both sides want to live in Brcko," he added.

Jusufovic said he hoped there would be a meeting with IFOR, the UN refugee agency and UN police, plus civilian officials overseeing the peace process to decide how to deal with the issue of homes in Brcko.

B-H: Bosnian Serb Republic Parties Form Electoral Alliance

LD2206103496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0956 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 22 Jun (TANJUG)—A new electoral coalition bloc called "the Alliance for Peace and Progress" [Savez za mir I progres—SMP] was launched today at a news conference in Banja Luka. It is made up of the Socialist Party of the Bosnian Serb Republic [SPRS], the Yugoslav Associated Left for the Serb Republic, the Alliance of Independent Social-Democrats of the Serb Republic, the Social-Liberal Party of the Serb Republic, and the New Workers' Party of the Serb Republic.

The Alliance is to be led by an 11-member coordinating body, led by Zivko Radisic, chairman of the SPRS.

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Radisic stressed that all the parties in the bloc, independently and within the deadline, have fulfilled the conditions for participation in the upcoming elections and have been registered with the Interim Electoral Commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The bloc itself registered with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] within the established deadline, which expired at 1700 yesterday.

Radisic said that a platform has been established setting out a minimum of common interests and basic objectives—lasting and stable peace and progress. [passage omitted]

B-H: Krajisnik, IFOR's Smith Discuss Elections, Movement

LD2406123796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1050 GMT 24 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 24 Jun (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, held talks in Pale today with Admiral Leighton Smith [IFOR, Implementation Force, commander] on the forthcoming elections, freedom of movement in the whole of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and implementation of the peace agreement.

Krajisnik said that "the arrest of four citizens from Glamoc, one from Orasje, and the Serbs who have remained in parts of Sarajevo now controlled by the Croat-Muslim Federation [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation] is of special importance at present because this is the best way to see on the ground how the other side abuses freedom of movement."

"People who wrongly believe that they could move freely on the other side's territory were arrested," Krajisnik elaborated, and added:

"As for the prisoners and the stipulations of the Dayton agreement, this is an important issue at the moment because now we have organizations that want to protect their rights as the international community is unable to do so."

Krajisnik pointed out that the Serb Republic wants "to implement the Dayton agreement, but it is often being blamed for certain oversights"; he added that the international community "must pay more attention to the other sides' observance of the stipulations of the agreement."

Expressing his hope that the implementation of the civilian aspect of the peace agreement would be more successful, the speaker said that he had been given Adm. Smith's assurances of doing his best in the future so that elections might be held.

Having emphasized the importance of elections, Adm. Smith expressed his dissatisfaction with "the way in which some citizens are treated, especially with regard to the limitations or restrictions of freedom of movement."

"Mr. Krajisnik told me how concerned he is with the behavior of the federal police toward the Serbs around Sarajevo and I accepted this objection," Smith said, and added:

"I hope that the Dayton agreement will be honored in relation to freedom of movement, so that all citizens may return to their homes, live where they want, and have a chance to work wherever they chose to."

B-H: Bosnian Serb Minister, Czech Envoy Discuss Cooperation

LD2406122096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1046 GMT 24 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 24 Jun (SRNA)—Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, held talks in Pale today with Ondrej Hazlen, the Czech ambassador in Zagreb [Croatia], on the possibility of economic and cultural cooperation between the two states.

"This is an opportunity to speed up economic, cultural, and every other kind of cooperation between the Serb Republic and the Czech Republic which has been suspended owing to the circumstances, primarily the war and the fact that Czechoslovakia was divided into two states," the Serb foreign minister said, and added:

"Mr. Hazlen informed us on the Czech views. It is a general belief here that President Havel's views expressed during the war are both official Czech views and the views of the Czech people. However, even in official circles there are two stands—one is pursued by Havel, another by Prime Minister Klaus."

Minister Buha said he is confident that "the uneasy part of the common history" will end and that normal cooperation and friendly relations between the Serb and the Czech peoples will be established soon.

Buha and Hazlen agreed that ministers of the Serb Republic will prepare an overview of the technological and economic cooperation before the war, so that it can be seen which companies cooperated well and their business relations reestablished.

Ambassador Hazlen said that the Czech Republic's experience with privatization was also discussed, as well

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as the economic cooperation and the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

"We discussed some common historical subjects, problems related to travelling within the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation], humanitarian aid and respect of human rights," the Czech ambassador said.

B-H: Pale's Koljevic on Dayton Accord, Cooperation With FRY

AU2106151896 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "Sl.P.": "Tighter Ties to Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest issue of the Doboj ALTERNATIVA published an interview with the Serb Republic vice president Nikola Koljevic.

The first question for Koljevic was the following. There are contradictory evaluations of the Dayton agreement among the leadership of the Serb Republic; from the fact that, in Dayton, we lost our country, which we had militarily conquered, to the fact that the sovereignty and statehood of the Serb Republic were legalized and recognized there. How do you see the actual situation?

"Views of the Dayton agreement are contradictory. Among other reasons, this is because the agreement itself is the most complicated peace agreement in history. Richard Holbrooke, the chief U.S. mediator, often spoke of the productive double meaning [dvomislenost] of this agreement. But productive for whom? It seems that the difficulties regarding the implementation are disappearing, as both entities strive to make these double meanings more productive for themselves. Moreover, there is obviously a conflict over the effectiveness of the Federation itself. For example, take the dispute over the elections in Mostar, or the Croatian interpretation of cantons as a 'national' political unit [celina], as opposed to the Muslim interpretation of cantons as a parts of a common, 'multiethnic' unit. However, the international community is striving to blunt and 'balance out' all the tricks and double meanings. It is not easy for them. On the other hand, the Muslims are arming themselves and publicly threatening a continuation of the war. That is why, for us, the most intelligent policy is to have the tightest possible ties among all the political movements with regard to the common national and state interests of the Serb Republic. Tighter ties with the FRY are important for the same reason, since the ratio of the forces within the future Bosnia-Herzegovina is not in our favor (2:1 for the Federation, to express it like a soccer result). We will not, because of our disagreement, throw away what we have paid for so dearly with the lives our fighters."

According to Koljevic, "in order to avoid war, it is at this moment most important to create a minimum of political strategic unity, regardless of natural and legitimate party differences."

When asked what currently characterizes the basic relations between the Serb Republic and the FRY and in what direction these relations will continue to develop, Koljevic said: "Attempts at and already existing examples of the tightest cooperation possible. There were problems and differences regarding the role of [former] prime minister Rajko Kasagic, but I hope that this has already been overcome. The FRY respects the decisions that are verified by our assembly. A lot will now depend on us."

The state public media in this region, which reflect exclusively the position of the SDS [Serb Democratic Party], are publicly telling the members of the left-oriented parties that they have signed their own death warrants through their party determination.

Is this also the position of one of the highest authorities in the Serb Republic?

"It is not good if what you are afraid of and what you see as a tendency in the field actually happens. The 'leadership' of the republic is not behind this, nor has anyone from the leadership supported anything like this."

He also gave his opinion on the controversial stories regarding the "unresolved" issues between Banja Luka and Pale. "This will be considered and, I hope, solved at the next session of the assembly. The most responsible people are in no way keen for such an important issue to become (remain) a taboo."

B-H: SGV's Pejanovic, Steiner Discuss Serbs Vote

AU2006185896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Serb Civic Council [SGV] again expressed the demand to open a polling station in Mostar so that Mostar citizens who fled or were expelled from the city at the beginning of or during the aggression could vote. This was stated today in the talks of SGV President Mirko Pejanovic and Vice President Rajko Zivkovic with Michael Steiner, deputy high representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement. Steiner expressed the conviction that the polling station cannot be opened, but reiterated that the international community will provide funds to pay for buses for those Mostar citizens who want to come from Belgrade or elsewhere to Mostar or Nevesinje to vote.

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B-H: 'Democratic Patriotic Bloc' Presented in Banja Luka

AU1906155896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Patriotic Bloc [Demokratski patriotski blok] held a news conference in Banja Luka today. Here is a report by Branislav Bozic:

[Bozic] Its orientation is neither too strongly nationalistic nor overly ideological, and therefore it represents a political center. This is how the representatives of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc determined their position in Banja Luka today. Heading the bloc is Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic, and it consists of five political parties: the Democratic Center Party from Trebinje, the Peasant-Workers Party from Kozarska Dubica, the Nikola Pasic National Radical Party from Banja Luka, the Fatherland Party from Prijedor, and the Democratic Party from Bijeljina. This is not a technical coalition formed prior to the elections, but a much closer unity of parties and people who think independently, Predrag Radic said. With this act, Radic has in fact left the Serbian Democratic Party.

Among other things these parties advocate comprehensive cooperation and the closest possible links with Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, albeit they are not supported by any of the parties there and reject all manipulations, such as those that were above all directed from Zoran Djindjic's Democratic Party. They will participate in the elections with great ambitions, and reckon to win the confidence of one-third of the electorate in the Serb Republic.

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Croatia: Tudjman Interviewed on Developments

NC2106171096 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS in English 18 Jun 96

[Report on an "exclusive interview" with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by correspondent Yusuf Kanli in Zagreb; date not given—received via Internet]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said his country is a Central European state.

In an exclusive interview with the TURKISH DAILY NEWS before his scheduled visit to Turkey, which starts Wednesday [19 June], the Croatian president said implementation of the Dayton peace accord was not expected to be painless one but has to be implemented because there was no other solution available to the conflict on the former Yugoslavia territory.

He said fears that the elections called for by the Dayton Accord might not be held were unnecessary and stressed: "We are going to have elections. I think we have to do everything possible to hold the elections."

However, the Croatian president underlined that "the election itself is not going to change the situation we are in right now" but will create a legal basis for the end of the war and will create preconditions for the new world order in the region.

Accusing opponents of the elections of being against implementation of the Dayton agreements, "That is the essence. We have to face that problem if we want Dayton to end the war and create peace," Tudjman said.

He said the importance of peace becomes even more evident when the other crisis areas in the world are considered. "Similar agreements have been reached in the Middle East between the Israelis and the Palestinians and, in a way, in Europe as far as Northern Ireland is concerned. Because of that, all those who were actually involved in it, especially the United States and other members of the international community who led us to the Dayton peace agreement, must reassure and force some of the players to participate in the election," he underlined.

Tudjman said the Yugoslavia crisis showed that, but for the American involvement, the international community was incapable of dealing with a major crisis. He said that at the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the European Union and the international community wanted to find a solution which would enable the preservation of Yugoslavia. That was not possible, he said, because "it was unnatural."

He complained that "in terms of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis, the international community was on the side of those who wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, even through using force."

The Croatian president said his country attached great importance on relations with Turkey.

"Turkey is important for two reasons. First, politically the position of Turkey is, though not directly Balkan, actually linked with the history of the Balkans and related with the Balkans," he said. "Beside that political linkage, Turkey has special cultural links with the Balkans as could be observed in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and Bulgaria. And it is discernible, whichever way you point, that we have Islamic elements here...."

"Turkish policy has a great role here. And it was shown in relations with Bosnia that it is very important. When we are talking about relations with Croatia and Turkey, we have close, if not identical, views on the situation in Bosnia. It is also clear that Europe is not willing to help us. Turkey is a country which is linked to the Middle East as well as to central Asia, which are parts of the former Soviet Union. Because Croatia was in the former Yugoslavia and because of Bosnia, Croatia is interested and linked to those problems," the Croatian president said.

Responding to a question about regional cooperation, Tudjman said his country supported regional cooperation but did not consider itself a Balkan country. "When we are talking about regional problems, Croatia wants to go back to the area where it was historically and geopolitically based: Central Europe. That was where Croatia was until the end of World War I. Some international groups in Europe and in the world would like to link Croatia to the Balkans, the Balkan regional approach and Balkan institutions, even southeast Europe in the wider concept. Turkey is naturally in that area—Balkan eastern Europe—and Croatia, with its creation as an independent state, is absolutely in the right place to be part of Central Europe. Croatia is Mediterranean and Central European and that is the region with which Croatia is trying to integrate," he stressed.

Tudjman said that the regional approach could serve the purpose of integration but "I have already said that Croatia is interested in good relations with all the countries of the Balkan region and southeast Europe but Croatia, regionally, is a part of Central Europe."

"Regional integration is regional cooperation on the basis of geographic and historic links. Especially in the example of former Yugoslavia, integration of the areas which are part of Eastern Europe with the Balkans. Maybe with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, with the creation of such states as emerged after WW I and WW II, then nowadays, the dissolution of Yugoslavia may

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be earning some recognition for a new and stable order in this part of the world," he said.

Talking about bilateral relations between Turkey and Croatia, Tudjman said the two countries enjoyed extremely good political ties, but economic relations did not so far match political ties. Yet, he said, with the restoration of peace and stability in the region, he was confident that economic relations between Turkey and Croatia would prosper.

"We can say that trade is not on the same level as political relations. There were successful political and military contacts to solve the (Bosnia) crisis and I think that there are good opportunities to develop economic relations with the ending of the crisis and the normalization of relations between all of the states in this area," Tudjman said.

Stressing that his country was in favor of the free market economy, Tudjman said there was a need for initiatives for increased economic transactions between the two countries.

Responding to a question about a military training agreement he is to sign during the forthcoming visit to Turkey, Tudjman said "I think that there is a necessity for such a military agreement."

The Croatian president said he believed the Turks are similar to Croatians and added "They also went through war. I expect that Turkey will continue on the path set by Kemal Ataturk, Ismet Inonu and the others, with President Ozal and President Demirel, and will play a positive role as a bridge between Islam and the Western world. Turks have a role to cement the links between civilizations. With such a role we can prevent the conflict which some extremists would like to see, a conflict which would be catastrophic."

Croatia: Zagreb Seeks Adriatic Pipeline Deal With Russia

AU2206165096 Paris AFP in English 1636 GMT 22 Jun 96

[Article by Tessa Fras]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 21 (AFP)—Croatia is holding talks with Russia on a deal to use an oil pipeline linking Moscow to the Adriatic to export Russian oil to Europe avoiding the narrow Bosphorus Straits, Croatian officials have told AFP.

Croatia and Serbia agreed this week to a deal to pump Chinese oil through the 17-year-old Adriatic pipeline from the Croatian coast to Serbia.

The idea being proposed in talks with Russia "is that this pipeline would be used in a reverse direction," to pump oil from Moscow to the Mediterranean markets, Economy Minister Davor Stern told AFP this weekend.

The pipeline starts opposite an island off the Croatian coast. One branch runs to Belgrade, while the main branch runs to Hungary before joining a network of oil pipelines linking up eastern and central Europe.

The countries served by the pipeline are Austria, Belarus, the Czech Republic, areas of former East Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

Stern, who used to work for the former Yugoslav oil company INA, said that there would have to be modifications to the pipeline in Croatia and in Hungary, to push through the Russian deal, but said that these could be done in "months."

"The Russian crude would be bypassing the Bosphorus Straits, which is limited by the size of ships, and would be loaded into vessels which would be able to carry it all over the world," he said.

The minister said that Russian and multinational oil companies had expressed interest in the scheme and that it would be in the interests of eastern European countries involved to let the deal go through.

However he declined to give the names of the companies of predict when the proposed deal might be signed.

Chris Skrebowski, editor of the London-based publication Petroleum Economist, told AFP that the idea of exporting Russian oil to Europe through the pipeline was technically feasible, if it would require a lot of paperwork to achieve.

"The historic way the pipeline was used was to bring crude oil in and pump it into eastern Europe," he said.

"One of the purposes was to make these countries less dependent on Russia. Of course in the new world order, this may not matter," he said.

The company that runs the pipeline, Jadranski Naftovod, told AFP meanwhile that its principal terminal opposite Omislaj on the northern Croatian island of Krk can take up to 6.1 million tonnes of oil a year.

The current nominal capacity of the pipeline is 24 million tonnes a year, it added.

The pipeline, which passed though an area held by Croatia's rebel Serbs, was closed when war broke out in 1991 until the area was recaptured last August. The branch going to Belgrade was reopened in May after talks between Zagreb and Belgrade.

While Croatia is proposing a deal with Russia, the company is awaiting its first major delivery of recent years.

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According to the Belgrade newspaper Politika, last week, 100,000 tonnes Chinese oil was due to arrive "in the next few days" at the Omisalj terminal.

Croatia: Reaction to Case of Croat General in The Hague

LD2306171696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Croatia intends to replace its counsel for the defense of the accused Croats in The Hague and appoint [words indistinct], Zvonimir Hodak, the counsel for the defense of Tihomir Blaskic, has said. He accused the Croatian government of [word indistinct] all Croats in order to be admitted in the Council of Europe. [Words indistinct] that there is no evidence that the crimes in Ahmici and Stupni Do were committed by Croatian Defense Council [HVO] soldiers. Responsibility for the crimes is allegedly borne by the English who were there at the time.

The former has been immediately denied by the Croatian Government, but not the latter. Our Zagreb correspondent, Nada al Issa, reports:

[Al Issa] Why would Croatia replace its counsel for the defense who claims he will defend all the Croats accused by the Hague tribunal? Is it because of his previous statements, which could be detrimental to the reputation and the status of Croatia in the world—the solicitor Zvonimir Hodak who is defending Tihomir Blaskic and all other Croats has said that neither the HVO nor General Blaskic are to be blamed for the crime in Stupni Do, but British soldiers and their commander at the time, Colonel Bob Stewart, no more or less.

The solicitor claims that he has evidence to support this claim, not very firm, but evidence nevertheless. He also says that there is allegedly no evidence, or at least not firm evidence, that the crimes were committed by the HVO.

Has the talkative solicitor thus become an embarrassment to the Republic of Croatia—not because of Bosnia but because of Great Britain, which also has a vote in the Council of Europe?

Hodak claims that a Croatian ministry—he does not say which one—is prepared to arrest all the Croats in Croatia [as received] with the sole purpose of finally bringing Croatia into the Council of Europe. It would, however, be admitted without its population, Hodak says, because everyone would have been under arrest.

The Croatian Government issued an immediate and firm denial of the part on the Council of Europe. For this very reason it is surprising that it has not denied claims by its counsel for the defense that the HVO did not commit crimes in Stupni Do and Ahmici.

As Stipe Mesic, leader of Croatian Independent Democrats, says: Hodak may play dumb, but President Tudjman will have to react to such statements, if not because of the British and Bosnia, then at least for the sake of the innocent victims—people of Ahmici and Stupni Do. Despite everything, it is well known who killed them.

Croatia: Croatian Official on Slavonian Reintegration

AU2406095196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jun 96 p 5

[Interview with Ivica Vrkic, head of the government Office for the Reintegration of the Croatian Danube Valley, by Zeljko Hodonj; place and date not given: "The Government Will Buy Off Weapons From the Serbs in the Croatian Danube Valley"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "That Serbs and Croats should live together is nonsense! Especially as nobody needs that and as it could be a possible source of problems in the future. I refuse to accept the imposition of tribal relations among the people in that region. We are creating a modern Croatian society by enabling every person to live a free life, regardless of their national feeling. The idea of coexistence, as well as that of brotherhood and unity, is based on a primitive point of view that contradicts everything that modern Croatia is."

150 days into his office as head of the government's office in Osijek, Ivica Vrkic is promoting Croatia's intention to reintegrate the region of Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem in a really peaceful way.

The actions of Gen. Jacques Klein, international administrator of the Transitional Administration in the Croatian Danube valley, have led us to believe that he is a genuinely reliable partner for Croatia, and his actions will now decide whether Vrkic's messages will be successful. Klein should finish the demobilization of the region by 21 June. After that, his commanders will be given one week for inspection, and Klein will report to the UN Security Council two weeks later. From then on (11 July at latest), the civilian aspect of the function of the Transitional Administration comes into being, or more precisely the actual preparations for the establishing of Croatian authorities will begin.

The Return of Displaced Persons First

[Hodonj] What is the most important task in the beginning?

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[Vrkic] The return of displaced Croats. What else? Approximately 90,000 Croats are waiting to return.

[Hodonj] Who will meet them there?

[Vrkic] That is a difficult question. For the time being, we know that approximately 85,000 people are living in the Croatian part of the Danube valley, 20,000 of them non-Serbs. Before we return about 10,000 Serbs will have to leave Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem, because they came from Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia.

[Hodonj] How will they leave?

[Vrkic] The Erdut Agreement obliges them to do so, and their politicians will have to break it to them. If they do not do so, the international forces will. If not, our authorities will have to do that.

[Hodonj] What can those who stay expect?

[Vrkic] The Croatian Government will leave it to every person in that region to decide what they will do. Every individual has to determine his attitude toward his Croatian neighbors and the Croatian state, and then decide. Those whose attitudes are correct will be encouraged to stay. It will be easy to see who wants what, as we will be able to recognize their intentions by whether they are willing to help with the establishment of the Croatian authorities. Those are the criteria and the choice for everybody's personal future. Finally, Croatia is not a big country, and we are interested in each citizen and their contribution to our common prosperity.

Secure Optimism

[Hodonj] Could you describe your work as successful since not a single displaced Croat has returned home after 150 days of your work?

[Vrkic] No serious person could—and I must not—say that reintegration has been successful; it has only just started. I believe that demobilization is almost over, and now we can begin to talk about success, about Croats returning home. We have satisfied the prerequisite conditions, that is all.

[Hodonj] Do you believe that the Serbs have really handed over their weapons?

[Vrkic] The Serbs are handing the weapons over, that is true. They are doing so primarily because they are aware that they cannot fight Croatia anymore. The sooner and less reluctantly they hand over their weapons, the more willing Croatia will be to help them out of the situation their politicians have led them into, and in a more dignified manner. Certain people estimate that 85 or 95 percent of the weapons have been handed over, and that is ridiculous. Nobody but the Serbs knows the exact quantity of weapons there, and we'd better wait for the official report. That refers to heavy artillery. As to small arms, it is clear that every Serb has a gun. We will try to control that, to register every weapon in the region, and then we will offer to buy those off, just as we have done in Croatia.

[Hodonj] General Klein does not seem to share your optimism. He has announced that he needs a prolongation of 6 months, until July 1997.

[Vrkic] Gen. Klein is trying to ensure more time in case he fails to finish all his tasks by 15 January 1997. His duty is very important, and he wants to be very cautious in his work. However, as to the Croatian side, we have done everything to help the Transitional Administration—and the Serbs, too—finish the work in the course of one year. The sooner we establish the Croatian authorities in the region, the easier everybody will find it to live there. Accordingly—and that is my message—do not play the waiting game! Those who want to stay are invited to help with the establishment of the Croatian authorities, and those who want to leave should go as soon as possible.

Individuals Do Not Influence the Course of Events

[Hodonj] Judging by the reports that followed the visit to Vukovar that you had organized for journalists, they did not find a single Serb ready to cooperate in the organization and faster establishment of Croatian authorities. On the contrary, individuals expressed a very different opinion.

[Vrkic] The course of events does not depend on opinions of individual persons. The number of those who are afraid to speak their mind in public, afraid of reprisals from their present neighbors, is much bigger. One of the tasks of Gen. Klein is to create conditions for such individuals to become more exposed. Clearly, individuals act on the level of their experiences.

[Hodonj] Demobilization will be followed by programs for economic reconstruction. Are you familiar with the situation concerning international financial injections before the Croatian authorities take over complete responsibility for events and life in the Croatian Danube Valley? Even Gen. Klein has begun to implement his own program for employment of the local population.

[Vrkic] Those are two different things. Gen. Klein has decided to put tools into the hands of people he had taken guns from, to give demobilized persons a chance to work and make a living. None of that has happened without our knowledge, and it corresponds to the goals and programs of the Croatian Government. Life in that

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region has become very hard, all economic sources—except plundering—having collapsed. The resolute action of Gen. Klein has stopped the exploiting of oil fields near Djeletovci, the felling of oak trees, and plundering of the movable possessions of Croats—although we cannot say that the plundering has altogether ceased.

On the other side, ideas about financial injections from abroad before the Croatian authorities are established are very dangerous. The idea is allegedly to initiate private enterprise among persons who are already integrated into the existing system of local authorities. That would refresh their political power, which would give them unwanted ambitions to attempt political survival. The eventual consequence would be that, after plundering and occupation and all the things they have done in that region, we would invest in them as modern businessmen. The majority of those persons have defiled their relation toward Croatia, and we have warned the international community not to do such things without the consent of the Croatian Government.

"The Dissolved Unity"

[Hodonj] Does that mean that the Croatian Government has put a veto on such initiatives?

[Vrkic] On the contrary. Such initiatives are welcome, but only if they are logical. The reconstruction of the region is out of the question if the Croatian Government does not cooperate, and we are ready to discuss that, provided that the reconstruction is proceeded with according to the priorities.

[Hodonj] What does that mean?

[Vrkic] Displaced persons have to begin returning first. Now we have to reconstruct the infrastructure—that is crucial for the people in the region.

[Hodonj] What do you consider to be the greatest success in the past period?

[Vrkic] Our greatest success is that the entire region of Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem has been—let me put it metaphorically—dissolved in unity. Thanks to the consistency of the Transitional Administration, especially Gen. Klein, we can move freely around the region in his organization now, and that is a great achievement. With Klein's invitation, every person from the free part of Croatia can move over the entire territory under his supervision. The symbolical importance of our coming to the eastern border with the Croatian police and customs is immense. I think its political effect is equal to that of the operation Flash. We came there without a single shot being fired. We all understand that there is no room for illusions from sentimental politics. Serious Serbs ruled out that nonsense about autonomy before the ink was dry on the newspapers. A healthy psychological atmosphere has been created, and everybody understands that the Croatian authorities are coming to the region. The sooner they all get used to the idea, the easier it will be for everybody. It is all a matter of time and how it is done.

We Do Not Allow Blackmail

[Hodonj] Mentioning that, the Croatian Absolution Law does not seem to have had a good reception there. How do you explain that?

[Vrkic] There were negative opinions, mainly from local politicians. That is just a result of the intentions and ambitions of those politicians to blackmail Croatia and ensure mercy for Serbs everywhere. That is ordinary phoniness, which should not be taken seriously by anyone who has common sense. The Law applies to the population of Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem, and we will not let anybody blackmail us. Finally, Croatia has adopted the third Absolution Law already, which proves that we are ready to forgive—if things are forgivable.

[Hodonj] According to certain information, the Army of the FRY still recruits the population of the Croatian Danube Valley—unhindered. What have you done about that?

[Vrkic] Gen. Klein convinced us—and he told me so in person—that he would intercede with Milosevic and ask him to stop the recruiting of Croatian citizens in Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem. He is a serious person, and I believe he has done so.

[Box, p 5]

Return Before Fall

[Hodonj] Can you give us any concrete data about the beginning of the return?

[Vrkic] This week we will make a plan for clearing mines from the region of Lipovac, Ernestinovo, Antunovac, and other places—about 10 places altogether. When the plan is finished, engineers will begin their work. After that, people can begin to return, and we will make the first estimations of war damage. At the moment wedo not know exactly what has been destroyed, what the exact size of the destruction is, and how much has been stolen. The provisional police forces will be established by then, and nothing will stop the Croats from returning to their homes.

[Hodonj] When will displaced persons be able to return to the places you have mentioned?

[Vrkic] Before fall.

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[Hodonj] Do you think they will be satisfied with returning little by little?

[Vrkic] Nothing can satisfy them. Whatever we do cannot be good enough for them. Being displaced for five years is more than anybody can take. Regardless of how angry they are, and whatever they say, we would not have achieved all this without their tolerance. Without their sacrifice in the beginning of the war and patience in the end, Croatia would not have had a chance to prove good enough both in the war and in victory, in the military and political actions.

[Box, p 5]

Good Cooperation With General Klein

[Hodonj] The realization of your task is quite dependent on Gen. Klein. How would you describe your cooperation?

[Vrkic] Our relations are the relations of equal partners with the same task. We have never misused each other—each of us does his part of work within his mandate. Gen. Klein is a cautious, brave, and wise person, strong enough to follow his ideas and realize them very successfully. We have never negotiated or done anything in the interest of Croats and at the expense of Serbs—it has always been in the best interest of Croatia.

Croatia: Minister Views Serbs' Future in E. Slavonia

AU2106172096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Jure Radic by Jozsef Szabo; place and date not given: "Croatia Welcomes the Hungarians Back"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first phase of the region's reintegration and the area's demilitarization has come to its completion in Eastern Croatia's Serb-occupied areas. In accordance with the international peace agreement, in addition to the 5,000 foreign soldiers already present, the joint Serb-Croatian patrols, trained in Hungary, will also be joining in supervising the area starting on 22 June. Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Jure Radic gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG on the future of south Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Szeremseg [Srijem], which also have Hungarian inhabitants, and are to come back under Croatian control.

[Szabo] What can be expected after demilitarization?

[Radic] The restoration of the Croatian administration will be started gradually and peacefully. In the first phase of the region's reintegration, we will be concentrating on reconstruction and the return of the refugees. The plan for rebuilding the region is ready, we have put out several tenders for the work to be done, and we have selected some of the contractors. The reconstruction of eastern Croatia will start in July and Lipovac will be the first settlement to be restored.

[Szabo] When can the Croatian Hungarians who have been driven away return?

[Radic] Croatia is their homeland and we expect them to return and we will do all that we can to ensure that they can start a new life in the framework of peaceful reintegration. We would like them to get involved in the reconstruction as soon as possible.

[Szabo] When can we expect the region's only Croatian-Hungarian border crossing to be opened?

[Radic] Coordination talks on opening the crossing point at Udvar are in progress. We are working on facilitating the crossing as soon as possible.

[Szabo] How is the Croatian Government trying to prevent the local Serbs from fleeing?

[Radic] The area's peaceful reintegration excludes the possibility of military actions against Serb-controlled eastern Croatia. The Zagreb leadership takes the view that all those people who accept Croatia as their homeland should stay and participate in the reconstruction. However, some will reject Croatian authority and will leave to another country.

[Szabo] Can the Serbs get autonomy?

[Radic] They will not get it, there is no realistic basis for Serb autonomy in eastern Croatia. This is so partly because no autonomous regions will exist anywhere in Croatia and partly because they did not have either an absolute or a relative majority in these areas (eastern Slavonia, south Baranja, and western Srijem) at the beginning of their aggression against the country.

[Szabo] Can the almost 200,000 Serbs who fled Croatia last year return?

[Radic] They fled the country of their own accord. If they respect Croatian laws and accept the obligations that apply to everyone, they can return to Croatia. However, those who revolted against Croatian authority and the war criminals will have to answer for their actions.

[Szabo] When can we expect Croatian-Yugoslav relations to be normalized?

[Radic] To show our good intentions, we have signed bilateral agreements with the Yugoslav side and we are trying to fulfill our commitments in the same spirit. We have no objections to the country calling itself

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Yugoslavia. However, we consider it unacceptable for this state to become the only legal successor to the former Yugoslavia.

Croatia: Serbs Demand Extension of UNTAES in E. Slavonia

AU2206151196 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 20 Jun 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have just received another report on today's session of the district assembly. The fourth session of the Assembly of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem held in Dalj decided to demand that the UN Security Council extend the 12-month transitional period for another 12 months. The extension of the transitional period is based on Article 1 of the basic agreement on the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem. According to the explanation sent to the UN Security Council, the demand to extend the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mandate is based on the basic and, according to them, tragic fact that there is a strong, warlike conflict between the two sides, whose relations cannot improve in a period as short as 12 months, much less reach a level of tolerance.

The explanation warns of the unambiguous, vengeful determination of the Croatian side manifested in daily statements by Croatian representatives and selective amnesty laws passed outside the framework of international guidelines. The Serb nation on the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem agreed to and completed the demilitarization, having faith in the objectivity of the international community and its protection, provided through its regular institutions as well as those formed for the transitional period, states the explanation of the demand forwarded to the Security Council to extend the transitional period, adding that only the highest degree of goodwill and involvement by all three sides can, over the long run, produce positive results. In conclusion, the explanation of the demand says that the end of the transitional period after only 12 months would send a clear message to the Serbs in the district to leave the territory.

The Assembly reviewed the cooperation with UNTAES and concluded that the present problems result from different approaches in the work of committees for UNTAES documents. Vojislav Susa, coordinator for cooperation with UNTAES, said that the ambiguous amnesty law, incomplete basic documents laying the groundwork for the mission, and open threats from the Croatian side are the main obstacles to the population's acceptance of Croatian certificates of citizenship. "We are amnestied until Croatia gets a chance to prove otherwise," said Susa, alluding to the ambiguous amnesty law.

(Median Kishor), UNTAES high official and documents committee chairman, agreed with some of the claims and emphasized that citizenship is the outcome of all documents and rights of man and will ultimately have to be accepted as such by the population of the Serb district. "You better accept it sooner while UNTAES is still here," said (Kishor), adding that the document on citizenship does not prevent the Serbs from taking a better opportunity at a given moment. (Kishor) said the period following demilitarization is the best time to begin the real process, as he put it.

Informing the deputies about the political-military situation, Colonel Slobodan Antonic, Slavonia-Baranja Corps chief of staff, praised the success of the UNTAES monitoring activity and said that the UNTAES monitoring system had thus far discovered and registered all incursion attempts by Croatian forces. Col. Antonic said that the present political-military situation excludes the possibility of military action by Croatia and explained that UNTAES mediated an agreement to withdraw the Croatian military 30 km into the territory from the former separation line.

The first part of the district assembly session reviewed the fiscal policy problems and rescinded the law on special sales tax for financing the Serb Army of Krajina. The bill to change and complete the social insurance law was the most controversial item in this part of the session. [passage omitted]

The debate on extending the UNTAES mandate and the declaration on the district's special status were conducted in a closed-door session.

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FYROM: VMRO-DPMNE Leader Wants Early Elections

AU2206175896 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 21 Jun 96 p 4

[Report on interview with Ljubco Georgievski, leader of the VMRO-DPMNE, by Zarko Jordanovski; place and date not given: "It Will Culminate in the Fall"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest changes to the political map of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] alter the role of the political subjects. Strategies are being prepared, allies selected, and methods of work elaborated upon. The opposition parties are particularly "dynamic" in this sense.

According to Ljubco Georgievski, the leader of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], the party experienced a turning point at its 10th Congress, after which "it hardly steps out of the track." Although the outcome of his party's latest initiative (together with the Democratic Party) for early elections remains uncertain, its long range effect on the overall political situation in Macedonia is indisputable.

The Authorities Impose a Policy of Force

"The political climate following the Macedonian legislature's rejection of the '150,000 signatures' initiative has been imposed by force and by violations of the Constitution. A large number of citizens are disappointed with the situation and are asking for more. The situation is fragile. The political tension and changes, combined with social discontent and dissatisfaction with the degree of democracy in the country, will culminate in the fall. VMRO-DPMNE was prepared to launch a more aggressive political strategy to channel this disappointment. A growing number of political subjects are becoming ripe for 'street democracy' as another constitutional possibility," says Georgievski. Nevertheless, he hopes the Constitutional Court will decide "according to its conscience."

"'Street democracy' is a legal form of democratic expression of disappointment. When demonstrators in France block Paris, nobody even thinks of saying it is anticonstitutional or antistate. It is part of the democratic atmosphere in the country. The same thing happens in England, Germany, or the United States," Georgievski says. "VMRO-DPMNE continues its institutional struggle before the international organizations in order to disseminate real information about the situation in Macedonia."

Georgievski noted that international institutions are already pressuring the authorities in Macedonia, and he has not ruled out the possibility that the strong European attitude toward the Macedonian negotiating delegation in Brussels is a result of that pressure.

The Bubble Has Burst Over "Fast Admission to the EU"

VMRO-DPMNE has focused its criticism of the present authority on foreign policy.

"The last trip by Jane Miljovski's delegation to Brussels was another debacle for Macedonian foreign policy. There is an attempt to present the complete failure of the Macedonian negotiators as a victory and to present the leadership as very patriotic for not accepting the agreement because of the FYROM formulation. On the other hand, it has done the same things a thousand times before," Georgievski says.

"This is a pretext to justify failure before the Macedonian audience. Another bubble has been burst. Actually, it is the same one Macedonian authorities have been publicly blowing for years; that is, the claim that 'we are just about to join the EU.' The truth is that Macedonia is very far from Europe and is in a far less favorable position than other eastern European countries. The time has come for someone in Macedonia to ask the following question: Now what? That is the biggest national problem for everyone who feels at least a little responsible for Macedonia. What will Macedonia's place be in the next five, 10, or 15 years? Europe has slapped us. Right now Macedonia has been given the role of a buffer zone for the EU."

Georgievski does not reject European orientation as Macedonia's strategic determination, but he believes the previous approach to foreign policy has been a mistake. He is particularly cautious about neglected relations with the "other super power."

"In the overemphasized courting of the West, the attacks against Russia have become immeasurable, excellent economic ties have been broken, and some of Macedonia's old markets have been lost. I am afraid that this imbalanced policy will put us in the gray area between East and West," says Georgievski.

VMRO-DPMNE's leader predicts that Macedonia will finally find its place in the European family 15 to 20 years from now. Until then, Macedonia cannot afford to spoil its relations with Russia. "Macedonian politicians," Georgievski says, "should at least refrain from making frivolous statements."

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Abandoning Equal Distance

Referring to policy toward neighbors, Georgievski notes that equal distance has been abandoned as a principle, particularly in the last five to six months.

"With the coming of [Foreign Minister] Frckovski and [Culture Minister] Unkovski, we can freely say that Macedonia is once again becoming a Serbian economic and cultural colony at the expense of a permanent deterioration in relations with the other neighborly countries. The definition that existed until 1990 has been revived: The three neighbors are our enemies, and Serbia is our only friend," says Georgievski.

Georgievski sees confirmation of this in the "imposition of customs unification that is now being agreed upon by the two governments" for the sake of definitively uniting Macedonia with Serbia.

"The Macedonian authorities' policy toward Serbia is leading the country to a real destabilization that could end in civil war. Kiro Gligorov and the authorities must remember once and for all: There is no return for Macedonia to Serbia!"

As far as the internal economic plan is concerned, VMRO-DPMNE intends to draw the people's attention to what Georgievski calls the "general plunder of state wealth in the country."

"Beside the plunder in privatization, there is also plundering of the state budget. There are newspaper articles about small-time smuggling and about the gray economy, but the plundering of the state budget is rarely mentioned as part of organized crime. It is well known that 10 percent of each deal the ministry makes goes directly into the pocket of the minister or his assistant. Builders or contractors working with the government will confirm this for you," Georgievski accuses.

"The disastrous foreign policy, the catastrophic economic and social policy, and the paralyzed democracy, combined with the incapabil[illegible]f the government, are the strongest reasons for new elections," says Georgievski.

"Unless early elections are held now, by the time the next elections are held in two years, all political parties will be united on one foundation: to break and rebut the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia]," Georgievski stated.

FYROM: Court Reduces Sentences of Tetovo Activists

AU2106132496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Skopje District Court has decided to reduce the sentences for the Tetovo University activists. Thus, the sentence for Professor Dr Fadil Sulejmani was reduced from two years six months to one year, for Nevzat Halili from one year and six months to one year, and Milaim Fevziu from six months to four months.

The court ruling is final and according to it, the defendants will serve their sentences. The bail deposited by the defendants will be returned to them.

FYROM: Interior Minister Cokrevski Interviewed

96BA0229A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 1 Mar 96 pp 7-10

[Interview with Tomislav Cokrevski by Vasil Mickovski and Eleonora Karanfilovska; place and date not given: "The Police Need Criticism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The biggest surprise in the rostrum of the new government, and, therefore, the media, last week, was the name of Professor Dr. Tomislav Cokrevski, who was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs. Despite his heavy work load, Prof. Cokrevski responded to the request to discuss with PULS his reasons for assuming such a high and risky function in his career, given the nature of current events. The reasons for such discussion are broader than the liberal period of the 1970's and his "removal" as the opponent of party ideology, despite the civic involvement as chairman of the former prestigious Human Rights Forum, former rector of Skopje University, and Law School professor, while remaining a person who could distance himself from the authorities and look at the actual conditions in the country.*

[PULS] In our first contact, after your nomination as Minister of Internal Affairs, we were somewhat confused as to how to address you: professor or minister. You said that you prefer the title professor, this being a permanent position. What was your personal reason to abandon this position for the sake of something less enduring?

[Cokrevski] I had several reasons. Let me try to clarify a few of them. I believe that it will become clear why I quickly abandoned such a lasting career for something provisional. Naturally, it is not a question of replacing one with the other, for my intention is, in as much as I am able, to keep in touch with the faculty, the students, and the subjects I taught. Some new subjects

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have appeared, and I must complete writing the required textbooks. I hope that this aspect of my professorship will remain.

[PULS] Despite the remarks voiced by some of your colleagues?

[Cokrevski] I am not sure that colleagues who have made remarks are right. Nowhere in the world is professorship restricted. The interpretation that it is a violation of the rules to be involved with both sides is rather extreme and very dogmatic and, to a certain extent, malicious. Perhaps this could be discussed on another occasion. There are a variety of interpretations and, for the time being, things are as they are and I shall concentrate on practical affairs. If the court were to issue a strict resolution, I shall obey it. We shall see which side prevails.

Let me go back to another existing view: The reasons for my assuming that position. The reasons are several. Regardless of all restructuring and excitement, I had no personal ambition to become directly involved in day-to-day politics, in the structure of the political system and the state. I believed that, taking my age into consideration, the end of my career should be in the field of teaching. I have several projects on which I am working. I am preparing another book dealing with an area which has been quite neglected, both in our country and throughout the world—the sociology of the law, the correlation between law and society, subject and object, a discipline, which I consider quite important, not only in the training of lawyers but more broadly in shaping the basic principals of the system, which are so greatly needed in our country as well. Recently, when certain crises occurred in the top political structure surrounding the Alliance [for Macedonia—governing coalition], and the coalition government, and the partnership, the continuing functioning of parliamentary democracy, the problem of opposition and the government, a crisis developed caused by the fact that the social democratic group could no longer support the partnership for various reasons (I am unwilling to emphasis them, above all because of the position which I hold, although, as a sociologist, I always keep track of such matters). That crisis concealed a serious threat of an even worse crisis that could lead Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] into uncertainties and perhaps even ruin previous accomplishments. I do no know whether I am using big words here, but that is my view of the situation. My opinions were influenced by some consultations, contacts, suggestions, and advice to pursue a course of clear political orientation in which we shall find out who is responsible and who is not. In the final account, we need a younger, more daring governing structure in the political system in order to develop the government's identity and make it assume responsibility for the fate of this land, as long as it has been elected and is part of the system. There were certain dangers, some old schemes, so to say, which encouraged the idea that the destiny of this country depends on a single person, on individuals, or else on the agreement reached by partners. I do not share this view. I believe that what happened deserved support. In that situation, I was asked to help. I am saying this most frankly. The main reason is the fact that the group which asked for this believed that it needed a skillful person with the proper knowledge and ability. It is not proper to speak about myself, but past experience speaks for me. I became Minister of Education at the age of 33 and have experienced the vicissitudes of political life. I believe that essentially, in terms of my social activity, I have acted honestly. I have supported the view that we must do something with this piece of land. This skill was needed, and the people believed that I will be a good stabilizer, a person who will surmount various quarrels, extremes, and radicalisms, which naturally breakout and that, from this point of view, and precisely in such a position, I would be able to contribute to stabilizing a course aimed at settling some interstructural differences, and at creating bridges with other structures outside parliament, for I have never displayed any kind of partiality or orientation preventing me from discussing matters with other people. I believe that this is needed in terms of the development of our system. This is one reason.

Another reason is that I consider as most important the issue of the functioning of the system's institutions and, in connection with the institutions, the functioning of the law. However important the economy may be, the view which all of us shared and which does not require too many explanations, is that now, during this period, it is important for everyone to truly concentrate on the creation of a system of life, of existence, something known as economic experience. Equally important to me is the issue of the functioning of the institutions and the laws. It is not merely a matter of establishing institutions. It is not a question of merely passing a law. It is much more important for them to be able to function. Here, in Macedonia, we must realize that individuals, personalities are not all that important (they may be important but not too much), for it is more important to have a system, an institution, a law, and for everyone to base his expectations on them, and be confident as to what could happen to him, what is the nature of his daily life, and remove some of the uncertainties threatening him. I am not so ambitious as to think that I am the person who will accomplish this. However, I could contribute to it. Suffice it to point that out. Through this ministry, it would suffice to

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have everyone take into consideration the institutions, principles and laws. I believe that this is one of the country's fundamental problems. This is as important as the question of whether we have money, bread, and so on. Economic problems may be resolved. However, the economy would not be able to survive without an institutionalized legal framework of operations. In such cases the Mafia, the criminals, and abuses easily take over. I do not know whether I am clear enough as far as my reasons are concerned. At one point I had thought that I was in a good situation, I had completed some projects, I became involved with [Human Rights] Forum, and we from the Forum had provided the basic principles for a model and an orientation. A great deal of what the state has adopted on the basis of the constitution and other laws started from the Forum as ideas, as principles.

[PULS] We listened to you carefully. You are discussing a new position which you support and which you believe is important to the state and with respect for the laws. At the time it existed, however, the Forum dealt mostly with the laws, with their changes, and most of all, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Cokrevski] I do not see a big contradiction here. A great many of the principles we adopted, I believe, were formulated officially. Whether they will be implemented is a different matter. I shall never allow myself, wherever I am, or wherever anything depends on me, to tolerate something conflicting with what we discussed at the Forum. I can clearly tell you that. I hope that from this aspect as well, from the aspect of the entire body of human rights and the aspect of the freedom of man and democracy (real democracy and not only formally adopted) the resolutions, decisions, and management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will be related to this. Naturally, this will be done within the limits of the possible, for in no case could such a service be totally democratic in terms of its actions, although it may be so in terms of its essence. I shall try, if possible, eventually to democratize some operations and keep track of this entire body of problems related to human rights. Bare mention of human rights without providing them with real protection is meaningless. If the services operate in that direction, I believe that success will follow.

[PULS] You shed a new light on your assumption of this position, for the name of Tomislav Cokrevski was mentioned quite harshly and in a vulgarized manner, both related to the Forum and directly to the present Minister of Internal Affairs Ljubomir Frckoski. The outcome appears to be a continuity of people sharing the same idea.

[Cokrevski] Absolutely. There is no question in my mind that this is a continuity, whatever others may say. There are people who, motivated by a variety of ideas, like to be malicious and unfair. The Forum played its role. It stopped to function, and I say this clearly, after most of its members became state officials. At that point it would have been dishonest to function as members of the Forum. As people sharing this ideology, we must act within the state itself. Is this not a continuity? Is it not a continuity to support such a philosophy, such ideology developed by the Forum, including a concept which later found its way in the Constitution and other matters. A large number of principles have been debated. During that provisional period of transition, which was the most critical, when the issue was raised as to what model to choose—national, nationalistic, or civil—we prevailed. At least I hope that such is the case.

[PULS] That was a period of intensive shaping of political parties. Why is it that those people who truly worked jointly, who shared an idea, who were always together, who worked and fought jointly, did not adopt the path of this kind of political organization but acted as a civic initiative? Today, once again, a number of people have become part of the authorities.

[Cokrevski] I believe that had we organized ourselves as a party, we would have had no future, but develop as some marginal party, for we still carried the burden of the fact that we were struggling for power. Power was not our target. We did not fight for power. It was the authorities who felt that they needed us. The involvement of the people was not an institutional foundation like the Forum. The involvement of the people was as individuals, and the Forum consisted of individuals who shared the same ideological platform, the same philosophy in terms of the key processes that were developing at that time. Of this I am sure. I am not upset by the criticism that the Forum no longer exists. My view was that it had already become tasteless for the Forum to continue. Another matter was the significant dimension of the Forum, which became incompatible with our system in which all of us participated and built—starting with the Constitution, human rights, and so on, which now must be resolved somewhat differently. In the Forum we raised real issues. I am not saying that there was no abuse, I am not saying we must have a Forum that, most likely, may reappear, perhaps like some kind of new Forum, which I may not join....

[PULS] But you will be its topic?

[Cokrevski] Yes, I will be its topic but I will not participate in its essential operations. I will not be vain if the police are criticized. The police must be criticized.

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One of the dimensions, in my view, of the behavior of that service is the nature of the public thinking and the public attitude toward it. The police need criticism.

[PULS] In one of your articles you noted that human rights and freedoms are a forbidden zone for the state and the state organizations. However, when it becomes a question of the defense of human rights, it is presumed that the impulse will originate precisely with the citizen, that the citizen will raise the issue of the more rigid standards set by an authoritarian system. Today the citizen finds himself in an ambivalent position: he would like to have greater freedoms but, more specifically, the citizen is afraid of the stronger party, the state. I believe that we barely discuss or even mention topics dealing with restricting the citizens. We are as yet to discuss topics of threats to privacy and the intimate world of the citizen. Could the lack of discussion in this area be explained exclusively with the fact that we are preoccupied with economics and politics?

[Cokrevski] Such is probably the case, but there is more. In my view, some laws exist in daily life, which develop slowly and cannot take place overnight. It took a long time to develop our mentality. Everyone of us is a formed individual, socializing in a specific way, and such socialization has been influenced by objective and subjective factors, and within that framework and within that mentality in this area, those topics were not part of the awareness of the people. If we start feeling them (those topics which are felt within the personality), one may feel threatened by the fact that someone is interfering with his private life. Reaction and resolution are an issue which has been resolved differently in the western world. The privacy, intimacy, and closed system of a person's life are related to the extent to which the person is economically, culturally, and politically emancipated, the extent of his independence in terms of social policy, not only in terms of the system but in the daily social environment in which he lives. In terms of the development of global democratic processes in Macedonia, in my view, a great deal of freedom has come along with pluralism. Today, we have a different social situation in terms of our way of life, the battle for survival, and the safeguard of the family. This entire conversion to privacy, to private business, to capital, will also increase the need for the individual to protect his privacy and intimate life, his home, his private existence. At that point, most likely, there will be greater pressure for the emergence of such topics, to be discussed and even to lead to the creation of some associations and institutions to defend them. This exists all over the world.

[PULS] Surveillance which, in its way, involves respect and protection of human rights and privacy, came to our country as a political topic. It so happens that a party in the opposition accused the authorities of using the old methods. The use of force by the police as well became politicized and this suggests that some political parties that seemingly promote human rights are actually using pressure for observing such rights, instead of waiting for this issue to be brought up by a citizen who, let us say, will accuse the state. Should we expect such a development and wish that it would happen?

[Cokrevski] I believe that the citizens are of great importance. The interference of political parties, especially those that are strongly ideological and nationalistic, immediately makes clear that such accusations are somewhat true, but also include to a large extent the party's interest, which becomes part of the political struggle waged by the party for sympathizers, for votes, for improving its rating. The parties engaging in such criticism are neither very popular nor trustworthy. It is a different situation when a citizen is struggling for his rights. As to surveillance by that service, I have not looked into this situation, but, in my view, this has a long history in the course of which I personally was subject to surveillance. I believe that there must be strict rules that must be observed by all. No one has the right to threaten the freedom of the citizens before establishing, on the basis of their behavior, that it is a question of actions that will threaten the state. Such actions must be legally defined. Whenever documents are submitted relative to that procedure, although I have not as yet seen the action, the greatest responsibility must be born by the one who approves the document. That could be a judicial authority or an internal affairs authority that follows the case, and who must have strong reasons which must not be ideological. However, there also are the interests of the state. I am new in this area, but an individual should not be part of the service to be aware of the fact that Macedonia is becoming a very difficult area where the interests of many countries and neighbors and, more extensively, both European and global interests, intersect. The interests and activities of the services intersect as well. There are several such areas in the world where the services are not located inside their respective countries. This happens in a variety of ways—geographic, border, and so forth. It is not surprising that in this case we can see a variety of crisscrossing interests. I am thinking, at this point, still as a sociologist and not as a policeman.

Second, Macedonia could also be a good area for some other structures supported by other interests, business, and so on. This is beginning to be felt in Macedonia and we must have a protective service. We must have a service that will be as aware as possible as to what is happening, of who has come, and how he has come. In this context it may happen that some of our citizens

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become the object of investigation by the services. I would like to point out that by nature, essentially, I am a democrat. However, the defense of the affairs of the state, the land, the people, is also democracy. Third, there is a great interest in Macedonia and in the penetration of the country by its neighbors and, perhaps, by others, exerting their influence with the help of capital.

Within this context lies anything that normally relates to Macedonia—how to manage not being locked out, to be supportive of capital, ideas, and people. However, this does not mean threatening our existence, our originality and our essence. Why am I mentioning this? To realize that that ministry could perform a very important existential function in terms of our community. Every person must know this. We know that here his safety is being protected. I do not intend to do a great deal about relaxing the attitude of the citizens towards the police in the sense that the citizens would feel that the police are their own officials. However, there may be a change in relations, from employees behind the desk to the attitude of the police concerning the streets, the traffic, such people must feel that they are in favor of the citizens and the citizens must find a way to help them. However, this should not operate on the basis of the Balkan principle: if I make a mistake, you will forgive me and you will not punish me. Conversely, a number of matters here should be settled.

[PULS] I assume that one of the challenges is to reach a very fine balance between the two aspects of the police: its state-promoting function and that of the concept of civil service, and, at the same time, keep these two functions separate.

[Cokrevski] A clear demarcation between the two should be established.

[PULS] Although this may sound morbid, the attempt on President Gligorov's life was such a special "challenge" for the service. It revealed all the cracks in the specialization of the services and their dimensions. In a way, this attempt exposed us. What is your opinion of this situation, considering that at this moment you could look at it from a certain distance?

[Cokrevski] I agree with the statement that this exposed us. Unfortunately, even misfortunes should teach us something and become a basis for a serious analysis. There is a methodological step in sociology according to which a great deal of laws are focused on exceptional cases, which otherwise remain concealed. You can analyze the police but not attack the structure and the system, and ignore the essence of some matters which have now become apparent. As far as I am concerned, special attention will be paid to that event.

[PULS] On the other hand, it was a challenge for the state as well, which would like to punish the perpetrator. This will prove our persistence and decisiveness.

[Cokrevski] This dimension exists and must be retained. Regardless of when the perpetrator will be exposed, the crime will never become obsolete. This is due to a number of reasons. First, as a principle of justice. There is no state based on the law without justice. I am one of the sociologists of the law who consider this of great importance. Not the law in the absolute meaning of the word, but, at a certain point, inevitably some of its elements appear indicating the truth. I will be pleased if this matter is resolved as soon as possible. Intensive work is being done on this subject. We must introduce a certain modernization in the ministry. We cooperate well with foreign countries and we shall continue with such cooperation and undertake to cooperate with some other countries. This makes me confident that we shall be able to accomplish something.

[PULS] Once you become familiar with the work, what will you do? Do you intend to submit a work program to the public, so to say?

[Cokrevski] I need some time to become familiar with some of the structural and functional characteristics of this ministry, and with personnel and other problems. I also must study the formulation of the problems related to the security of Macedonia and what I too could contribute. At that point, I believe, I shall be prepared to face the public. In principle I am in favor of communication but not the type of communication in which a minister should discuss individual cases with the public. This should be done by the services. However, if some cases trigger the concern of society, this would be a proper occasion to do so. For example, in a commentary of the study of the attempt, in my view, the service did not act properly. This ministry needs a service dealing with public relations, for the sake of providing fast information and establishing contacts, and not only with the press.

[PULS] We were sidetracked somewhat from the fact that you are included in the list of ministers. Somehow, this was surprising, for you have reached what is essentially a high government position without having any party involvement. Even the best informed newsmen cannot pigeonhole you. Somehow, this suggests that you have not had a great deal of time for thoughts.

[Cokrevski] I would not like to leave the impression that the decision about me was hasty, or else that I had no time and that I did not know what I was doing, although from the official point of view, it may seem so. I told you that in my last discussion we made certain evaluations which indicated my involvement. I must

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tell you, and the prime minister could confirm this, that this was his idea and he asked for my support of this concept. I believe that, if I am part of the project, this would be a stronger reason for people to act more thoughtfully in some key projects. I have already said that I could contribute to the stabilization, to the elimination of certain friction which appeared, and to a more stable organization of the functioning of the principles of parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, this is a very sensitive area and, perhaps, looking for the psychological background, the search was for a person to guide this sensitive service along a peaceful and ethical way within the laws. I was that man. That is something that applies to all.

[PULS] In any case, the choice was a person with high credibility in the eyes of the public, a person with his own principles. I presume that you as well have set your own conditions?

[Cokrevski] I did set some conditions. One of them is that I insist that institutions stand above the people. Personalities are not the most important. What is most important is the institutions and the laws as well as respect for the same. I said that I shall never yield to any daily political party interference, and they know this. I respect the party that nominated me. However, there is no need, if we are setting up a political government, for the government to be a party as well. The connection is only in the main guideline, the fact that that party is in power and enjoys a parliamentary majority. Within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I shall insist that the parties have no contact with it. In that sense, I am not interested in party requirements. The most important work in that Ministry is professionalism and the development of a professional police based on the law, the Constitution, and the rules, the needs of the citizens, and not the needs of the party. In that sense, I believe that there will be no problems. The people employed by the Ministry must remain calm, for there will be no shifting, something which a party was able to do in the past.

[PULS] This applies not only to that Ministry but it is precisely the same concept that now is being persistently promoted—the fact that the authority or the party in power now has the opportunity to infiltrate literally all institutions.

[Cokrevski] I believe that the prime minister as well should not follow the principle that the party will interfere in everything. With the choice of people in the government, such as myself, [Minister of Justice] Vlado Popovski, Frckovski, and [Minister of Culture] Slobodan Unkovski, a strong group of people was created, a group which will not permit the ubiquitous infiltration by the party. It is natural for the parties to make a breach here and there. Surely this will happen. However, as a basic foundation, as an attitude, this is not acceptable.

[PULS] I was referring to the fact that a certain fear of new single-mindedness is being created.

[Cokrevski] Everyone must be aware of this fear and, in as much as we realize it, try to change the situation as much as one can.

[PULS] Professor, I listen to you carefully and I have a question which I hesitate to pose because of the exaggerated exploitation of "did the speaker of the assembly or did he not give some thought about three important areas, including yours." I raise the question because of what I hear that exclusively applies to your consultations with the speaker and the people around him. I have not heard it mentioned that you had a discussion with the speaker.

[Cokrevski] You should ask the prime minister as to whether the speaker gave this matter some consideration. I have not talked to the speaker. The prime minister has had several discussions this week, but I do not know whether this included that issue. To the best of my knowledge, my name was mentioned on one occasion, but I do not know what the speaker said. I believe that it makes no difference, whether this is official, based on our previous relations and extensive agreement with the speaker, there will be no problem, for I can discuss matters with the speaker differently, more openly, as always in the past, and I hope that such relations will continue in the future. This would benefit him as well. We must not act toward the chairman the way the liberals use to act, groveling. The speaker has his own prestige and image. He is part of the institutions. It would be very dangerous for Macedonia if the state is based on the conception of individuals, a legacy, or the development of a personality who determines the fate of the state. It is the system that must function. I believe that now the speaker should calmly do his work without fear that a young group may seek its independence. That is necessary, for it is to the benefit of Macedonia. So far, because of the time spent and the problem of Macedonia's recognition, which meant the defense of that state, structures were created having different rating, more than is normal. The speaker of the Assembly is the second most important person in the state. On what basis? Throughout the world such people are ordinarily speakers. Do you know who the parliamentary chairman is in other countries? Where does it say that the parliament speaker is the second most important individual in the state, other than in exceptional cases when he replaces the president. Lacking experience, under different circumstances, we created such a situation.

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We do not know if some person does something in violation of protocol this would mean broadening his own space. We have as yet no critical basis for judging the behavior of the people. This is a result of our times. A new time is coming in which everything will find its proper place.

[PULS] Let us go back to the beginning. You used, as you said yourself, big words for the current period, and for everything that has happened so far. Without paraphrasing your statement, do you feel that this a crucial time for the real functioning of the executive authority? Is this one of your reasons for becoming involved?

[Cokrevski] Yes. It is time for all systems to function the way it was conceived. You understood me accurately. I believe that the executive power has been neglected. The main burden and responsibility fall on the executive authorities. That is the reason for my main motivation.

[PULS] On the other hand, quite timidly, ideas are generated on strengthening the speaker's functions, revising constitutional resolutions, and raising the issue of whether we have a parliamentary or a presidential, or a vice-presidential system.

[Cokrevski] The issue is not whether the duties of the president of the Republic are being legitimately strengthened or else the other idea, that perhaps the government should be given greater authority. The problem is for the government to function as conceived, and whether its structures are within the framework of what has been anticipated or deleted. To me this is essential. Everything must be the way it was prescribed. The fact that, even if it has been prescribed, we could try to improve it, is a different matter. It is dangerous when one exceeds the framework given to him by the Constitution and the law. We must develop a system in which the constitutional and legal norms will be respected. That is my thesis.

[PULS] Professor, you are discussing quite openly issues which politicians could either ignore or distort. I heard one of your colleagues, from the so-called liberal period, say as follows: Your colleagues in the faculty caution him about his statements and publicly considering ideas the way you do, asking him to be careful, but despite having suffered, he has not become wiser.

[Cokrevski] Do you think I could suffer again? No, I do not think about this, and that is why I am what I am. To the extent to which my position is clear and pure, to that extent, I have no other ethical concepts and I do not consider the consequences. This is my nature and my concepts of life. Even when it was dangerous, I did not take that into consideration and I could hardly take it now. I say to this that whatever I will be saying should be responsible and principled. Never in my life, even when I had reasons, have I acted with malice towards someone. That is why I can sleep well. I am not engaging in any action to harm someone. My views may not be liked by some, but these are basic concepts stemming from my professional orientation and my intellectual state of mind.

[PULS] For quite some time you lived with the stigma, the objective feeling that you were removed through nondemocratic means and without any real reason. Today we say that changes in political life are one of the democratic attributes of life. On the other hand, in our country, a fall is always frightening and loud. Looking at the middle generation, some people have retained their old beliefs, while others found themselves in a sort of isolation.

[Cokrevski] Depends on the people, on their nature, there is no law to this effect. A decline is an interesting matter. A person who has not found himself in such a situation would lack a significant dimension in the practice of life. If a person has his own inner strength, he could control this situation and within itself find the meaning of a broader analysis, as was my case, as a result of which it can be survived well. A fall is a manifestation which shows how the entire surroundings, relation, people, and interests change. It is at that point that you test them. Naturally, this is to the extent of which you are aware of what is happening. The burden carried by your own ego and your vanity is a different matter. I was lucky enough to experience this and be properly aware of it all. There were stressed situations as well. However, I perhaps may not be able to sleep if people close to me are sick. At the same time, however, I could put my head on the pillow and fall asleep, with a feeling of self-satisfaction. This was as follows: I wanted to express my thoughts and, as the Bible says, "To save my soul." I was at peace. Whether or not what I said was good or bad did not concern me. But failure to mention it would prevent me from sleeping. I felt the failure within myself. This is the most frightening failure. At the time that such things happened, the time of "liberalism," the type of liberalism different from the one today, when I formulated my views, which at that point lead to a pause of the 36th session of the League of Macedonian Communists Central Committee, I was helped by the now deceased Zivko Cingo. He told me the following: "Cokre, the most important thing now is to remain silent. But you must speak out." He felt the need to tell me this. This is the inner world of man. I had my strength, for I did not fail inside within me, I could assess the situation normally and even prevail in

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some opposite situations which occurred and still occur, however, ever since I was appointed to this position. I am confused only when friends reject me. There were two or three people at that time who rejected me as a person. I did not ask anyone, on the level of ideology, to share my thoughts. I remained strong. To this day books are being written about that period, not describing it as it was. Perhaps I too will write a book, although I am unwilling to do so.

[PULS] Those who know you know that your passion is the game of chess. Your most frequent partner is Professor Pelivanov. Let me use chess as a metaphor—assuming that there is a person with whom you do not agree politically and ideologically, do you transfer your feelings to the chess board?

[Cokrevski] I have a special relationship with Pelivanov. We are good friends. Our friendship is based on human traditions. Ideological relations are a separate world, a world in which we respect one another to the maximal extent. We very rarely discuss ideological topics on which we may disagree. However, as sociologists, we frequently share the same views. I respect his support of communist ideology. That is the way he feels. I find this more valorous than switching repeatedly as others do. They change ideologies like their dirty shirts. The essence is to maintain a simple, human approach, and on that level we have remained clean. A great deal of good things happened in our country thanks to pluralism, while the affiliation of the people with different parties had a numerous negative aspect. One of them is the standard of normal political behavior.

[PULS] You spoke of the way people change their political views. You experienced your abandonment by the party and living without it. I do not know what is more difficult, whether this is the way to remain independent or else if independence is conceived as the loss of one's personality.

[Cokrevski] By nature I am the type of person who always wants to know who he is. Times and relation change but one things remains constant: man must follow his convictions.

[PULS] Why is it that you are not a member of a party now? Is there no party to satisfy your views?

[Cokrevski] No single party has met my views and my attitude toward social work. I believe that a party means, on the one hand, a restriction of the personality, although, on the other hand, today a person without a party in our country is nothing. I can freely say this. The fact that some people, like myself, have become part of the government is an exception. If you have no party to back you up, unfortunately, there is very little you can do for your career. That is the way we structured the system.

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Poland: Deputy Defense Minister Gets Assurances From NATO

LD2206201396 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1737 GMT 22 Jun 96

[From the "Wiadomosci" newscast; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka has said that he has received assurances from politicians and military men from the alliance that the West will not give way to any pressure from Russia intended to stop the process of the expansion of NATO. General Klaus Naumann, the chief of the Military Committee of the alliance, has confirmed that the alliance is seeking to contract a special partnership with Ukraine.

As the "Wiadomosci" program has discovered, during the talks with a Russian delegation today, Gen. Naumann decisively replied that no veto by Moscow will be effective.

Minister Andrzej Karkoszka confirmed that the alliance will not negotiate with the Russians any possible delay or suspension of the expansion of NATO.

[Begin Karkoszka recording] That which NATO is concerned about, and we as well, Poland, is the fact of joining the alliance without any prior conditions, so that the credibility of Article Five, ' t on mutual assistance in the case of any attacks, yes, be unconditional, not undermined by anything. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Poland: Deputy Defense Minister Interviewed on NATO Entry

WS2106133796 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 26

[Interview with Andrzej Karkoszka, first deputy to the national defense minister, by Franciszek Nietz; place and date not given: "How Far Are We Still From NATO?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Nietz] Polish diplomats and representatives of the military have recently been very actively promoting our aspirations to join NATO. Let me recall, for example, the "Polish Days" at the military headquarters of the alliance in Mons and the fact that NATO has already begun an individual dialogue with us on our membership in the organization. Does this mean that we can already say that our membership in the alliance has already been unequivocally and definitely decided?

[Karkoszka] As is known, in politics one can never be 100-percent sure. It will be necessary to convince the governments and nations of many countries on our continent and in other parts of the world to accept the decision on enlarging NATO and admitting us to the organization. For this reason, today we still cannot say that we are 100-percent certain that our membership in NATO is a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless, I can say that I am pretty certain that all of the actions we are taking as well as the developments that are taking place indicate that Poland is among those countries whose applications for membership will be considered first.

[Nietz] Let us assume that the West is already convinced that NATO expansion to the east is necessary. Does this mean that it is impossible that the West may change its stand on the issue? Does this mean that some kind of a turnaround is impossible?

[Karkoszka] The process of Poland's integration with NATO cannot be halted. It is, however, possible that it may be slowed. Let us imagine the following scenario: At the December NATO summit meeting, the member states fail to arrive at an agreement on which postcommunist countries will be admitted to the organization and when this will happen. NATO leaders do not meet in the spring and the summer of 1997; at the next ministerial session, the issue is delayed again. To make matter worse, a crisis arises among member states; although this crisis does not impinge on NATO's unity, it does affect the manner in which the alliance is functioning.

[Nietz] What kind of crisis do you have in mind?

[Karkoszka] For example, another crisis in the Balkan states or a conflict on the southern flank of NATO. The issue of enlarging the alliance would then be delayed by, let us say, two years or so. In the meantime, we must make certain decisions regarding investments in the defense sphere, in the area of restructuring our Armed Forces. If in the next three or four years we fail to "hook up" to NATO, then we should start thinking about some kind of an autonomous defense system. However, this alternative would be far worse because it would spell the end of the entire process now under way of building our security on NATO structures. Thus, I do not really expect a turnaround in the West's stand, but there is a possibility of a black scenario, in which our membership in NATO is delayed.

[Nietz] In this black scenario, the country that may play a decisive role is Russia. To some extent, Moscow is prepared to accept the very idea of NATO expansion, but it is now concentrating its diplomatic efforts on trying to delay this process as much as possible.

[Karkoszka] I would not agree with you on this. I believe that Russia's influence on the decisions that will be made in NATO will certainly be significant,

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but it will by no means be decisive. I would even dare say that, if Russia's stand on expansion of the alliance continues to be more and more negative, if Russia takes specific actions to achieve its goal, then the result may be the opposite. I dare say that Russia's influence on our membership in NATO will be of secondary importance. The decisive factor will be the internal situation in NATO member states, especially in the larger countries, such as the United States, Germany, and France. Should there be any delay in admitting new member states to the alliance, it would be primarily a consequence of the internal situation in NATO.

[Nietz] Is the alliance convinced that we have met the criteria that must be met by its member states? Certain doubts are expressed on this issue in the West.

[Karkoszka] Those who would prefer not to see us join NATO may submit all kinds of reservations regarding Poland...

[Nietz] Doubts are also voiced by those Western political and military groups that are favorably disposed toward us.

[Karkoszka] I believe that we have met all of the political and military criteria that NATO submitted to us in its expansion study. It is worth recalling at this point that these criteria, not any others, will decide our readiness to join NATO and will make it possible for us to actually join the organization. The remaining criteria—technical, organizational, and material—are of secondary importance and will not affect NATO's decision on admitting us to the alliance as much as the basic criteria. Poland can most certainly be said today to be a democratic country, and no one can say that we have not satisfied this criterion.

As far as the economy is concerned, we have sound arguments in this area as well. Let me list such things as the uninterrupted, normal functioning of the free-market system and the economic growth, which we have had for a few years now. We do not have any problems with our neighbors, and we certainly are trying to act as a regional stabilization factor.

There is also the issue of civilian control of the Armed Forces. Now that the law on the office of the defense minister has been passed and the team, headed by me, for restructuring the central institutions of the Defense Ministry has been set up, we can be convinced that the manner in which we are resolving the issue of civilian control over the military can actually serve as a model for other countries.

[Nietz] You have depicted a very optimistic picture of our political, economic, and military readiness to join NATO. However, do you not think that we also have certain weak points?

[Karkoszka] What exactly do you have in mind?

[Nietz] Let me give you the example of our Air Force, which is using primarily Russian-made MiG aircraft. It is no secret that, for example, the United States would like very much to see the air forces of the countries that aspire to join NATO use Western-made hardware.

[Karkoszka] There certainly are weak points in the generally positive picture of our readiness to join NATO. One of them is the poor knowledge of foreign languages, which is of considerable importance in military cooperation. We are trying to resolve this problem, but it requires some time. There are also other problems, such as the manner in which our armed forces have been financed so far.

As far as our Air Force is concerned, the most important problem is that we should have electronic, communications, avionics, and navigation systems that are compatible with those used in the West; it is crucial to maintain their interoperability. Russian-made equipment definitely does not meet all of these criteria. Aside from that, if we continue to use MiG's, we will be largely dependent on a country that is not a NATO member state and that is unfavorably disposed to this alliance. In this situation, it is only understandable that NATO is somewhat concerned about the future of our Air Force and that it is encouraging us to start using different equipment.

While the alliance is urging us to change the hardware we are using, it is also pointing to certain specifics. The Americans do not conceal that they would be glad if the Polish Air Force began using their aircraft. We would certainly be only too glad to be able to use such aircraft, but our aspirations must not be greater than our financial capabilities. We cannot afford to buy the latest-generation U.S. fighter planes. I do believe, however, that if we assume that the Polish economy will continue to grow, over a period of several or more than 10 years we can bear the financial burden of purchasing [paying in installments] modern, perfectly airworthy aircraft, with huge fighting potential—F-16's and F-18's. They can be used to carry out all combat tasks both now and in the next 10 years.

[Nietz] You claim that we can afford to buy U.S. planes. However, we would have to spend a huge amount of money. Can we really afford to make such an expensive purchase? This leads me to ask you a more basic question: How much will our membership in NATO really cost us (there is even talk of tens of billions of U.S. dollars)? Can we afford this, and who would

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provide the money? These issues are sort of ignored in our country.

[Karkoszka] It so happens that you cannot accuse me of ignoring this issue. I was the first to bring up the issue of the costs that our integration with NATO entails; incidentally, some politicians and journalists interpreted it as an opinion against quick integration with the alliance. All I wanted to do by making that statement was to stress that our membership in NATO involves not only our rights and a sense of security, but also considerable burdens and duties, including costs.

We are not trying to avoid discussion of the costs of our membership in NATO. We are thoroughly analyzing the studies that have recently been published in the West on the price that Poland and the Visegrad Group countries will have to pay for their membership in NATO. It must be pointed out, though, that those studies are based on various scenarios of enlarging NATO and on data and calculations that are already obsolete. The financial options of membership have not been officially discussed with us yet.

[Nietz] Has the NATO leadership never brought up the subject of costs? Is this issue never raised in discussions with NATO?

[Karkoszka] It certainly is, but usually as casual remarks. This subject will certainly return immediately after NATO decides to invite Poland to join it. I would like to stress at this point something that is sometimes forgotten in discussions on evaluating our membership in NATO: As a result of our entry into NATO, we will have far better results from the investments we will make in the defense sphere, investments we would have to make anyway.

I will not conceal that this will cost us billions [currency not specified]. If, however, we assume that the moment we join NATO we will achieve the minimum interoperability and that the international situation will not deteriorate, then we have enough time to quietly modernize the Polish Armed Forces by ourselves, with the help of our allies. The thing is, however, that this is ignored in our budget, that it is difficult to find something on our membership in the alliance in the "Package 2000" [package of economic policies up to the year 2000 adopted by the government].

It will be indispensable to gain public support for the unavoidable expenditures related to our integration with NATO; it will be crucial to make people realize that some money will just have to be taken out of the taxpayers' pockets.

[Nietz] All the time we are talking about membership in NATO. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to clarify certain terms. What we want to achieve is full membership, without any partial or compromise solutions that Russia, for example, insists on. Is that true?

[Karkoszka] We can accept only full membership, which means that, in line with Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, the allies guarantee that an attack on any one of them is tantamount to an attack on all of them. Therefore, we cannot say in advance, regardless of situations that are hard to predict, that, for example, we do not want to see foreign troops or some specific kind of weapons on our soil. In such a case, the alliance ceases to be an alliance, and we—in advance—deprive ourselves of certain security guarantees.

Just as artificial delaying of our entry into NATO is not acceptable, we cannot accept partial membership; on this issue one cannot attach too much importance to the stand taken by Russia, which has recently been heavily promoting the idea of such a compromised membership of Poland in NATO.

[Nietz] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: President on Gdansk Shipyard Bankruptcy, Concordat

LD2106134096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was the guest of the Polish Radio First Program this morning, said that the decision on the bankruptcy of the Gdansk shipyard was painful therapy but that it provided a chance for a positive outcome. [passage omitted]

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] I would like to say clearly that, in accordance with the Constitution that is in force now, the president has no realistic instrument to enable him to put forward any economic proposals to the shipyard or any other enterprise in Poland.

I believe—and I discussed this with the prime minister and the government—that this decision, the bankruptcy decision, which should result in the formation of new economic units, is painful therapy, but it opens opportunities for a positive outcome in the future. [end recording]

President Kwasniewski also told Polish radio that, in his opinion, the Concordat signed in 1993 was not good and that he would not sign it in its present form.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] My position is clear and I have not changed it. The Concordat signed in 1993 aroused my very firm doubts. I think that in this form, without additional clarification, I could not vote for its ratification. I have said this many times.

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I also believe that a mistake was made at the very outset. Namely, the Concordat was not preceded by a broad discussion. However, we cannot reverse this now. I think that attempts by both Oleksy's and Cimoszewicz's governments to clarify these doubts through contacts with the Vatican were a correct thing to do. In my opinion, a good way to resolve the problem would be to renegotiate the Concordat. However, this proposal has been rejected by the Vatican.

On the other hand, attempts have been made, through various declarations, to clarify what is not just a problem for the Democratic Left Alliance, but a problem for a significant part of society. People are simply worried that unclear regulations can give too much power or may result in too much influence being given to the church hierarchy, and that this may be in breach of the principle of neutrality of the state, the public authorities, and state institutions with regard to religion. [end recording]

Poland: UOP To Collect Strike Infomation by 'Open Methods'

WS2406114396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "PAP, SKI:" "It Was About Open Methods"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Political Consultative Committee, subordinated to the interior minister, yesterday accepted a report that the UOP [Office of State Protection] was going to gather only publicly available information on strikes.

At the request of Janusz Palubicki, a committee member from Solidarity, the committee heard the report by UOP Chief Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski on his instruction regarding monitoring dangers stemming from social unrest and strikes. Col. Kapkowski stated that it was about collecting information by open rather than operational methods.

The committee also discussed a reorganization of the Wisła Military Units, deciding that this should be a limited in number, semiprofessional, and parapolice formation supporting police, border troops, and fire brigades.

Poland: Deputy Foreign Minister on Relations With Japan

WS2406102896 Warsaw Radio RMF FM in Polish 0605 GMT 24 Jun 96

[Interview with Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Mroziewicz by radio commentator Magda Kowalczuk at the Radio RMF FM studio in Tokyo on the "Guest of the Radio RMF FM" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kowalczuk] What subjects prevailed during these Polish-Japanese consultations?

[Mroziewicz] To make it short, as regards bilateral relations, it suddenly turned out that everything is in a perfect state. Whatever subject we raised, either the Japanese nodded their heads and said that everything was all right and clear, or said: We perfectly agree with you. We are also thinking in the same way. The same situation existed when we began to discuss international issues in their broadest, global aspect. In practical terms, the Polish and Japanese Foreign Ministries' stances on problems of world politics are also very similar, if not identical with, those that I had in my documents. So, it suddenly turned out again that we nodded our heads and fully agreed when we discussed regular issues and problems.

[Kowalczuk] Did you raise the issue of Japan's potential support for Poland's accession to NATO?

[Mroziewicz] Yes, we discussed this. Japan has perfect knowledge of the course of discussions and negotiations on NATO expansion that have been carried out over the past four years. Minister Yanai [name as heard] raised a very interesting issue. In particular, we spoke about the presence of U.S. military forces. It suddenly turned out that Minister Yanai's views about the U.S. presence in Asia—in Japan—is very similar to our Polish stance on the issue regarding the need for the presence of U.S. military forces in Europe. In geographical terms, perhaps formulations were different, but the train of thought was precisely identical: To put it succinctly, in military terms, the United States must be present both here and there. [passage omitted]

[Kowalczuk] Were any binding decisions or resolutions adopted during these plenary negotiations on the future development of Polish-Japanese relations? Did you get an impression that the Japanese are somewhat hesitant to develop closer or hasty relations with Poland, where—let us not conceal this—the stabilization of the economic and political situation leaves much to be desired?

[Mroziewicz] No, I think that they are not scared by this. They spoke about this officially, semiofficially, and absolutely unofficially during receptions; but, of course, one should remember and understand proportions—Japan is a big and economically powerful superpower. In these terms, I think that Poland is a middle-sized European country to Japan; this is the reality. But, as regards the Central European region, we are a strategic

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partner for Japan. We also treat Japan as our strategic partner.

Poland: BdP on Proposed Unification on Political Right

LD2206202196 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1737 GMT 22 Jun 96

[From the "Wiadomosci" newscast; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bloc for Poland [BdP] has announced that it will go into the parliamentary elections with its own Christian-Democratic list. It has also criticized the Solidarity Electoral Action [AWS]. The Christian-National Union [ZChN], on the other hand, has supported the AWS and has declared itself to be in favor of the widening of the latter to include the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP].

[Reporter] The BdP, combining the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], the National Party [SN], and Catholic and regional associations, has announced the creation of a program for a well-managed and secure Poland, one that new people and not just party leaders could combine around.

The leaders of the BdP have deemed the creation of the AWS to be an error.

[Begin Leszek Zielinski recording, BdP] It is necessary to unite around acknowledged and confessed ideological and program values and not around a wide, single and, in fact, shapeless in this case, bloc, such as is being proposed to us. [end recording]

The ZChN, on the other hand, has ratified the accord on the creation of the AWS and has proposed that it be widened so as to include ROP. The ZChN feels, contrary to the stance of ROP, that Lech Walesa ought to be the patron of the AWS.

[Begin Marian Pilka recording, ZChN] Such an integration has an opportunity to take the electorates of Walesa, Gronkiewicz-Waltz, and Jan Olszewski. This is the sole Polish state imperative, to create such an electoral bloc. [end recording]

The ZChN feels that it is too early to, as ROP proposes, determine the share of places on the electoral list.

Poland: Minister's Order Said To Destroy Antimafia Departments

WS2106132896 Warsaw NIE in Polish 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Roman Stobnicki: "The Mafia Holiday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his interview to PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, published on 22 May, Polish Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said: "If we lose the war with organized crime now, we will next have to deal with mafia-type crime."

On 20 May, Minister Siemiatkowski introduced to journalists the government's plenipotentiary for combating organized crime, calling him "our Elliot Ness."

On 21 May, Minister Siemiatkowski signed Directive No. 51, which "quashed" the previous organizational system of police forces assigned to fight organized crime. It is as if "our Elliot Ness" told his people to go home and not worry about their jobs....

The Bureau for Combating Organized Crime was established on 1 January 1994 in compliance with Order No. 35/93 issued by the chief police commander. The Bureau comprised three departments of the Main Police Headquarters [KGP] and 12 field departments. Several dozens of policemen received service identification cards from the Main Headquarters and set about recreating Departments for Combating Organized Crime in the field (so-called PZ's).

By a fairly wise concept, these were supposed to be the "elite units—independent of local structures and with a lot of room for action." One of the tasks of the PZ's was combating drug dealers and smugglers, forgerers of money, securities, and documents, and gunrunners and pimps, as well as fighting corruption and unearthing possible links between the underworld and state and self-government officials. A bill, later made into law, on police sting operations was largely designed for the "antimob" cops.

The system proved viable. PZ commanders hired the most talented policemen, luring them with Police Main Headquarters identification cards, a lot of room and freedom of action, unconventional work methods, and higher wages (one or two grades up, which is an additional 1-2 million old zlotys for one person. PZ operatives resembled cops from U.S. movies: They worked on one case for several months without showing up at Headquarters and worrying about writing idiotic reports. As a matter of fact, they were not bound by the borders of voivodships or even, in some cases, states. Soon, their independence, stemming from direct subordination to the KGP Warsaw office, started to yield positive results. Although there are mixed opinions about the efficiency of the PZ's (voiced largely by other cops who failed to join the antimafia units), things apparently were not so bad if the police leadership decided to increase the number of PZ departments in the field.

Siemiatkowski's Order No. 51/96 of 21 May was received by the cops at first with distrust, which was

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later replaced by anger. From the order, it appears that: The Departments Combating Organized Crime were put out of the KGP system and incorporated into the structure of voivodship police headquarters of the first and second categories. Second, PZ agents were offered to go down by one service grade.

Of course, operatives were most pissed off about the less money that they will receive for the same—and one should admit, quite dangerous—work. However, the problem is not only in the cops' compensation....

Through one signature, Siemiatkowski has crossed out the current system of fighting organized crime based on the above independence from local police and self-government authorities. Many billions of zlotys were pumped into this system, which was being built for over two years, from the meager police budget. Meanwhile, the recent decision was explained by...considerations of frugality. So, why the heck did they have to reorganize PZ's two years ago? Why did they promise the agents more money and independence in exchange for efficient work? Why is all this being taken away from them today, without even accusing them of bad work? What is this all about?

The cops resented not so much the minister's order itself as the written explanation, not signed by anyone, of this decision. When you read it, you get the impression that the person who wrote it was either drunk or, at best, had a terrible hangover. First of all, this applies to legal drawbacks, such as the absence of an opinion of trade unions, references to mutually contradictory regulations, wrong terminology, and the lack of knowledge of such obvious facts as the number of voivodship police headquarters where the PZ's operated. We are not providing any details because they are boring and complicated. If Mr. Siemiatkowski wants to know them, let him pore over the documents sent in the past several years by individual PZ's to the director of the KGP Bureau for Combating Organized Crime.

Echoing the policemen, we repeat their question, which seems to strike a bit of a conspiracy chord: Who was interested in screwing up the old system of combating organized crime? Corrupted officials who were afraid that the PZ's would kick their asses? Mafia structures—for obvious reasons?

The most probable answer is very banal. It appears that the order, which was slipped on the minister's desk, was born in the minds of officers from the KGP who had vowed austerity measures and a "streamlining of the KGP" for a long time then. By trotting out Order No. 51 alone, the police bureaucrats will be able to gain favor with the [Interior] Ministry's leadership: Just as we promised, we have eliminated several positions from the KGP, so decorate us with medals. Indeed, everything will look fine in the statistical reports. But, if you take a closer look at them, you will see that they are phony. Instead of the planned reduction of bureaucracy in the KGP, several purely police positions will be moved over to voivodship police headquarters. This is a trick that the bureaucrats invented to keep their asses seated in their current positions. Police Chief Commander Stanczyk himself is said to be one of the authors of Order No. 51. Faced with an imminent dismissal, he has nothing to be afraid of.

The question as to the dangers that Siemiatkowski's order will pose has yet to be answered. The PZ chiefs reckon with the possibility that their operatives may leave their departments for better jobs within the police or quit the force altogether. This is how the antimafia structures, which were being built for two years and are now achieving their first successes, will go to the dogs.

Poland: Police Chief Explains Changes in Fighting Crime

WS2406102796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Jun 96 pp 1, 13

[Report by Jan Ordynski: "Controversy Over the Fight Against Organized Crime"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The interior minister's decision to subordinate police units combating organized crime to voivodship police headquarters has become a target of harsh criticism. [passage omitted]

Interior Minister Siemiatkowski stated that the Main Police Headquarters [KGP] had mislead him, saying that this controversial decision might be changed.

Meanwhile, Police Chief Commander Jerzy Stanczyk flatly disagreed that the decision regarding antiorganized crime units [PZ's] would cripple this section of the police. [passage omitted]

The following is the full statement made by Mr. Stanczyk for RZECZPOSPOLITA:

[Stanczyk] In the second half of 1993, modeled on Western police forces, police units in charge of combating organized crime were set up.

At first, 400 positions at the KGP and 12 headquarters based in large voivodships were created as part of the KGP. Policemen were employed by the chief police commander. However, day-to-day supervision over them was carried out by voivodship police commanders. The positions were filled very slowly with the best people from other departments of voivodship police headquarters [KWP]. As an incentive, all policemen from

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PZ's, being KGP employees, were paid wages according to the KGP compensation plan and had KGP service grades, which are the highest ones. Right after I came to the KGP in March 1995, I accepted a proposal by chiefs of voivodship police headquarters where PZ's are operating to give them even more powers in employing, assessing, and setting tasks. After all, they are masters of their area and, according to the law on the police, a body of state administration. At the same time, we reinforced the antiorganized crime units because I delegated 120 positions from the KGP to the KWP. Some of them were made part of the existing PZ's, with 55 positions used to create new PZ departments in Kielce, Rzeszow, and Zielona Gora.

This year, after new positions are approved, we will set up PZ units in other voivodships. We noticed that Warsaw and other criminal rings started to move to voivodships where those units had not yet been established. The additional units were created in some voivodship police headquarters of the so-called second category (Torun, Bielsko-Biala, Czestochowa, Radom, Opole, and Walbrzych) and later in the third-category KWP's, which are the areas particularly exposed to criminal activities—in the border regions, for example. [passage omitted]

It should also be said that I supervise voivodship antiterrorist companies and prevention units, which could also demand higher wages according to the KGP grades. Besides, no one is capable of thoroughly overseeing 600 servicemen (so many now man the PZ's) while sitting in Warsaw. And their number will soon reach 800. The KGP is supposed to coordinate, organize teamwork, and provide PZ units with technical support, including a computer network, data bases, and operational equipment. In addition, to improve coordination, I set up at the KGP Bureau for PZ issues two new departments. I believe that I have no right to allow a situation where voivodship police chiefs, responsible for security, are not able to ensure this security just because their employees are not subordinated to them. I resolutely protest opinions challenging the right of local police chiefs to engage in combating organized crime. Facts prove otherwise.

Despite all sorts of arguments, this hoopla is about a difference in wages of 60-90 zlotys. As I mentioned, the interior minister has decided that the PZ employees will not lose any of their wages. Notably, 11 voivodship police chiefs who have PZ units supported the proposed changes, while four opposed them, contending that the old wages should be preserved.

Poland: Government Adopts Anti-Inflation Package

WS2106125296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 14

[Article by Jakub Cegiela: "New Government Project; Anti-Inflation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday [18 June] the government adopted the "Directions of Anti-Inflation Measures in the Years 1996-97." The document provides for 17-percent inflation this year and 13 percent in the next. The assumptions of socioeconomic policies for the next year submitted by the Central Planning Office were approved as well. They will provide the basis of the 1997 budget law.

At the end of the first five months of this year, inflation reached the level of 10.3 percent. Krzysztof Mazur, director of the Financial Policies and Analyses Department at the Ministry of Finance, who presented the "Directions...," claims that this is a far better result than last year's. It is, however, 0.5 percent above what the budget law stipulated.

Lower Increase in Salaries and Prices

The anti-inflation package adopted yesterday spells bad news for employees of state companies and the public sector. The government plans to lower their nominal earnings. Last year they grew by more than 30 percent, thus inducing producers and merchants to raise prices.

The Finance Ministry announced that heads of state companies would be very closely watched. Unless they curb salary growth, they will find it difficult to have their debts remitted, repay them in installments, or have their tax payments deferred.

The government did, however, soften the anti-inflation measures it had "directed against itself." The real and not the nominal wages of top government officials will be frozen, despite the Finance's Ministry's earlier claims. Krzysztof Mazur was unable to say why this is so. "I am not a Cabinet member," he said. None of the Cabinet members who could provide an explanation showed up at the news conference.

This year and next the growth of energy, gas, telephone, and bus and train ticket prices will be lower than the projected inflation rate (they should not exceed 12 percent in 1997). The Ministry of Industry is to decide whether the government can back out of the increase of electric energy prices scheduled for July. This will be possible if prices grow as projected. The government will also appeal to self-governments not to introduce any major raises in rent and municipal transportation.

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Monetary Policy

The government is to limit the issue of State Treasury Eurobonds this year to the minimum profit-bearing level ($120-150 million). Next year's issue is to be limited as well. Polish banks will not be entitled to any tax allowances or exemptions for issuing bonds on foreign markets. The finance minister will continue to restrict the issue of short-term Treasury bonds.

The government is determined to cut down subsidies of the budget deficit via the central bank. The value of bonds sold to the National Bank of Poland next year will not exceed 2 percent of budget expenditures. This year there was only one issue.

The government claims it can no longer strengthen the zloty because this is detrimental to exporters and causes the foreign trade deficit to grow. The Council of Ministers is thus postulating that the central bank allow larger fluctuations in the exchange rate of the zloty.

Agricultural Intervention

The government wants to strongly intervene on the agricultural market. The extortionate prices of grain, bread, and flour have to be reduced; therefore, there will be no customs on grain until the end of the year. Additional customs on all other agricultural produce will be introduced only in exceptional cases. Until the end of next year, there will be no customs on corn, soya bean, or hard wheat. "We might even decide to lift customs or introduce customs-free quotas for rape," Mazur announced.

The introduction of suggested prices was put off for the indefinite future. Formally, the government did not back out of the project, but it did admit that today it would be illegal and technically impossible.

The document adopted yesterday also provides for an expeditious development of commodity exchanges and the wholesale market. The Agency for Agricultural Marketing is to gather enough supplies to stabilize the market and establish a national data base on commodity exchanges.

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Romania: President Iliescu Views Relations With Hungary

AU2106191496 Budapest REFORM in Hungarian 24 Jun 96 p 43

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Konrad Matthaeidesz in Bucharest; date not given: "The Future, Rather Than the Past, Is Important"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Matthaeidesz] Mr. President! In your opinion, when can the differences between Romania and Hungary be solved?

[Iliescu] The problems between our two countries derive from the past. However, cooperation between our two armies is outstanding today too, and our economic relations are increasing. The embargo on Yugoslavia hurt our economies, so we have identical positions here too. Romania has the best economic relations with Hungary. Our citizens can quickly and simply cross the border without visa requirements. Most Romanian citizens visit Hungary.

[Matthaeidesz] How do you evaluate our political contacts?

[Iliescu] These relations have improved since the Hornm Cabinet took office. We experienced several manifestations that prove the need for a realistic dialogue. Although such political contacts emerged after our revolution, they lacked a realistic dialogue.

[Matthaeidesz] What about NATO membership?

[Iliescu] We would also like to become NATO members; security is Romania's basic interest. In this spirit, we accepted an active role in peace partnership. We are not a military potential, and we see our security in a broader alliance. A regional alliance cannot represent an alternative.

[Matthaeidesz] What if Romania does not become a NATO member in the first round?

[Iliescu] Getting into NATO is not a competition for us. It would be a mistake to talk about an order of acceptance here. Stressing such an order definitely leads to tension.

[Matthaeidesz] Many people criticize your national minority policy.

[Iliescu] Our national minority policy is of a European level. Our Constitution guarantees this. Education, mother-tongue, religious, and press freedoms are guaranteed. I do not mean by this that there are not any mistakes, just like everywhere else. There are mistakes both with the national minorities and the majority population. Romania is advancing on the road of transformations, and a lot of people are living under very difficult conditions, irrespective of whether they belong to a national minority or the majority. Unfortunately, many politicians make use of this for their own interests, intensify this, and place it on an emotional level. They do not see or say anything if there is no water or adequate schooling in a Romanian village. If this happens in a Hungarian village, that is a national minority issue. Unfortunately, many people become unemployed as a result of privatization and reorganization. If a Romanian gets unemployed, the aforementioned people keep quiet; if a Hungarian gets unemployed, this is a national minority issue. We are convinced that, along with economic development, the national minority problem will decrease and then will cease to exist.

[Matthaeidesz] Is it true that Romanian troops were deployed along the border with Hungary?

[Iliescu] I am not aware of this. Every military movement must be reported in Romania, and we observe the obligations we took upon ourselves.

[Matthaeidesz] What is your opinion about Moldova?

[Iliescu] People having Romanian as their mother tongue are in the majority in Moldova, and this territory belonged to Romania until the Russian tsarist imperialism took it away from us. The Soviets then continued the occupation. We take the realities into consideration. Democracy and the sovereignty of democratic states is recognized, so our relations with Moldova are as good as our relations with the other neighboring countries. Even the idea of a possible border revision would lead to unforeseeable consequences. We are aware of the historical truth, but we are also aware of realities.

[Matthaeidesz] What do you expect from the Russian situation?

[Iliescu] I do not think that they are going to restore the old ways. It is the basic interest of our region to have a democratic regime in Russia. A possible change of the leader cannot restore the antidemocratic regime; the Soviet regime will never return!

Romania: New Law To Declare War on Copyright Pirates

AU2306134196 Paris AFP in English 0440 GMT 23 Jun 96

[By Mihaela Rodina]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Bucharest, June 23 (AFP)—Romania brings in laws Monday to protect copyright

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and stamp out rampant video, disc and data piracy which has discouraged investors.

The legislation which the United States and the European Union have been demanding for years, calls for heavy fines or prison terms of three months to three years for copyright violations.

"It is a new area for Romania and everyone will have to learn to respect or in some cases, take advantage of this law," said Eugen Vasiliu, the director of the Office for Copyright Protection.

After the fall of former communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, the absence of any coopyright legislation, spawned a thriving black market in audio and video cassettes and compact discs, mainly imported from Bulgaria and China and sold for between one and five dollars apiece.

"The first visible effect of the new law will be the disappearance of dozens of vendors of cassettes and CDs from the avenues of Bucharest," Vasiliu said. He said the police were preparing to go into action from Tuesday on the streets of the capital.

However at shops renting pirated video cassettes, staff were undaunted at the prospect of going to prison or paying a fine.

"We will continue renting out unlicensed cassettes, even if we have to do it in secret like in the days of Ceausescu," said Gabi, a young salesman.

Martin Vladimir, the director of the film distribution department was more upbeat: "Thanks to the copyright law, we won't have to worry any more about films being sold on the black market even before they are officially released in Romania."

The law also extends to cable television who will now have to pay to broadcast foreign programmes which up to now they have retransmitted free and without permission.

"This will mean increasing monthly subscriptions which now cost three dollars but we have decided to respect the law, even if we lose customers," said Traian Anton who runs one of the estimated 200 television stations operating in Romania. [passage omitted]

The mood was less optimistic among licensed dealers in computer software.

"The law is good but change will not come for two or three yars because it will take time to educate the users. Even if we know our programmes are being pirated, we cannot take everyone to court," said Razvan Petrescu of the firm Ciel.

Romania: Government Criticized for Not Raising Fuel Price

AU2206194996 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 18 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by V.A.: "The World Bank Ultimatum: If the Government Does Not Increase the Price of Energy, Foreign Financing Will Stop"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The World Bank gave an ultimatum to the Vacaroiu government: if, by 20 June, it does not increase the price of energy, foreign financing to Romania will stop. So far, the price of fuel had been set in accordance with the evolution of the exchange rate when winter is over. This year, due to local elections, the price increase was postponed; nonetheless, in spite of what one might assume, the consumers lost as a result of having the price of gasoline and other fuel unchanged. Why is that? Because the difference between the real price of energy and that paid by the consumer was subsidized from taxes. Moreover, maintaining the price of energy below its real value favored waste. The unjustified imports increased, a fact that tilted the trade balance even further.

The deficit of the current costs put increasingly higher pressure on the rate of the national currency, the leu, which has devaluated a lot lately. The increase of the dollar's exchange rate contributed to further losses in the oil sector, which are also a burden on the budget and the banking system. And all this has happened because the ruling party wanted to gain a few more votes in the local elections. The price of those votes did not matter ...

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Federal

FRY: Kosovo Serbs, Montenegrins Concerned About Their Future

LD2206185796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1538 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 22 June (SRNA)—Participants in today's meeting of the Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosmet, which was held at Gracanica monastery and organized by the Serbian Resistance Movement [SRM], demanded that an internal Serb consensus be reached and the national interest clearly defined before any solution to the problem of Kosovo was proposed.

Since Serbian President Milosevic did not answer the invitation to come to Kosovo and present his views on how to solve regional problems, the meeting began with a prepared address to the state leader.

The address, read by writer Aco Rakocevic, said that since the Kosovo nightmare, terrible things had happened in the Serb Krajinas and that they did not befall "someone far away" but happened "under our roof, on our doorsteps and hearths; they happened to our closest kin."

"Having seen the experience of our brothers in the Krajinas, we are anxious not to suffer the same fate," the Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovo say. They expect an answer to the question: "What will happen to Kosovo-Metohija, and in relation to this to Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro?"

"One often hears that Kosovo-Metohija should be the third Yugoslav republic, that it should be handed to the Shiptars [Albanians] or, at best, divided between Serbia and Albania. This is why the Serbs and Montenegrins want to know whether in Dayton or somewhere else something was decided which we are unaware of."

Participants in today's meeting refuse the possibility that their fate could be decided without them. They said that "even cattle would, if they could, ask the owner whether they were going to be sold or slaughtered." The Serbs of Kosovo refuse "to be cattle peacefully led to the slaughter, without knowing what awaits them."

Even at a time when Albanian secessionists do not recognize the Serbian state, defile it in the eyes of Europe and the world and kill its policemen as Serbia watches calmly, the Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovo are looking for the possibility of coexistence between "the wolf and the sheep."

The opening speech received full support while opposition was expressed to any partition of Serbia. It was pointed out that Kosovo must not be given away.

The aim of the [Kosovo] Serbs and Montenegrins is to preserve their human dignity and ethnic identity and to contribute to coexistence through a civilized dialogue with the Albanians. However, those solutions contrary to the national interest will be rejected.

All the ruling party's attacks on the SRM were rejected and it was pointed out that the SRM is just a patriotic movement which wants to help resolve problems and exert influence on the current authorities to solve them faster.

The meeting decided that the SRM would register itself with a competent court not as a party, but as a movement.

The main committee was also elected to coordinate activities until the SRM founding assembly, planned for this autumn, when the new SRM leadership will be elected.

Serbia

Serbia: Party Urges Belgrade To Discuss Serbs Leaving Kosovo

LD2206175396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1448 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 22 Jun (SRNA)—The Serbian People's Assembly Party has warned that the issue of Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija] is being daily debated in the media, while the federal parliament remains silent about the problem.

"While a new exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo is taking place owing to undiminishing Muslim terror, the authorities in Belgrade remain silent and the Serbs in Serbia argue and create divisions," the party's statement says.

The party points out that the issue of Kosovo shows Serbia to be not a sovereign state, but under an international protectorate.

"At the entrance to the recently opened U.S. Information Center in Pristina, located in an exclusively Albanian quarter, one can see a plaque that says 'USA-Kosovo,' not 'USA-Serbia,' or 'USA-Yugoslavia,'" the statement says.

Serbia: Military Production Workers Threaten General Strike

AU2106134896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 96 p 11

[Article by Z. Radovanovic: "'Gunsmiths Favor Leaving Serbian Trade Unions']

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kragujevac—Unless the long-awaited statement about the Yugoslav Army's

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willingness to sign 70 million dinars worth of business agreements with the factories of the special purpose industry in Serbia is issued by the Serbian Government by noon, the trade union organization of this industrial branch will propose at today's session of the republican committee of the Metal Workers' Trade Unions that the workers in the Serbian metal complex go on general strike. Not immediately, of course, but within the legally prescribed deadlines.

This is what Zoran Nedeljkovic, president of Zastava Namenski Proizvodi trade unions, told NASA BORBA yesterday. He added that, due to the long-lasting production and business crisis of the Serbian special purpose industry, the patience of "the gunsmiths" has reached its limits. On the other hand, he says, they have been waiting for the above Yugoslav Army decision, which should only represent emergency aid to the special purpose industry since February this year. Following several delays, it was expected that the decision will finally be announced this week, on Tuesday, to be precise. As the deadline expired and the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Army did not make a sound, the workers in the special production factories, according to Nedeljkovic, have nothing to wait for anymore.

"If our proposal of a general strike is rejected at today's session of the republican metal workers trade unions, we shall start an initiative that the trade union organizations of all special purpose factories leave the Serbian trade unions and affiliate themselves directly with the federal trade unions. All this is particularly because the federal and not the republican government is in charge of special purpose production, Nedeljkovic says. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Opposition Says Karadzic Candidacy 'Legitimate'

LD2106142696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Jun (SRNA)—Slobodan Vuksanovic, spokesman for the Democratic Party, said at a news conference in Belgrade today that the possible candidacy of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, in the forthcoming elections is completely legitimate.

"President Karadzic has so far shown sufficient responsibility to the people he leads and has always placed their interests above his own," Vuksanovic said.

"The truth about the situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is gradually coming out, much delayed and after big Serb sacrifices, to be sure," the Democratic Party spokesman said.

Serbia: Autonomy 'Optimal Guarantee' for E. Slavonia Serbs

AU2206202096 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 96 p 7

[Commentary by Radivoje Petrovic: "What Can Europe Guarantee Serbs in Croatia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What guarantees should the international community and Croatia offer Serbs in the Srem and Baranja region to avoid a repetition of what has happened in earlier cases following a UN mission?

This question has long been the subject of political debate as it is the key to Serb-Croat relations as a whole, and stability throughout the region depends on it. In his interview by the widely read weekly paper DER SPIEGEL, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic expressed how important it is to regulate these relations, explicitly displaying a willingness to start a new chapter between Belgrade and Zagreb in which equality would be the most important principle. At the same time, EU leaders Santer and Dini, during their recent visit to the countries of the former SFRY, assessed that "Belgrade is the closest to the EU," stating that Croatia has failed to respect many universal principles of the Union.

Bearing in mind this disobedience by Zagreb, it is no wonder that the question posed at the beginning of this text was also raised at the latest session of the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva. Everything that has happened in Croatia in the last few months proves that Franjo Tudjman and the team surrounding him are hardly willing to give up their approach to solving the crisis, which makes very few guarantees for Serbs.

In that sense, what recently happened in the Croatian capital, where the roundtable organized by the Croatian Helsinki Committee on the position of Serbs in this former Yugoslav republic was practically made impossible, is very illustrative. The fact that the nearly 300 invited intellectuals, mostly Croatian, did not show up confirmed the impression, formed long ago, that it is not only the official authorities in Zagreb who are against different treatment for the Serbs. Various Croatian opposition parties have already shown that they agree with the regime when it comes to this issue, and after the unsuccessful session of the Helsinki Committee, it seems that a majority of intellectuals have joined that bloc.

Under such circumstances, a demand for autonomy for the Serbs in the Srem and Baranja region appears to be a result of the natural instinct for survival. That would be the optimal model which would satisfy all principles and assert the authority of the peace mediators and of the world organization. Although for a good part of the

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Croatian public, there have been attempts to present this aspect of the Serbian diplomatic struggle as yet another "machination by Belgrade," it seems that in the authoritative political centers of Europe, there is an ever increasing understanding of the necessity for more effective protection for the Serbs.

At the risk of raising false hopes for a relatively quick realization of autonomy for the local population, it is a fact that the situation has begun to develop in an encouraging direction. This first relates to the role and activities of UN High Administrator Jacques Klein.

Announcing that the mandate of the UN temporary administration for the Srem and Baranja region would certainly be prolonged and that demilitarization would be complete by 21 June, Klein emphasized:

"I do not believe they (Croatia) have a clear plan for what to do after the UN mission in this region ends," he said, rejecting any possibility of a forceful solution of these questions.

Aside from the aforementioned interview of the Serbian president, what happens on the terrain speaks about the presence of goodwill to solve the key question of Serb-Croat relations peacefully. Local Serb authorities readily cooperate with UNTAES [UN Temporary Administration for Eastern Slavonia] representatives and give their full support to the seemingly tiny but extremely important steps toward reestablishing the torn communications with Croatia and, as the sources of POLITIKA confirm, they are about to finalize the autonomy project. As we have discovered, it will be sent to several relevant European addresses, among the first of which will certainly be the leadership of the EU and the head of German diplomacy, who was the one who suggested this model and initiated the whole process.

For the Serb population in the Srem and Baranja region, the question of autonomy as the optimal guarantee for a safe and equal life has exceptional importance. For European and world mediators for the restoration of peace in this region, it has become an indicator of the authority of the international community and of its possibilities for ensuring basic human rights for Serbs in Croatia. If one were to add up the efforts of world peacemakers to make Croatia create conditions for the return of the displaced people from Krajina and western Slavonia, the picture of Serb-Croat relations would become more complete.

Therefore, every move toward their full normalization and the establishment of long-term stability after the departure of international civilian and military mediators should be welcome. Local authorities in Vukovar express their goodwill daily, and Belgrade does so continuously in compliance with the role it has played in this process. The world organization has also started doing in the person of Jacques Klein. It is now Zagreb's turn, or the turn of those who would make it respect EU principles and the human rights of Serbs in this part of Croatia.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Bulatovic Reportedly Hesitating About U.S. Visit

AU2406101796 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 96 p 7

[Report by R.M.: "Waiting for a Word From the Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following Prime Minister Djukanovic's three consecutive trips to the United States, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic is also getting ready to make the trip across the Atlantic. As MONITOR has learned from the sources very close to the Montenegrin Government, President Bulatovic could depart for New York, where he is supposed to formally open the Montenegrin trade mission, at the beginning of July.

The agreement on the opening of the Montenegrin trade mission in the United States was reached during one of Prime Minister Djukanovic's visits to Washington. The chief of mission will supposedly be Mr. Ratko Knezevic, a Montenegrin businessman currently working in London and a special adviser to the Montenegrin prime minister.

MONITOR has learned that President Bulatovic had not finally decided yet whether to travel to the United States now or wait a little. The true motives of Bulatovic's hesitation, however, are not known. According to some, as the highest authority in Montenegro, Bulatovic finds it awkward to go to the United States only a few weeks after Djukanovic and not be photographed together with President Clinton, as the prime minister was. Closer to the truth is perhaps the story that the Montenegrin president has not been given "the green light" from the Belgrade court yet and he would not dream of becoming an entry in Mira Markovic's DUGA diary.

Montenegro: SKPJ Announces Electoral Coalition With JUL

AU2106195396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1319 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 21 June (BETA)—Rade Lakusic, chairman of the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ) of Montenegro, said today that this party would enter a

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coalition with the Yugoslav United Left [JUL] in the coming elections in Montenegro.

"The Yugoslav committee of the League of Communists is autonomous in making decisions on when it will take actions alone, and when it will enter a coalition," Lakusic said at a news conference, whose statement is carried by MONTENA-FAX.

He added that the SKPJ is one of the founders of the JUL, "a movement which fosters humanist and socialist ideas that are still not asserted enough in Montenegro."

According to Lakusic, the SKPJ does not have time to wait for the JUL to finish "some processes," and following its positive determinations, it is undertaking the realization of its goals.

Montenegro: Communists Say Hague Has No Right To Try Karadzic

LD2106184196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1450 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 21 June (SRNA)—The Hague tribunal has no right to bring Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic to trial nor can it conduct proceedings against them because they fought to allow the Serb people living in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain within Yugoslavia, it was said at today's news conference organized by the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ).

In the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war only one side—the Serb—was blamed and that is why the Montenegrin communists do not recognize the war crimes tribunal in the Hague, "as it is a political tribunal putting one nation on trial."

The SKPJ in Montenegro believes that no one in the area of the former Yugoslavia has the right to even contemplate the possibility of extraditing to The Hague the people who fought to remain within Yugoslavia.

At the news conference, the communists criticized the newly adopted law according to which Montenegro has 14 electoral constituencies.

According to them, the new electoral system will enable the ruling party in this republic to manipulate around 15 percent of the votes of the whole electorate.

Privatization, which is in full swing in this region, and the recently adopted laws allowing limitless foreign investment serve the interests of the ruling elite, communists say.

According to them, Montenegro will soon be transformed into a colony of the large capitalist countries.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Interior Minister Vows To Curb 'Terrorism'

AU2306161896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukasin Jokanovic, federal minister of internal affairs, spoke in the Sunday at 10 program about the recent terrorist attack by separatists in Kosovo-Metohija. Here is what he said.

[Begin Jokanovic recording] With these terrorist attacks, the separatist movement is trying to maintain a tense situation and create additional tensions in Kosovo-Metohija. The stabilization of the situation does not suit them at all, especially after the international community has taken a clear stand that Kosovo-Metohija is an internal matter of Serbia and thus Yugoslavia.

Living together does not suit them. Living in peace and equality does not suit them. They think that they can accomplish their well-known separatist aims with such actions.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, you must rest assured, will take all the necessary measures to find and punish the perpetrators of these terrorist actions. I believe that the international community is increasingly clear what kind of terrorist forces and groups we are dealing with. It must also be clear that their method is terrorism, and this terrorism must be certainly be stopped.

I would also like to say that their actions are causing tensions among the Serbs, Montenegrins, and other citizens in Kosovo-Metohija, and further afield, in Serbia. However, they should bear in mind that this is part of the strategy and aims of the terrorists.

Therefore, terrorism must be stopped. In doing so we will enjoy the full support of the international community. [end recording]

Kosovo: Rugova Denies Existence of Liberation Organization

AU2106194096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1247 GMT 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 21 June (BETA)—Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Kosovar Albanians, categorically rejected today the possibility of the existence of an organization called the Kosovo Liberation Organization, which has claimed responsibility for the recent attacks on members of the Serbian police in Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica and for the attacks carried out in February and April.

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"We do not have any information on the existence of such an organization," Rugova said at a news conference.

He assessed as insignificant faxes and letters that this organization had reportedly sent to BBC radio and Deutche Welle, and also to the editorial boards of some Albanian-language Pristina newspapers, but he said that their goal was "to increase tensions in Kosovo and impede the settlement of the Kosovo issue by political means."

Rugova has accused the Serbian police of launching a large-scale campaign of repression in Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica, within which a number of Albanians have been maltreated and imprisoned after one Serbian policeman was killed and two wounded.

Those still unsolved cases serve as a pretext to the Serbian authorities for violence, repression, and increasing tensions in Kosovo, Rugova assessed.

He called for restraint from citizens and urged the Serbian police to stop provocations and prevent a deterioration of the situation.

Rugova said that Serbian propaganda had used these still unsolved cases to label the ethnic Albanians according to an old recipe.

The chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo also said that such cases were hampering the settlement of the Kosovo issue and destabilizing the situation in the region and called on the international community, particularly the Western countries, to take preventative steps and increase their presence in Kosovo.

Rugova pointed out that the Kosovar Albanians will not be taking part in the coming federal elections "because they have already had their elections," and announced that they will be holding "their elections" again.

Kosovo: Rugova Calls For 'Increased International Presence'

AU2206160696 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No. 905 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova applauded Friday [21 June] a recent statement by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake that the United States' attention is focused on Kosova, noting that the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina bespeaks that attention.

During a meeting earlier this week with American Albanians, Clinton's aide was quoted as saying a special envoy for Kosova may be identified in due time.

In a press conference in Prishtina today (Friday), President Rugova availed himself of the opportunity to say he welcomed the position of the European parliamentarians (Mendeluce, Habsburg, etc.) on the need for the European Union to address the Kosova issue more seriously, the right of the people of Kosova to self-determination, as well as the need for the holding of an internationally-sponsored conference on Kosova.

President Rugova called for an increased international presence and preventative measures in Kosova and an immediate end to Serbian repression and violence. Last week saw 22 Serbian police interventions and scores of Albanians maltreated and families raided on, mainly under arms searches pretexts, he said, noting that Albanian teachers, human rights and political activists have borne the brunt of Serbian regime's crackdown.

The Kosova president noted that a spate of Serbian regime violence against Albanians followed the recent shooting incidents in Podujeve and Mitrovice, in which one Serb policeman was shot dead and two others wounded in as yet unclear circumstances. "These incidents have been used as a pretext by the Serbian regime to step up repressive practices (against Albanians) and further increase tensions in Kosova," President Rugova said, and added that the Kosova leadership has called "on the citizens of Kosova to self-restraint."

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said Serbian police should bring an end to its repressive practices, calling for the police and Serb civilians to stop provoking the Albanians of Kosova.

The April shooting incidents were exploited by the Serbian propaganda to accuse and lay the blame on Albanians while the incidents themselves have never been clarified, President Rugova remarked, and added: "In themselves, such incidents are aimed at undermining a political settlement to the Kosova issue and destabilizing the whole region."

"We have no information on the existence of such an organization," President Rugova said when asked by the BBC correspondent to comment reports that the so-called Liberation Army of Kosova (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, UCK) has claimed responsibility for the recent shooting incidents in Kosova. "Those faxed letters have no identity or validity whatsoever," Dr. Rugova said, noting that any individual may be able to do that: fax such a letter.

President Rugova reiterated the now familiar position that an independent and neutral Kosova, open to both Albania and Serbia, is the optimal solution, in tandem with an interim international civil administration to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the Kosova issue.

The Albanians will not participate in the elections of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia late this year, President

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Rugova said in reply to a question by the Croatian HINA news agency's correspondent. "We have had our own elections, we have created our own democratic order in Kosova. Naturally enough, Albanians will not participate in such ('Yugoslav') elections," president of the Republic of Kosova said.

Replying to what reporters called "internal Serbian frictions" in the wake of calls from local Serb groups from Kosova for Serbian President Milosevic to come to Kosova (on Saturday, 22 June), President Rugova said those internal Serbian strives come at a time the Kosova issue has attained considerable international affirmation. "These strives and frictions may be interrelated with a rising Serbian propaganda and a rude rhetoric which does not contribute to the prospects for a political settlement to the Kosova issue," President Rugova concluded.

Kosovo: Police Chief Blames Albanian 'Separatists' for Tension

AU2206170296 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chief of the Serbia-Montenegro police, Vukasin Jokanovic, told reporters in Belgrade "the (Albanian) separatist movement has been striving to maintain a tense situation and even further increase tensions in Kosova." He said the "separatists" do not like "coexistence" and life in "peace and equality," but "resort to terrorist acts in their separatist objectives." The Serbian police chief Vukasin Jokanovic, notorious for his role in the crackdown on the Kosova federal status in the former Yugoslavia, said terrorism is cause of concern for Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosova and vowed to undertake "all measures" to track down the perpetrators of the terrorist acts, for which, as he said, he would enjoy the "support of the international community."

A similar rhetoric was used yesterday in Prishtina by the vice-chairman of the Party for Serb Unity (led by Serbian criminal-accused Zelkjo Raznajtovic-Arkan), Borisav Pelevic. He said bluntly: "Behind these acts (the recent shooting incidents in Kosova) is the LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] leader, Ibrahim Rugova."

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has also routinely accused "Albanian terrorists" for the latest incidents in Kosova.

Hundreds of Albanians, including the leader of the UNIKOMB [National Unity] Party Ukshin Hoti, have been sentenced by the Serbian regime to long prison terms for their political activities in the past few years. Quite a number of them have even been branded "terrorists" by the regime.

While not a single Kosova Albanian has been convicted under substantiated terrorism charges so far, President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia said in a recent interview with the German DER SPIEGEL there are no political prisoners in Kosova (sic!). The argument goes, in Milosevic's weird terminology, the Albanian political activists who strive for Kosova's independence by peaceful means are terrorists!

Kosovo: Serbian Resistance Movement Opposes Dividing Kosovo

AU2206183896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1448 GMT 22 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 22 Jun (BETA)—A protest meeting of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, organized by the Serbian Resistance Movement, was held in the Gracanica Monastary near Pristina today.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had been invited to the meeting, which was attended by several hundred citizens, but he did not appear. He had been invited by the representatives of the Serbian Resistance Movement several times and had been sent a petition signed by some 40,000 Serbs and Montenegrins.

Despite the absence of the Serbian president, the participants in the protest meeting were read the letter that had been sent to him. This was then followed by a lively debate inside the monastery.

One of the leaders of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in Kosovo, Milorad Jevtic, stressed that those who advocate the independence or division of Kosovo should openly be told that this would never happen.

"In Kosovo, it is even better to cohabitate with others than have a life offered by the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and JUL [Yugoslav Left]," Jevtic stressed.

After the debate, the meeting decided to conduct the work of the Serbian Resistance Movement official by setting up a committee of 70 members, which should prepare the founding of a Pan-Serbian assembly by next fall.

Kosovo: Kosovo Serbs Threaten To Seal Milosevic's 'Fate'

LD2406134196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1009 GMT 24 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 Jun (SRNA)—By ignoring an invitation by 43,000 Serbs in Kosovo and failing to appear at their meeting in Gracanica, Serbian President Milosevic "has made himself a coward in the

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eyes of the Serb people", Miroslav Solevic, one of the leaders of the Serbian Resistance Movement in Kosovo-Metohija, has said.

"Because of Milosevic's failure to appear at the meeting, the Serbs in Kosovo will seal his political fate," the 'Dnevni Telegraf' quotes Solevic as threatening.

"The Serbian president undertook a courageous step by coming to Kosovo in 1987, and the promise he gave then made him a national hero and set up his extremely speedy political ascent," Solevic said.

"Now, however, he has gambled away the enormous trust this people put in him. People wanted Milosevic to explain which of his public promises he had fulfilled and what he signed in Dayton in relation to Kosovo."

Solevic pointed out that 250,000 Serbs in Kosovo were capable of defending the region successfully, regardless of NATO troops stationed in [the Former Yugoslav Republic of] Macedonia.

"I would be very worried if the defense of Kosovo were to be conducted from Belgrade—in that case we would suffer certain defeat," Solevic said.

Kosovo: Rugova's Adviser Indicted for Disobeying Serb Ruling

AU2206171296 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dr. Alush Gashi, President Rugova's adviser for health care issues, was ordered to report today (Friday) [21 June] before the Serbian-run Magistrate Court in Prishtina [Pristina].

Dr. Gashi, formerly dean of the Medical Faculty of the Prishtina University, has been accused for having allegedly "abused office and disobeyed a ruling of the Serbian Assembly in 1990." Namely, according to the indictment, in 1990 when Dr. Alush Gashi as then the dean of the Prishtina Medical Faculty had opposed the enrollment of Serb students with the Faculty without having to take an entrance examination.

The defending lawyers, Destan Rukiqi and Bajram Kelmendi, told the court today that the indictment of Alush Gashi lacks legal grounds and is in opposition with the Serbian legislation itself. Firstly, Alush Gashi is to face charges pursuant to Article 21, Paragraph 1, of the former Penal Code of Serbia, and secondly, if cases are not dealt within three years they are dismissed. Moreover, the Serbian-run Court in Prishtina has issued an arrest warrant to Dr. Alush Gashi without having earlier been delivered a summons to appear before the court, the lawyers said. If sentenced, a defendant may be convicted from 3-5 years in prison.

Destan Rukiqi, told KIC [Kosova Information Center] today that by re-activating political trials of 90's the Serbian regime aims at intimidating the Kosova Albanians involved in political parties and institution of Kosova. The trail of Dr. Alush Gashi will resume on 1 July 1996.

Kosovo: LDK Activist 'Harassed' for Meeting U.S. Officials

AU2206165996 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 21 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Qaush Krasniqi, presidency member of the LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] branch at Junik of Decan [Decani] was ordered to report at the Serbian police station in Decan on 19 June.

The LDK Information Commission in Decan said Mr. Krasniqi was questioned and harassed for several hours in connection with a meeting he had had with officials of the Belgrade-based U.S. Embassy during a visit they had paid to the village earlier.

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